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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Introduction 
This research is an attempt to understand the change in governance at two different levels 
(see figure 1). One is the level of the field of facilities services. The supportive services and 
processes (e.g; cleaning, repairs & maintenance, communications, catering, relocations, etc.)  
are called facilities services and the management of these processes and services is known as 
facilities management. The field level analysis examines the changes in the governance at a 
wider level instead of a particular firm or an interfirm level. The field includes different 
organizations such as suppliers of facilities services, service providers, professional 
associations, consultants, researchers & educators, facilities managers and the clients 
(organizations) of the service providers or suppliers. At this level, it has been investigated 
why and how the governance is changing in the field of facilities services in the Netherlands. 
A new governance form labeled as Integrated Facilities Management (IFM) has emerged 
during the last 10 year or so. IFM means that both the execution and management of the 
facilities services are outsourced to a single service provider.  
 
There are different definitions of governance. According to Williamson (2000) governance is 
an effort to craft order, thereby to mitigate conflict and realize mutual gains. Jones et al. 
(1997) state that organizational governance is about the mechanisms used by firms in 
coordinating economic activity. Governance has also been defined as the package of 
practices used to regulate lateral relations that extend organizational boundaries or that of 
organizational units. It includes the notion of control, but is a wider concept (Minnaar and 
Vosselman, forthcoming; Nooteboom 1999). In this thesis, governance refers to the different 
‘packages of practices’ that regulate lateral relations regarding the execution and the 
management of facilities services, both at field level and at the level of intra- and interfirm 
organizational relationships. At the level of intra- and interfirm organizational relationships 
the notion of governance is strongly connected to that of management control, where the 
focus is on influencing managers of and in the interfirm relationships in order to enhance 
effectiveness and efficiency (Minnaar and Vosselman, forthcoming).  
 
















































Prior research on organizational governance to a substantial extent focuses on understanding 
changes in organizational design, particularly on changes between markets, hierarchies and 
networks (Thornton, Jones, and Kury 2005). However, institutional logics at wider societal 
levels shape the governance designs and strategies for organizations (Greenwood and 
Hinings 1993). The field1 level analysis focuses on these wider institutional logics, 
particularly on the role of some institutional entrepreneurs in the process of the social 
construction and institutionalization of IFM. As the thesis proceeds, it will be shown how the 
institutional entrepreneurs have shaped (and are still shaping) the governance in the field of 
facilities services by constructing IFM as an important contemporary ‘package of practices’. 
The thesis will demonstrate how the ‘logic of rationalization’ (cost reduction/savings) has 
strongly influenced the field of FM in the Netherlands over the last three decades. This logic 
is connected to societal logics of markets and corporations wherein the focus is on increasing 
shareholders’ value and profits. Influential academic research (e.g informed by theories on 
the value chain and on lean and mean production) developed over time also strengthened the 
‘logic of rationalization’. Although an alternative ‘logic of professionalism’ also exists in the 
field of FM, the ‘logic of rationalization’ has no doubt been dominant over the last three 
decades. The thesis will show that different forms of governance may survive and thrive 
because of their consistency with one dominant institutional logic in the organizational field. 
This deviates from prior research (e.g; Lounsbury and Crumley 2007) which attributes the 
emergence of different practices to change in institutional logics. This research shows that a 
new practice can emerge without change in the dominant institutional logics.  
 
The logics and the packages of practices prove to be spread across the field by international 
organizations. The international organizations, either as service providers, as client 
organizations or as consultants, are field-crossing actors because they simultaneously exist at 
                                                 
1 The term field or field level or organizational field means the domains of organizations that in aggregate constitute a 
recognized area of institutional life, such as key suppliers, resource and product consumers, regulatory agencies and 
other organizations producing similar services and products (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) or a community of 
organizations that interact frequently and fatefully with each other (Scott, 1995) or institutional logics or broad belief 
systems (Friedland and Alford, 1991).  But more than just a collection of influential organizations, a field is the center 
of common channels of dialogue and discussion. This important clarification leads to a conception of organizational 
fields that diverges from that dominant in the literature. A field is not formed around common technologies or common 
industries, but around issues that bring together various field constituents with disparate purposes (Hoffman, 1999, 
p.352). In this research organizational field comprises all the organizations which are somehow or the other connected 
to IFM (a governance form).   
 





different spaces / levels such as organizational fields, national fields and the transnational 
field. This field crossing capacity enables these actors to spread the logics, ideas and 
practices across the fields. Particularly, the international service providers and consultants are 
the institutional entrepreneurs who shape the field by using the professional associations and 
other networks as platforms through conferences, seminars, market reports and other 
publications.  
 
Field research analysis investigates the how and why of governance by drawing upon two 
different concepts of rationalities (instrumental rationality and institutional rationality) 
discussed in the institutional theory in sociology-ITS (e.g; Lounsbury 2008). Institutional 
entrepreneurship assumes the existence of instrumental rationality. Instrumental rationality 
displays and focuses the active agency of institutional entrepreneurs in response to 
institutional pressures. It is contrasted with institutional rationality that displays and 
emphasizes the influence of institutional logics on the cognition and actions of the actors 
(The concepts of these rationalities will be further explained in the coming chapters).   
 
The second level of analysis is the level of a specific interfirm relationship. The thesis 
investigates how governance is shaped when an organization adopts the new institution of 
governance (IFM in this case) and enters into a long term interfirm relationship. At the level 
of the relationship between a buyer and a seller the transactions have to be controlled and 
trust may play an active role. The field level research in this thesis reveals that top 
management is mostly interested in costs savings and flexibility and that they are of the 
opinion that an adoption of IFM as one of the few institutionalized governance choices 
available at the field level will indeed realize cost savings and flexibility. The adoption 
decision may or may not result in the successful and durable relationship between the 
contracting organizations. The research will reveal that local managers (called boundary 
spanners in this research), their involvement in the contracting process and their commitment 
to the relationship, and the institutional environment may be very important in the 
development of a longstanding trusting relationship. It will be demonstrated that the creation 
of trust apparently gives parties a feeling of being free from the influence of explicitly 
designed controls such as contracts and performance management system. Yet, trust proves 





to produce an implicit (invisible) control. This implicit control is tacit and consists of a frame 
that, at the one hand, defines the situation in the relationship as a cooperative one in which 
short term self-interest is subordinate to the interest of the relationship and at the other hand, 
guides decisions and actions by the parties involved. Based on this research work it will be 
shown how trust may be an implicit control structure that positively influences the behavior 
of boundary spanners. It may also influence and change the explicit control systems. 
Together and in interaction, the explicit control structure and implicit control structure 
govern the relationship. Further implicit control or trust may emerge and develop through the 
enactment of either explicit control systems or voluntary actions of boundary spanners. 
However, the field study also reveals how a trust-based relationship developed over years can 
turn into a power-based relationship and, thus, how an implicit control structure may rupture 
and emphasis may shift to explicit controls. The role, shared understandings, norms and 
values of boundary spanners prove to be critical to the shaping of the interfirm relationship. 
The historical development of the interfirm relationship had consequences for the governance 
of that relationship. 
 
1.2 Research Objectives and Questions 
The aim of this research is to understand the emergence and development of a new institution 
of governance (IFM) at the level of the field of facilities services in the Netherlands and then 
the adoption and further implementation / development of such an institution of governance 
at the level of an interfirm relationship, with a particular focus on the role of management 
control and trust. The role of accounting either as a part of control systems (such as 
contracting, performance measurement, incentive system, etc.) or as a trust building device is 
also implicated in the inquiry. The research questions are as follows: 
 
1- Why and how is governance changing in the field of facilities services in the 
Netherlands? 
2- How is IFM, as an institution of governance, socially constructed at field level and what 
particularly is the role of institutional entrepreneurs? 





3- How is governance in a specific interfirm relationship shaped through the development 
and interaction of control and trust, and how is accounting implicated in that 
development? 
 
In order to address the above research questions, first a field level analysis was conducted 
and then it was zoomed into a specific interfirm relationship  
 
1.3 Theories 
In the field level analysis this research draws upon institutional theory in sociology (ITS). 
ITS is more appropriate for understanding the institutional change at field level and broader 
societal levels. Processes of institutionalization may exist at different levels, namely a 
society, a state, an organizational field, a community, an organization, a group or an 
individual (Scott 2008a; Suddaby and Greenwood 2009). Institutions are both supra-
organizational patterns of activity through which humans conduct their material life in time 
and space, and symbolic systems through which they categorize that activity and infuse it 
with a meaning (Friedland and Alford 1991). In the field level research governance is 
conceptualized as an institution, because the deployment of governance involves practices 
(material social relations) as well as communication of meanings. A package of practices like 
governance, providing order and meaning to a set of activities, is best understood as an 
institution—practices that are fundamentally interpenetrated and shaped by broader cultural 
frameworks such as categories, classifications, frames and other kinds of ordered belief 
systems (Bourdieu 1977; Lounsbury and Ventresca 2003; Lounsbury and Crumley 2007; 
Mohr 2000). The change in institutions of governance in the field of facilities services is the 
focus of this research. Each institution has a central logic which is a set of material practices 
and symbolic constructions. The logic constitutes the organizing principles of an institution 
and is available to organizations and individuals to elaborate (Friedland and Alford 1991). 
The different institutional logics are contradictory and may change over time. Thus, as per 
ITS, the change in the institutional logics, that is, both new social relationships (material 
practices) and new symbolic orders, of an institution leads to the change in that institution. 
Institutional contradictions give birth to the most important political conflicts and 
institutional changes. Individuals and organizations may draw upon and exploit institutional 





contradictions and transform institutions. Such individuals and organizations are called the 
institutional entrepreneurs. Viewing governance as an institution, the thesis is an effort to 
understand why and how governance is changing in the field of facilities services and how a 
new institution of governance (IFM) is being socially constructed at the level of the field of 
facilities services. 
The theoretical basis for the examination of governance at interfirm level comes from the 
extant literature on management control and trust in interfirm relationships. Organizational 
control has been defined as the processes by which organizations govern their activities so 
that they continue to achieve the objectives they set for themselves (Emmanuel, Otley, and 
Merchant 1990). The existing literature on management control in interfirm relationships 
draws upon the same idea of organizational control. Thus, control, or more specifically 
management control, is designed to meet the objectives set by the cooperating organizations. 
It meets coordination requirements and it copes with appropriation concerns (Dekker 2004). 
Management control in interfirm relationships comprises both formal (e.g; contract, 
performance measurement systems, incentive-penalty system, etc.) and informal control (e.g; 
involvement in the decision making process, rituals, ceremonies, etc.). Though a 
management control system is an effort to constrain opportunism, reduce uncertainty and 
encourage cooperation, it may also bring costs, constraints, mistrust and hindrances in the 
development of an interfirm relationship. Thus, trust could also be a relevant dimension of 
governance in addition to management control systems. Trust not only makes transactions 
cheaper and more agreeable but also yields greater flexibility (Nooteboom 1999). Trust also 
reduces the costs of contracting and control because it alleviates the risk of opportunism 
(Bradach and Eccles 1989). There is much overlap in the functions of control and trust and 
this has led to a substantial number of studies that investigate the relationship between 
control and trust (Bradach and Eccles 1989; For instance, Macaulay 1963; Puranam and 
Vanneste 2009; Uzzy 1997; Vélez, Sánchez, and Álvarez-Dardet 2008; Vosselman and Van 
der Meer-Kooistra 2009). The current research aims to further contribute to the knowledge 
production. It aims to investigate the processes in and dynamics of the relationship between 
management control and trust in the context of a specific interfirm relationship as they are 
related to institutional developments at field level. By doing so this effort responds to the 
calls for more in depth longitudinal studies on the relationship between control and 





trust(Caglio and Ditillo 2008; Free 2008), while at the same time responding to a call for 
multi-level analyses (Hopper and Major 2007; Lounsbury 2008). 
 
1.4 Research Method 
The research interprets the processes through which a governance institution (IFM) in the 
field of facilities services in the Netherlands is socially constructed. Then it further interprets 
the processes and dynamics that take place at the level of a particular interfirm relationship 
when a governance institution is adopted by an individual organization. The methodological 
approach used is qualitative field research (for details see chapter 3). The main source of data 
is the semi-structured interviews; in total 33 interviews were conducted. Out of these 33 
semi-structured interviews, 19 focused on a specific interfirm relationship (interfirm level) 
and 14 paid attention to the field of facilities services (field level). In the field level analysis, 
the interviewees were consultants, service providers, clients, facilities managers and 
representatives of professional associations. At the interfirm level, the interviewees included 
the managers at different hierarchical and functional units of the two firms involved. 
However, the data collected from all the interviews was helpful in both field and interfirm 
level analyses. In addition to the interviews, 4 general meetings and two seminars were 
arranged to get access to the interviewees and also to present interim results of this research. 
The feedback during the discussions of the results was helpful in further analysis and 
interviews. Also, documents were collected from different organizations, in order to get more 
insights into the field in general and into the specifics of a particular interfirm relationship. 
These documents proved to be very useful during the investigation process. Desk research 
also included academic research in Facilities Management (FM) published between 1994 and 
2010 in the FM journals. Both academic and non-academic documents were used to 
understand the historical development of the field of FM and development of the institutions 
of governance. 
 
In order to study the development of the interfirm relationship over time and to have a rich 
contextual data, the field research was a longitudinal study. At this level, the interviews were 
conducted in two rounds. The process of data collection started in June 2008 and the first 





round of interviews ended in September 2009. The second round of interviews was 
conducted from June 2010 till November 2010. 
 
1.5 Research Contributions: Theoretical and Practical Relevance 
This thesis contributes to two fields of research, namely to the academic field of accounting 
& control and to the academic field of facilities management. However, the primary 
contribution is to the field of accounting & control. Within the accounting & control 
discipline, this research particularly contributes to two streams of accounting research, 
namely institutional perspectives on accounting and control change, and management control 
and trust in interfirm relationships. More specifically, the field level analysis links up with 
extant knowledge informed by institutional theory from sociology (ITS), whereas the 
analysis of the interfirm relationship is connected to extant knowledge on management 
control and trust in interfirm relationships.  
 
1.5.1 Field Level Governance Institutionalization—an institutional perspective 
A review of extant literature in accounting & control drawing upon ITS reveals that there has 
been much emphasis on the adoption and diffusion of ‘given’ organizational constructs2 with 
little attention being paid to the emergence and development of new constructs. An 
institutional perspective from ITS focuses on the adoption of ‘new’ institutions at the level of 
a specific organization or organizational relationship though such characterization of ITS has 
been criticized as a caricatured version of ITS (e.g; Lounsbury, 2008). Whereas a rational 
choice perspective emphasizes efficiency considerations and reveals conscious rational 
decision making at the level of the specific organization or organizational relationship, an 
ITS perspective emphasizes legitimacy considerations and views the adoption and diffusion 
as more or less isomorphic. Legitimacy is a generalized perception or assumption that the 
actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed 
system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions (Suchman 1995; p.574). Our study, however, 
does not focus on the diffusion and adoption side of ‘new’ institutions (governance in this 
case), but on the construction side. It seeks to gain knowledge on how a package of practices 
in the area of governance is socially constructed at field level. Therefore, the focus of this 
                                                 
2 The word ‘organizational construct’ means an organizational form as well as a governance / management control structure. 





part of the study is on construction at field level (e.g; O' Dwyer, Owen, and Unerman 2011) 
rather than on adoption at organizational level and thereby adding to a limited number of ITS 
based studies in accounting that focused on the field level (Examples inlcude  Dillard, 
Rigsby, and Goodman 2004; Ezzamel, Robson, Stapleton, and McLean 2007; Hopper and 
Major 2007; O' Dwyer, Owen, and Unerman 2011). Related to the research focus, special 
consideration will be given to the path creating and path changing individuals or 
organizations to whom this research refers as the institutional entrepreneurs (e.g; Garud, 
Hardy, and Maguire 2007). Instead of treating organizations as a-rational and passive entities 
(Lounsbury 2008) that have no potential to bring about institutional change (i.e. the creation 
or construction of new practices or the de-institutionalization of an existing institution of 
governance), organizations are assumed to inhabit agents with path breaking capabilities. In 
other words, the aim is to study how and why a ‘new’ governance gains acceptance in the 
field of FM.  
 
This research is unique in the sense that it focuses not only on the instrumental rationality 
(active agency of the powerful actors in the field as institutional entrepreneurs in response to 
the institutional pressures) but also the institutional rationality (the logics i.e. broader cultural 
beliefs and rules that structure cognition and decision making of the actors). By doing this, 
the research explains the how and why of the governance change in the field of FM in the 
Netherlands. The field research reveals that some actors transcend the organizational field 
boundaries and they are connected to other national and transnational fields. These actors 
bring changes in the governance in the field of FM in the Netherlands. These field-crossing 
actors are multinational organizations; they include client organizations, service providers, 
consultants and professional associations. Two of these field-crossing actors (service 
providers and consultants) got the identity of institutional entrepreneurs because they actively 
participated in the social construction of IFM in the field of FM in the Netherlands. The local 
service providers and consultants proved to follow the international ones. The professional 
associations provided the stage to disseminate the ideas inter alia through conferences and 
publications. Moreover, the initial adopters of IFM (international client organizations) were 
drawn upon to narrate their success stories to further reinforce the concept. So, this thesis 
reveals that over the last decades the social construction of IFM is broadly explained by 





instrumentally rational behaviour by institutional entrepreneurs in the form of service 
providers and consultants. But why are the actors behaving in such a way? The thesis seeks 
to answer this question by drawing on the concept of institutional rationality that emphasizes 
the role of institutional logics in guiding the cognition and decision making of the people and 
organizations. Through historical analysis of the academic and professional literature in the 
field of FM in the Netherlands in combination with interviews, the research reveals that the 
field of FM has been dominated by the ‘logic of rationalization’ (reduction of costs) that is in 
turn connected to broader logics of shareholders value (market) and profitability 
(corporation). This logic influences all the participants in the field of FM including the 
institutional entrepreneurs. It is analyzed that the ‘logic of rationalization’ has been 
reinforced over time by the ‘performativity’ of theories of the value chain, lean and mean 
production, emphasizing the legitimacy of outsourcing. It is suggested that the ‘logic of 
rationalization’ has further been reinforced by the competition and financial crisis over time.  
 
Lastly, prior literature on institutional logics shows that the practices change and new 
practices emerge because underlying logics of the field change (e.g; Lounsbury and Crumley 
2007; Thornton 2002). But this research demonstrates that different sets practices and 
institutions (for instance both the concept of IFM and less integrated constructions) may 
survive and endure without change in the dominant logics because they are all compatible 
with the dominant logic. New governance (new practices) form emerged over time in the 
field of FM though there has been only one dominant institutional logic of rationalization.  
 
As is stated above, the contribution to the FM domain (both in an academic and in a 
professional sense) was not the primary focus of this research. Nevertheless, the research 
result may provide the practitioners in the field of FM with knowledge that may help them in 
reflecting on the ongoing change in institutions of governance. The study expands the 
knowledge in the field of FM, which to a large extent is focused on technical aspects of FM. 
More reflection by practitioners is particularly relevant because the ‘logic of professionalism’ 
does not seem to dominate in the field of FM in the Netherlands. Apart from some ripples of 
professionalism in the literature (Exceptions include Duffy 2000; Roberts 2001), there is 
hardly any academic support for such reflection.  






This research also questions an all too positive notion of the practitioners’ literature about 
IFM/TFM and an overload of success stories of IFM. Further, the research observes some 
inconsistencies in the market reports of FM in the Netherlands.  
 
1.5.2 Interfirm Level Governance—an interactive perspective on control and trust 
This study also contributes to the knowledge production on accounting, control and trust in 
interfirm relationships. Trust and control have been theorized as both substitutes and 
complements, but there is a need to go beyond a simple complements-substitutes dichotomy 
(Puranam and Vanneste 2009). Prior studies examined the influence of formal control system 
on trust (Colleti, Sedatole, and Towry 2005; Vélez, Sánchez, and Álvarez-Dardet 2008) and 
how trust could affect control (e.g; Vosselman and Van der Meer-Kooistra 2009). 
Longitudinal research into the evolution of accounting, control and trust has been suggested 
(e.g; Free 2008; Caglio and Ditillo 2008; Gulati 2010). This thesis contains a longitudinal 
field study of an interfirm relationship that builds on theory on the dynamics of control and 
trust in an interfirm relationships (Vosselman and Van der Meer-Kooistra, 2009). It is 
receptive to a warning by Free (2008), who questions the romanticized notion of trust and 
suggests that power-based relationships may be cloaked in a fake perception of trust.   
 
This study makes a number of contributions to the extant literature. Firstly, it shows that an 
interfirm relationship may experience both trust and power at different periods of time. It 
reveals that there existed a trusting relationship for more than two years with one (old) 
management or boundary spanners (the contact persons in the respective collaborating 
organizations). But later the trust decreased and power emerged as a consequence of the 
arrival of new boundary spanners. Therefore, in contrast with extant literature, this research 
suggest that a prior trusting relationship may be questioned and may not lead to further 
development of trust.  
 
Secondly, while Van der Meer-Kooistra and Vosselman (2000) theorize that trust is 
particularly important and may be a replacement for control in transactional relations that are 
characterized by high complexity and environmental uncertainty, this study reveals that the 





significance of trust in transactional relations may not only be dependent on complexity and 
uncertainty, but also on the actions and mindset (values and norms) of the boundary 
spanners. Earlier work (e.g; Dekker, 2004; Vosselman and Van der Meer-Kooistra , 2009) 
theorizes that formal control structures (in the form of performance management and 
incentive systems) are deliberately written down in a contract in order to align interests and, 
thus, in order to cope with appropriation concerns. However, this study suggests that 
contracting is not only a tool for safeguarding, but also an inducement of commitment. 
Therefore, as suggested by Woolthuis et al, (2005), the contract serves various purposes. 
Safeguarding aspects and commitment aspects may be observed in different time areas, one 
aspect becoming prevalent in different time areas.  
 
Thirdly, the trust built in an interfirm relationship may be limited only to the boundary 
spanners and may not extend to some of the other managers in the participating 
organizations. But if the trust is limited only to the boundary spanners and it is built only on 
the information coming from the formal control system (e.g; KPIs), other members of the 
organizations may feel alienated for not being heard in the design of the formal control 
system. It proved to be very important whether the boundary spanners consider the formal 
control system as a valuable tool in the relationship or not. This particularly raises a question 
as to what the trust between organizations means. Is it trust between the boundary spanners 
or between both the organizations as a whole? 
 
Fourthly, the talk of trust may dissemble power and opportunism (Free 2008) and in the 
opportunistic atmosphere one powerful partner may dominate contract contents and 
execution (Woolthuis, Hillebrand, and Nooteboom 2005). Since trust is the result of a 
communication process through which meanings and values are shared (Hardy, Philips, and 
Lawrence 1998), a resulting match between the values of the boundary spanners is very 
important. When there remains a mismatch, trust may not develop and the power of one of 
the partners may become salient. 
  
Fifthly, much of the literature on trust between organizations classifies trust as ‘good’, 
pacifying uncertainty and creating stability and mistrust as ‘bad’ (Free 2008). However, trust 





may bring inertia, it may reduce incentives for innovation, adaptation and change. This study 
reveals that once trust (or implicit control) is built it also influences the formal control, 
informal control and the agency / freedom of the boundary spanners. Particularly it is 
suggested that trust makes the boundary spanners complacent. Such complacency might not 
be in the economic interest of the parties involved. Lastly, the history and context prove to be 
very important for the development of an interfirm relationship. Trust is not an objective 
condition and it varies between individuals, even those individuals in otherwise identical 
conditions (Nooteboom, Berger, and Noorderhaven 1997). In this study, the history and 
context include the role (and agency) of boundary spanners, the influence of legal 
environment in the country and the special circumstances (or changes thereof) of the 
interfirm relationship over time. 
 
1.6 Thesis Structure 
This thesis has eight chapters. Chapter two describes the facilities services, facilities 
management and the developments in the field of facilities management over the last 20 
years, especially the developments related to the governance of facilities services. Then it 
discusses the emergence of a new mode of governance that is becoming very much popular 
in the field of facilities services in the Netherlands. This mode of governance is called the 
integrated facilities management (IFM) or total facilities management (TFM).  
 
Chapter three discusses the methodological approach of this field research. It explains why 
the researcher adopted a qualitative field study approach and how the research was done 
including the collection of data, description and analysis of the field data. 
 
The objective of chapter four is to review the extant literature in ITS and accounting and the 
latest insights in the ITS literature. This chapter ends with a theoretical framework that is 
used in chapter five to show how and why the governance, particularly IFM, has been 
shaping at the level of the field of facilities services in the Netherlands.  
 
Chapter six takes the governance from the field to a specific interfirm level. This chapter 
reviews the state of the art on the governance (management control and trust) of interfirm 





relationships. This chapter ends with the theoretical ambitions of the field research at an 
interfirm level. Chapter seven describes the setting, start and development of a specific 
interfirm relationship over a period of four years. This chapter provides an analysis and 
discussions of a longitudinal interfirm relationship.  
 
Chapter eight concludes this thesis. This chapter contains three parts. The first part is about 
the overview of the research project. Then the theoretical contributions are elaborated in the 
next part. The last part of this chapter is about the limitations of this research and contains 











































































CHAPTER 2: GOVERNANCE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE FIELD OF FACILITIES 
SERVICES IN THE NETHERLANDS  
 
2.1. Introduction 
This chapter provides an overview of the governance developments in the field of facilities 
services in the Netherlands. It heavily draws on field documents such as market reports, 
magazines and other non-academic literature but not to the exclusion of academic literature 
in the field of facilities management (FM). The structure of the current chapter is as follows. 
First, it is explained what is meant by facilities services in this research i.e. what type of 
specific facilities services fall within the scope of this thesis. Then the concept of FM is 
discussed and a brief comparison is made between US and European (also Dutch) definitions 
of FM. The next section talks about the FM market in Europe and the Netherlands. The 
second last section gives a description of governance developments in the field of FM in the 
Netherlands. The last section summarizes this chapter. 
 
2.2.  Facilities Services 
Facilities services are all those services that support the core operations of any organization. 
Broadly speaking, services that belong to any discipline or function that are not directly 
related to the core operations of the organization are all facilities services. In this sense, 
human resource management or the accounting function are both facilities services. But in 
this thesis, the latter functions are excluded and the scope of this thesis is limited to a specific 
type of facilities services. The specific scope and focus is helpful in making a lucid and 
logical investigation and contribution. Besides, the data was collected from a specific field of 
facilities services. Such facilities services include building and office environment related 
services such as a fire prevention system, heating ventilation and air-conditioning (HVAC), 
environment and safety, technical maintenance, water management, energy and utilities 










 Table 1: The Facilities Services  
 
2.3 Facilities Management (FM) 
There is a debate on the definition of facilities management (FM) and its scope (De Bruijn, 
Van Wezel, and Wood 2001). Generally speaking, FM includes managing and controlling 
some activities that support the primary processes of an organization. A comprehensive 
definition describes FM” as an integrated approach to operating, maintaining, improving and 
adapting the buildings and infrastructure of an organization in order to create an environment that 
strongly supports the primary objectives of that organization” (De Bruijn, Van Wezel, and Wood 
2001). 
 
The US and the Dutch (the Dutch having played a major role in Europe in promoting the 
development of FM education) have contrasting definitions of FM (Cotts and Lee 1992, 
p.3). Two US definitions cited by Wagenberg (1997) are as follows: 
 
“The practice of coordinating the physical workplace with the people and work of the organization; 
it integrates the principles of business administration, architecture and the behavioral and 
engineering sciences” (Becker 1987).  
 
“FM is responsible for coordinating all efforts related to planning, design and managing buildings 
and their systems, equipment and furniture to enhance the organization’s ability to compete 
successfully in a rapid changing world” (De Bruijn, Van Wezel, and Wood 2001; Wagenberg 1997). 
 
Major type of Service Description 
Office Services Cleaning, reprographics, reception, parking, 
planting, data management and office supplies 
Projects Capital works, space management, relocations 
and change management 
Communications Multi client service desk, mail, telecom, courriers 
and signage 
Hospitality Catering, conference, audiovisual services, 
flowers and event management 
Building and 
Environment 
Fire prevention system, heating ventilation and 
air-conditioning (HVAC), environment and 
safety, repairs and maintenance, water 
management, energy and utilities management 





The European Committee for Standardization (CEN) gives a European (presuming Dutch 
also) definition of FM. According to CEN, FM “is the integration of processes within an 
organization to maintain and develop the agreed services which support and improve the 
effectiveness of its primary activities” (EN15221-1:2006 Facility Management-Part 1: 
Terms and definitions). As per CEN, FM covers and integrates a very broad scope of 
processes, services, activities and facilities3. CEN claims that the field of FM can be grouped 
under two headings representing ‘People, Place, Process’: 
 
- Space & Infrastructure which includes client demand for (work-) space through 
services such as space planning, workplace, design, construction, lease, 
occupancy management, building operations, maintenance, furniture, equipment, 
technical infrastructure, cleaning, etc. 
- People & Organization which includes client demands for health services, 
catering, event management, ICT, hospitality, security, safety, human resource 
management, logistics, office supplies, document management, accounting, 
marketing, etc. 
 
The main difference between the US and the European (also Dutch) definitions is that the 
European definition is broader. It explicitly includes services that are not closely connected 
to space (building services) and infrastructure but that fit within a more broad definition of 
FM, as for instance given by Grinshaw (2003), is as follows: “FM is a general management 
function responsible for the facility as a result of planning and coordinating the support 
processes, aimed at the promotion of the success of the core process of the organization” 
(Grimshaw 2003).  
 
Summing up, in a broad sense FM could be characterized by any or all of the following 
statements (Becker 1990): 
(1) FM is a technical function concerned with maintaining the practical utility of the physical 
infrastructure to ensure it supports the core activity of an organization (operational 
maintenance). 
                                                 
3 Browsed on 08-03-2011 at the website of European FM Network at: http://www.eurofm.org/about-us/what-is-fm/ 





(2) FM is an economic function concerned with ensuring the efficient use of physical 
resources by controlling cost (financial control). 
(3) FM is a strategic function concerned with the forward planning of physical infrastructure 
resources to support organizational development and reduce risk (change management). 
(4) FM is a social function concerned with ensuring the physical infrastructure of work meets 
the legitimate needs of users within their organizational roles (user interfacing). 
(5) FM is a service function concerned with the provision of non-core support services 
(support services). 
(6) FM is a professional function with social responsibility for people in the workplace 
(advocacy). 
 
In a broad sense, FM is an integrated management approach that perceives its role as being a 
significant determinant of corporate goal alignment. It provides competitive advantage by a 
philosophy of focus on core and restructuring. The desired outcome is the saving of senior 
management time and improvement in effectiveness (Pathirage, Haigh, Amaratunga, and 
Baldry 2008). 
 
FM is a relatively a new profession (Gilleard, Chan, Ratcliffe, and Pilling 1994; Tay and Ooi 
2001) and it has achieved a foothold as a discipline since 1980s (Ventovuori, Lehtonen, 
Salonen, and Nenonen 2007). The idea of FM as a better way of dealing with facilities and 
services originated in the USA in the beginning of 1980s and then came to the Netherlands 
(and the rest of Europe) in the mid-1980s (Brat 1996; Wagenberg 1997). It does not mean 
that FM did not exist before 1980s. But in the 1980s the idea became popular as a new and 
better way of dealing with facilities services. 
 
2.4  Facilities Management (FM) Market Size in Europe and the Netherlands 
FM market size in 2008 in relation to GDP in Europe at large was €655 billion and in the 
Netherlands it was approximately €26 billion. The market size refers to the total expenditure 
on FM services as well as the ratio between internal and external services. External services 
are the outsourced facilities services. Table 2 shows the country wise details:  
 





Table 2. FM Market Size in Europe till 2008 
Country Market segmentation GDP FM market size 2008 in relation to GDP  
Ranking 




















Market size FM 





United Kingdom UK Northern Europe Pioneer Market 1,859.05 128.26 76.13 204.39 1 
Germany DE Central Europe Developed Market 2,360.06 37.80 35.58 73.38 2 
France FR Western Europe Developed Market 1,795.75 28.62 30.27 58.89 3 
Italy IT Southern Europe Developed Market 1,488.29 21.60 27.18 48.78 4 
Spain ES Southern Europe Developed Market 949.66 16.20 21.11 37.31 5 
Russia RU Eastern Europe Emerging Market 645.55 11.59 20.17 31.76 6 
Netherlands NL Western Europe Pioneer Market 527.08 15.48 10.46 25.93 7 
Belgium BE Western Europe Developed Market 313.13 7.25 8.15 15.41 8 
Switzerland CH Central Europe Developed Market 309.92 7.18 8.07 15.25 9 
Turkey TR South Eastern Europe Pre-Emerging Market 306.83 3.21 11.89 15.10 10 
Sweden SE Northern Europe Emerging Market 302.03 5.42 9.44 14.86 11 
Austria AT Central Europe Developed Market 258.45 5.99 6.73 12.72 12 
Poland PL Eastern Europe Emerging Market 255.99 4.60 8.00 12.59 13 
Norway NO Northern Europe Emerging Market 249.53 4.48 7.80 12.28 14 
Denmark DK Northern Europe Developed Market 218.46 5.06 5.69 10.75 15 
Greece GR Southern Europe Pre-Emerging Market 190.17 1.99 7.37 9.36 16 
Ireland IE Northern Europe Developed Market 170.42 3.95 4.44 8.38 17 
Finland FI Northern Europe Emerging Market 163.11 2.93 5.10 8.02 18 
Portugal PT Southern Europe Emerging Market 154.78 2.78 4.84 7.62 19 
Czech Republic CZ Eastern Europe Emerging Market 104.69 1.88 3.27 5.15 20 
Hungary HU Eastern Europe Emerging Market 93.19 1.67 2.91 4.59 21 
Rumania RO South Eastern Europe Pre-Emerging Market 83.47 0.87 3.23 4.11 22 
Ukraine UA Eastern Europe Pre-Emerging Market 72.73 0.76 2.82 3.58 23 
Slovakia SK Eastern Europe Emerging Market 40.04 0.72 1.25 1.97 24 
Croatia HR South Eastern Europe Pre-Emerging Market 32.84 0.34 1.27 1.62 25 
Luxemburg LU Western Europe Developed Market 30.79 0.71 0.80 1.52 26 
Slovenia SI Eastern Europe Emerging Market 29.01 0.52 0.91 1.43 27 
Belarus BY Eastern Europe Pre-Emerging Market 24.97 0.26 0.97 1.23 28 
Bulgaria BG South Eastern Europe Emerging Market 22.96 0.41 0.72 1.13 29 
Lithuania LT Eastern Europe Pre-Emerging Market 21.66 0.23 0.84 1.07 30 
Serbia RS South Eastern Europe Pre-Emerging Market 20.40 0.21 0.79 1.00 31 
Latvia LV Eastern Europe Pre-Emerging Market 13.55 0.14 0.52 0.67 32 
Iceland IS Northern Europe Emerging Market 13.35 0.24 0.42 0.66 33 
Cyprus CY Southern Europe Pre-Emerging Market 13.02 0.14 0.50 0.64 34 
Estonia EE Eastern Europe Pre-Emerging Market 11.61 0.12 0.45 0.57 35 
Bosnia & Herzegovina BA South Eastern Europe Pre-Emerging Market 8.38 0.09 0.32 0.41 36 
Albania AL South Eastern Europe Pre-Emerging Market 7.08 0.07 0.27 0.35 37 
Macedonia MK South Eastern Europe Pre-Emerging Market 4.87 0.05 0.19 0.24 38 
Malta MT Southern Europe Pre-Emerging Market 4.70 0.05 0.18 0.23 39 
Moldova. Republic of 
Moldova 
 
MD  Eastern Europe  Pre-Emerging Market 2.52 0.03 0.10 0.12  40 
Montenegro Unit South Eastern Europe Pre-Emerging Market 1.77 0.03 0.07 0.09 41 
Europe TOP 5: Total 232.48 190.27 422.75 S 
Europe total (n=41) 323.93 331.19 655.13 S 
Source: European FM insight issue 11-September 2009 page 6 





A professional association in the Netherlands called Facility Management Nederland (FMN) and 
a consultant firm jointly publish the statistics of the market of FM in the Netherlands biennially. 
According to such a market report of 2010, the FM market in the Netherlands was worth €33.6 
billion in 2009 but the market has declined as compared to 2007 (€35.5 billion) and apparently, 
as per said report, the financial crisis had an impact on the market. However, the outsourcing 
percentage and index have grown over the last decade. Table 3 shows an overview of the FM 
market in the Netherlands from 2000 till 2009: 
 
Table 3. FM Market Size in the Netherlands over the last 10 years 
Total Market Share 2009 2007 2005 2003 2000 
Market share                    
(x €1,000,000) 
€33,623 €35,489 €33,372 €34,625 €34,074 
Market shared outsourced 
(x €1,000,000) 
€21,018 €21,546 €19,726 €20,140 €19,408 
Outsourcing percentage 63% 61% 59% 58% 57% 
Number of employees 
outsourced 
314,684 300,796 287,085 303,653 313,878 
Number of suppliers 25,666 24,176 23,164 22,506 22,452 
Market growth index total 
market share 
99 104 98 102 100 
Market growth index 
outsourced market 
108 111 102 104 100 
 Source: De Nederlandse Facility Management Markt 2010 
 
2.5  Developments in the governance of FM 
The history of FM in the Netherlands is very old, but the focus of this research is specifically on 
the changes and developments surrounding the emergence and development of integrated facility 
management (IFM) as a concept. IFM seems to have emerged in the field of FM in the 
Netherlands during the last 10 years or so. The developments could be studied in different ways. 
In this study, the focus is on the developments related to different ways of organizing and 
controlling facilities services. To be more precise, the focus is on developments in the 





governance and management control of facilities services. The term governance was discussed in 
detail in chapter 1. For the purpose of elaborating the presence of different forms of governance 
and control in the field of FM in the Netherlands, we draw upon Vosselman (2002). He (ibid) 
discusses different management control archetypes available to a Dutch company in 1994. For 
the purpose of our investigation we summarize the options for executing and controlling FM as 
follows: 
a- Some facilities services are executed and controlled by a centralized department and 
many facilities services are executed and controlled locally by several business units. (It 
is in-house-FM without tight centralized control of FM. Without tight control means the 
planning and control of FM is not the responsibility of one department). 
b- All facilities services are executed and controlled in a central staff unit that may take the 
form of a cost center (an expense center). Some of the services may be outsourced by the 
department. This staff department is called a facility management organization. 
Management of such a department has the responsibility to plan and control the space and 
other facilities services. This is similar to a tight fit FM organization in which there is one 
central department close to the board of directors and the main objective is to cut facility 
costs by standardizing (Becker 1990).  
c- Shared service centers in different forms (internal to the organization or external to the 
organization) 
d- Facilities services organized and managed by each business unit separately (either in-
house or outsourced) and there is no central department. This may also be called a loose 
fit FM organization (Becker 1990). 
 
The management control of FM within the boundaries of an organization is related to 
developments in institutions of governance at field level, i.e. the field of FM. During the past 10 
years or so, there has been a development towards the institution of IFM, integrated facilities 
management. For analyzing the change in governance and management control we distinguish 
between a pre-IFM phase and an IFM-phase:  
 





Pre-IFM Phase: characterized by either the presence of a facility management organization (cost 
centre), a shared service centre (internal / external); and single or multi-services outsourcing 
described above as a, b, c and d. 
IFM Phase: characterized by the emergence and development of IFM during the last 10 years or 
so wherein the execution as well as the management of facilities services has been transferred to 
a single service provider. The terms ‘main contracting’ or ‘total facility management’ are also 
often used to refer to IFM. In IFM, all the operational and tactical tasks and even some strategic 
tasks of FM are outsourced to a single service provider. Figure 2 below explains different models 
of FM, including IFM, in terms of three different levels of management within an organization: 
 
Figure 2. Different FM Solutions / Models4 
 
 
                                                 
4 The diagram has been taken from the presentation of a facilities manager 





The above figure explains the developments from traditional FM to the IFM. In traditional FM 
only a part of operations is outsourced (blue color) and some operations, tactical and strategic 
management remain in-house. The second pyramid shows a development where all operations 
and tactical management is handled by a service provider. In a way, the first two pyramids 
represent a pre-IFM phase of development in the field of FM in the Netherlands. The third 
pyramid depicts the IFM wherein only one FM service provider takes over the tactical and some 
of the strategic task related to FM. The service provider may also outsource the operations to 
other suppliers and manage those suppliers. It is worth noting that even today different 
organizations in the field of facility services in the Netherlands have different types of 
governance and control (both pre IFM and IFM). It will be shown in the thesis that the specific 
circumstances of the organizations influence the choice of the governance type. For instance big 
organizations prefer to have IFM governance arrangement. 
  
2.5.1. IFM market trends during the last decade 
The FM outsourcing market in the Netherlands has seen an enormous growth during the last 
decade. Regarding IFM the statistics are shown by the following table 4, extracted from the 
Netherlands FM Market Report 2010. 
       
Table 4. IFM Market Statistics 2000-2009 
Integrated Facility Management 2009 2007 2005 2003 2000 
Market share (x €1,000,000) €4,382 €4,629 €4,353 €4,516 €4,444 
Market shared outsourced (x €1,000,000) €104 €51 €35 €26 €17 
Outsourcing percentage 2.4% 1.1% 0.7% 0.5% 0.3% 
Number of employees outsourced 1,484 1,000 700 420 290 
Number of suppliers 16 20 15 11 6 
Share of top three suppliers 62% 67% 48% 73% 65% 
Market growth index total market share 99 104 98 102 100 
Market growth index outsourcing market 614 302 206 153 100 
Source: De Nederlandse Facility Management Markt 2010  
(Note: market share is based on estimated management fee of facilities. In the calculation of outsourcing market the amount charged by the 
integrated facility management providers includes only the fees for management. The income from the operational facilities services is not 
included in the (outsourced) market share.) 






The market share of IFM has declined by 5% in 2009 when compared with 2007. This appears to 
be due to the financial crises. However, there is an enormous growth in the outsourcing 
percentage and index. Overall the outsourcing index is six times higher in 2009 as compared to 
2000. De Nederlandse Facility Management Markt Report 2010 describes that the development 
towards a demand facility organization has been one of the five major trends since 2007 
(Gijsbers, Van der Kluit, and Spijker 2010, p.102). The demand facility organization (a part of 
the outsourcing organization) is connected to an organization format in which most operational 
tasks are performed and managed by external providers and only a few tasks are managed 
internally (Gijsbers, Van der Kluit, and Spijker 2010). The next step could be the outsourcing of 
all operational tasks and may be even more tactical tasks to a single facility service provider, 
which is called IFM. According to the report, 65% of the facility managers indicate that they 
view the demand facility organization as an intermediary step towards IFM (Gijsbers and Van 
der Kluit 2008; Gijsbers, Van der Kluit, and Spijker 2010). The tactical tasks could include the 
management of the services provided by the suppliers of facilities services. These survey results 
indicate that most organizations and facility managers are still at the stage of a demand facility 
organization and IFM is yet to develop in the future. In this regard, the service providers are 
more optimistic than facility managers About 76% (78% in 2008) of the service providers expect 
that facility managers will have more IFM while only 42% (50% in 2008) of the facility 
managers think so (Gijsbers, Van der Kluit, and Spijker 2010). The report also reveals that 61% 
of the facility managers have to reduce cost in 2010 with an average cost reduction target of 
10.5%, and 77% of the facility managers select facility service providers based on price. It 
appears that most of the decisions regarding the service providers are driven by cost reduction 
pressures. If IFM can help in getting cost reductions then this IFM might be growing fast in the 
next 3 years. Moreover, 74% of the facility mangers indicate that in three years they will be 
organized as a demand facility organization. So, the service providers have an opportunity to 
convince the facility managers and win the contracts of IFM if they could save costs and could 
create trusting examples before facility managers. The Netherlands FM Market Report 2010 
concludes (p. 49) that the market does not yet recognize the growth line towards IFM and that 
IFM is also not an automatic next step after the demand facility organization. This conclusion is 
based on a survey question that asks facility managers if demand facility management is the 





intermediate step towards full outsourcing or IFM. Only 19% people replied positive to this 
question. But the same report (p. 100) reveals that 65% of the facility managers indicate that they 
view the demand facility organization as an intermediary step towards IFM. The contradictory 
results in this report warrant further attention. Further, the market sizes of IFM for the years 
2000, 2003, 2005 and 2007 reported in the 2008 market report (page 125) differ from those 
reported in the 2010 market report (page 129). No explanation as to such a difference was found 
in the 2010 market report. Moss (2008) has already expressed concern about the market reports 
of the UK facilities management industry. It was found that surprisingly none of the current 
reports uses a robust market research methodology and this casts doubt on the estimated size of 
the market and other findings (Moss 2008). 
 
Some big organizations have already adopted IFM. The biggest companies having an IFM 
contract in 2009 and the beginning of 2010 are KPN, Centocour, Vopak and Nederlandse 
Spoorwegen (NS) and the biggest service providers of IFM in 2010 are Arcadis Aqumen, 
Sodexo Altys and ISS facility services. 
 
The following figure5(3) shows the IFM at different stages in different countries and the number 
of Dutch organizations that have already adopted IFM. The picture also gives an overview of the 












                                                 
5 Presentation at EruoFM 21-01-2010 by a consultant 










2.6  Chapter Summary 
This chapter explained the scope and focus of this research in terms of the nature of facilities 
services under investigation. The building and office related facilities services are the focus of 
this thesis. Different definitions of FM were discussed. FM proves to be about the integration of 
processes that support and improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the primary operations of 
an organization. The European definition of FM proves to be broader than US definitions.  






The chapter also highlighted different governance and management control choices available to 
the organizations in the field of facilities services in the Netherlands. As will be shown later in 
this thesis, these different governance forms emerged over time. The governance of facilities 
services could take the form of either a facility management organization (cost centre), or a 
shared service centre (internal / external), or different departments managing their own facilities 
services. These governance forms were labeled as pre-IFM governance because they existed 
before the emergence of IFM. Single or multi-services outsourcing was also present in the pre-
IFM phase. Then IFM emerged and developed during the last 10 years or so. In IFM both the 
operations and management of the facilities services are done by a single service provider. The 
service provider may further outsource the facilities services operations to other suppliers but 
retains the management of such services. The terms ‘main contracting’ or ‘total facility 
management’ or IFM are often used as synonyms in the field of FM.  
 
The chapter also described the market statistics of FM for the European countries and the 
Netherlands. The market of FM and outsourcing of FM have grown over the last decade. The FM 
and IFM market size data of the last nine years pertaining to the Netherlands was extracted from 
three market reports (called De Nederlandse Facility Management Markt 2006, 2008 and 2010) 
published by the FMN and Twynstra Gudde (a consultant organization). Some inconsistencies in 
these reports were found. First, the statistics of market sizes for specific years are not the same in 
all the reports. For instance, the values of market sizes for 2000, 2003, 2005 and 2007 appearing 
in the market report of 2008 differ from the amounts of the same years in the market report of 
2010. Secondly, the market report of 2010 shows conflicting opinions of the facility managers 
about the future of IFM in the Netherlands.  
 
The chapter also reveals that only big organizations have embraced the idea of IFM and that 
other forms of governance are also present in different organizations. The number of 













































CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND METHODS 
This chapter first discusses some concepts such as methodology, methods and field research. 
The chapter also differentiates qualitative field research from quantitative field research and 
describes the reasons for selecting qualitative field research in this thesis. Then the design of 
the research is explained. The chapter goes on with the process of data collection and 
analysis. Then some limitations encountered during field research are stated. The chapter 
ends with a summary.  
 
3.1.  Research methodology, methods and field research 
Research methodology refers to the choices we make regarding cases to study, methods of 
data gathering, forms of data analysis, etc., in planning and executing a research study 
(Silverman 2005; p.99). A method is a specific research technique (such as interviews). The 
research methodology is the general approach to studying research topics. Methodologies 
could be broadly classified as qualitative or quantitative. A distinctive feature of qualitative 
methodology is its assumption about social reality that is assumed to be “emergent, 
subjectively created and objectified through human interaction” (Ahrens and Chapman 
2006; Chua 1986, p.615). This is different from positivistic research that makes the 
ontological assumption that “empirical reality is objective and external to the subject” 
(Chua 1986; p.611). Qualitative methodology stresses the understanding of the social world 
through an examination of the interpretation of that world by its participants (Bryman 2008).  
 
The methodology adopted in this study is qualitative and, as mentioned in the first chapter, 
the study is strongly based on field research. This field research has the following 
characteristics (Ferreira and Merchant 1992; p.4): 
1- Direct, in-depth contact with organizational participants, particularly in interviews. 
These contacts provide a primary source of research data. 
2- The study focuses on real tasks or processes, not on a situation artificially created by 
the researcher. 
3- The research design is not totally structured. It evolves along with the field 
observations. 





4- The presentations of data include relatively rich (detailed) descriptions of company 
contexts and practices.  
5- The resulting publication is meant for the academic community but some of the field 
research literature is also easily read and used by practitioners. 
In other words, “qualitative field studies collect data in the domain ‘field’ and employ 
‘qualitative’ methodology” (Ahrens and Chapman 2006; p.821). 
 
3.2.   The reasons for the research design 
The field research methodology was chosen for a number of reasons. Firstly, in a general 
sense in the scientific discipline of accounting and control there have been calls for more 
empirical studies that adopt a qualitative research methodology (cf. Ahrens and 
Chapman, 2006). Governance and management control happen in the field (Chapman 
2007) and there have been calls for joining the fascinating organizational world (Cooper 
2004). Secondly, the ‘why’ and ‘how’ nature of the research questions (Yin 2003) and the 
focus on the processes in the real life context made qualitative field research an 
appropriate research methodology (Silverman 2005). Thirdly, the adoption of qualitative 
field research was important because of its emphasis on the description and 
understanding of processes, in particular the meanings individuals give to processes in 
the real life organizational settings (Cooper and Morgan 2008; Gephart 2004).  
 
The aim is to contribute to theory by positioning data against the theories through an 
ongoing reflection on data (Ahrens and Chapman 2006) while at the same time retaining 
the context specific information (authenticity) in drawing plausible conclusions (Lukka 
and Modell 2010). Theory is both an input for understanding practice and an outcome. 
The researcher is part of the process of knowledge production and uses existing 
knowledge as well as field data to draw plausible conclusions. To a researcher the task is 
not simply to describe something as given but to analyze it in a specific context. Thus, the 
field study is not simply empirical but a profoundly theoretical activity which is shaped 
by the theoretical interests of the researcher (Ahrens and Chapman 2006).   
 





Figure 4 below depicts the research design and methodology of this study. As it can be 
seen the research objective is to understand and reflect on the governance (IFM) and 
management control at two different levels, i.e. the field level and the interfirm level. For 
the purpose of reflection the study draws upon two different theoretical perspectives. For 
the field level research, the state of the art in institutional theory in sociology (ITS) and 
accounting research is utilized. After reviewing relevant parts of ITS-informed research 
into governance and control, a theoretical framework for the institutionalization of new 
forms of governance is developed. For the purpose of the interfirm analysis the study 
draws on governance and control theory, particularly as discussed in accounting 
literature. For the interfirm level research, a longitudinal case study was conducted. The 



















































The data was collected through semi-structured interviews. Interview questions were 
developed from extant theoretical knowledge. Documents in different forms such as 
service level agreements, road maps, quarterly reports (performance reports), industry 
reports by professional associations and consultants, annual reports, presentations by 
managers and consultants, etc. were also an important source of data.  
 





3.3.   The development of the research process  
This sub-section describes the process of data collection and analysis. 
 
3.3.1  Data Collection at the level of an interfirm relationship 
This research project is about governance change at two different levels i.e. interfirm 
level and field level. In case of the interfirm relationship, the data collection started with 
a first meeting with a Real Estate and Facility Manager (RE & FM) of an organization 
that outsourced the management of its facilities services to a service provider. In this 
thesis, this organization (a renowned multinational company) is called Client Firm (CF) 
and the service provider is called the Management Firm (MF) because it manages 
facilities services on behalf of the CF. Hence, there is an interfirm relationship between 
CF and MF. The first meeting with the manager took place at the university in June 2008. 
After that meeting a formal letter, containing the research topics and questions, the nature 
of the interviews and assurance of confidentiality, was sent to the interviewees.  
 
The data collection pertaining to this interfirm relationship further included general 
meetings, interviews and documents. The following table (5) gives an overview of the 



















Table 5: General meetings with CF 





















2 Sept. 2008 DvT RE&FM manager
 







FV Purchase Manager 
EV Researcher
RM Researcher
















4 Sept. 2009 DvT RE&FM manager Presentation and 
discussion of the 












As can be concluded form the table, the case study was conducted by a group of three 
researchers: KH (the author of this thesis), RM and EV. Two PhD-research projects are 
related to this case study, one executed by RM and one by the author of this thesis. EV 
acted as supervisor and took part in the interviews occasionally. First, three general 
introductory meetings were part of the process to get access. Two out of these first three 
general meetings were not recorded. A fourth general meeting was organized to discuss 
the results of the first round of interviews. The manager RE & FM and the manager 
Purchasing participated in that meeting along with a group of 5 researchers (the three 
mentioned above, another associate professor and a masters student). It was interesting 
and useful to listen to the feedback of the practitioners and the information from these 





discussions also became part of our further analysis. It helped us to revisit the data 
representativeness and to re-assess the plausibility of the conclusions (Yin 2003). 
 
The interviews were conducted in two rounds. The first round of interviews started with 
the sending of a brief description of the research to the CF, particularly to the potential 
interviewees. This document introduced the researchers, research aims and research 
method (semi-structured interview). It furthermore assured confidentiality and suggested 
topics for discussions. The appendix A contains this brief description of the research. The 
questions posed during the interviews were based on extant theory and literature on 
interfirm management control and trust as well as on institutional theory in sociology 
(ITS). The focus of the research was on the processual implications of governance, 
management control, trust and accounting information. In addition, the context within 
which the interfirm relationship developed was given a careful consideration. A major 
source of the data was the semi-structured interviews with questions based on extant 
theory. But sometimes, new questions relevant to the broad research questions and topic 
emerged during the interviews and such discussions and interactions were useful during 
the analysis. Thus, the case study provided us with flexibility and it was an iterative 
investigation. The interaction between the researchers and the interviewees was weakly 
structured in order to allow better communication of the field insights. The interviews 
were conducted at CF, MF and two supplier firms. The duration of the interviews was 
between 1 and 1 ½ hours. In total 19 semi-structured interviews were conducted in two 
rounds, along with 4 general meetings (as detailed in the table 5) from June 2008 till 
November 2010. 13 interviews were conducted with the managers of CF at different 
hierarchical levels and in different departments such as facilities management, 
purchasing, finance & accounting and manufacturing. Out of the remaining 6 interviews, 
4 were with the managers at MF and 2 with the managers of two different suppliers of the 
facilities services. In the first round 11 interviews and 3 general meetings took place and 
in the second round 1 general meeting and 8 interviews were held. Table 6 gives the 
interviews conducted at CF, table 7 gives the interviews conducted at the MF and table 8 
provides information about interviews with the supplier firms. 
 
 




























































First Round of Interviews
1 March 2009 DvT RE&FM manager 134 
2 March 2009 BT Manager FM-Fabs 67 
3 March 2009 FV Purchase Manager 98 
4 March 2009 PM Manager FM 59 
5 April 2009 FR Managing director (Senior 
VP)
63 
6 April 2009 NW Finance manager 16 
7 April 2009 HvD Finance manager 90 
NW Finance manager
8 April 2009 FvZ RE&FM manager 74 
9 April 2009 JE Site Purchasing Manager 92 
10 April 2009 JP Facility manager 111 
Second Round of Interviews
11 June 2010 FV Purchase Manager 61 
12 Sept. 2010 FvZ RE&FM manager 52 








First Round of Interviews
1 April 2009 ES Account director 97 
Second Round of Interviews
2 July 2010 NF Account director 63 
3 July 2010 CPR Senior facility manager 26 
4 July 2010 NA Facility/ contract manager 58 




1 Oct. 2010 OA Manager 
maintenance
97
2 Nov. 2010 RvW District manager 96
FK District manager






Along the way, documents were studied. The documents included service level 
agreements (SLAs), roadmap documents (monthly meeting documents), quarterly reports, 
organization charts and power point presentations. 
 
3.3.2.  Data collection at field level 
Apart from governance issues at the level of an (inter)organizational relationship this 
thesis also investigated the governance at the level of the field of FM in the Netherlands. 
For the purpose of getting access to potential interviewees the association manager of a 
professional association in the field of FM, called Facility Management Nederland 
(FMN), was contacted in October 2009. In order to introduce the research aims, the 
research process and potential interviewees a meeting was planned with her at the annual 
general meeting of FMN, A written description of the research (see appendix B) was also 
sent. This description outlined the aims of the research, the research topics and the 
questions for interviews. The plan was to arrange interviews with account managers of 
major service providers, FM managers of the client organizations of each of the service 
providers, consultants in the field of facilities management and representatives of 
professional associations in the field of FM in the Netherlands. The association manager 
of FMN sent the research description to the potential interviewees. But interviewees also 
had to be contacted through individual emails, arranging interviews with them. The 
sample letter (email) is shown in the appendix C. All the interviews were recorded on an 
MP3 player and were subsequently fully transcribed. A commitment to confidentiality 
was conveyed in the research description document, the emails and during the interview. 
In total 14 interviews were conducted. The interviewees were managers at 3 different 
service providers, 3 consultants, 6 facilities managers in different big organizations, 1 
representative of FMN and 1 academic. The following table (9) summarizes the field 


































Documents in different forms were the second source of data collected. In case of the 
field level research, the documents included the FM market reports in the Netherlands for 
the year 2006, 2008 & 2010, IFM Market report 2009, academic literature in FM relating 
to the Netherlands, etcetera. (See appendix D for the complete listing of field documents). 
Furthermore the websites of different organizations, (professional associations, 
consultants and service providers) such as Facility Management Nederland (FMN), 
European Facility Management Network (EuroFM), the International Facility 
Management Association (IFMA), Facility Management Excellence and Experience (F-
MEX) and Twynstra Gudde, were browsed and data was used for the description and 
analysis. 
 
3.3.3 Data Analysis 
For the collection of data at the interfirm level the interviews were conducted by at least 
two researchers. After each interview thoughts, impressions and opinions about the 
interview were exchanged between the researchers. This exchange of ideas between the 




1 February 2010 LL Consultant 103 (not 
recorded) 
2 February 2010 JB Facility manager 97 
3 February 2010 DvW Academic 90 
4 February 2010 RL Consultant 88 
5 February 2010 RV Service Provider 59 
6 February 2010 PK FMN 47 
7 February 2010 JF & MvL Facility manager/ Client 
Organization
68 
8 March 2010 GM Consultant 75 
9 March 2010 DK Service Provider 83 
10 April 2010 LvL Facility manager / Client 
Organization
81 
11 April 2010 IL Facility manager 89 
12 April 2010 VvH Facility manager / Client 
Organization
84 
13 April 2010 DvV Facility manager / Client 
Organization
72 
14 April 2010 UG Service Provider 81 





researchers was also recorded and transcribed. However, the interviews for the research 
at the field level of FM were conducted by only one researcher, so no records about the 
discussion of interviews exists. The thoughts and ideas from each interview were an input 
to the future interviews.  
 
All the interviews, pertaining to the field level research, were transcribed by the author of 
this thesis. Self-transcription was very useful in creating intimacy with the data and doing 
the analysis. Different researchers transcribed the interviews pertaining to interfirm level 
research. The transcription of some of the interviews was outsourced to an external 
transcription service. But interview transcripts were carefully scrutinized for any errors 
that might have arisen during external transcription. The transcription of interviews was 
followed by a coding process which enables the recognizing of important issues in the 
transcript prior to the process of interpretation (Fereday and Muir-Cochrane 2006). 
 
There were both deductive codes (derived from the theoretical frameworks) and inductive 
codes (themes emerging from the participant’s discussions) (Fereday and Muir-Cochrane 
2006). The interviews done for interfirm level research also had some questions about the 
field level research and vice versa. The same holds for the deductive codes in both 
interfirm and field level interview transcripts. The list of codes for interfirm governance 
(interfirm level research) and field level governance (field level research) can be seen in 
the appendix E and F respectively.  
 
The transcripts were coded and analysed by using the qualitative data analysis software 
ATLAS.ti. By coding all the material, the software allowed us to manage and organize 
data that helped in the understanding and analysis of the data. The analysis of the 
transcribed interviews was done in three sub-processes, that is, data reduction, data 
display and conclusion drawing / verification (Miles and Huberman 1994b; O'Dwyer 
2004). The careful reading and subsequent coding of all the transcripts gave way to the 
identification of key themes related to the issues of governance at both interfirm and field 
level. Then code-wise prints of all the transcripts were taken and read more than two 
times. During the careful reading themes, comments and memos were identified and 





written by hand on the printed codes and quotations. Then, an extensive comparison of 
themes across interviewees was done (Miles and Huberman 1994b).   
 
The field documents were not coded because of time constraints. Nevertheless, all the 
relevant documents were read (and themes /ideas were written manually) in order to 
identify contradictions or inconsistencies (or confirmation) with the interview themes. An 
effort was made to triangulate the documents and interview transcripts. For instance, the 
review of quarterly reports gave us the description of the performance and the status of 
the interfirm relationship and this was compared with the views expressed by different 
managers. The documents were also helpful in making tables, diagrams and extracting 
contextual information. After the reading of transcripts and emergence of different 
themes, a thick description of the findings was prepared. This process of thick written 
description involved an in-depth analysis characterised by an iterative back-and-forth 
movement between data and theory. Most important was to understand what the data 
meant in a theoretical sense. The credibility of research was enhanced through the use of 
quotes so that interviewees’ voices are heard (O'Dwyer 2004).  
 
In the case of interfirm governance, the findings of the first round of interviews were 
presented at a formal meeting (fourth general meeting) at the CF. In this meeting one of 
the researchers presented her master’s thesis results. She was involved in conducting and 
transcribing a few interviews. Other participants were 4 researchers, manager RE & FM 
and manager purchasing. This meeting helped in eliciting the feedback from the 
practitioners. The overall response of practitioners in this meeting was positive and 
encouraging which suggests ongoing dependability of the research process and the 
credibility of the case findings. However, there were a few interesting and critical 
remarks by the participants. These remarks provided an input for the second round of the 
interviews. The analysis of the first round of interviews also facilitated the identification 
of the gaps in that round.  
 
The conclusions drawn from the first round of interviews were reinvestigated during the 
analysis of the second round in order to find rival explanations and to substantiate the 





theoretical claims made. The field level interviews were conducted in only one round and 
no formal presentation of findings was made due to time constraints. Nevertheless, the 
historical analysis of field documents and academic research in FM, pertaining to the last 
two decades, particularly relating to the Netherlands, helped in understanding the 
development of governance in the field. The theoretical findings of both levels of 
research are the results of repeated drafting and analysis and continual referrals to theory 
and data. Frequent discussions of the results with co-researchers were also an important 
part of the analysis. Such meetings were formal as well as informal. These informal 
meetings, lengthy argumentations and reviews among research colleagues developed an 
intersubjective consensus (Miles and Huberman 1994a) and were important elements that 
resulted in refinements of the results of this study.  
 
Another important point to mention is the writing of the research findings in the form of 
working papers, which were presented at different international conferences including 
RACC (Research Centre for Accounting & Control Change) conferences. This process of 
writing working papers, conference presentations and review reports provided a critical 
input to the analysis and led to the revisit of data and theory. In other words, this process 
proved to be important in enhancing clarity and rigor of the research. 
 
3.4.   Limitations  
One limitation is that the interview transcripts were not sent to the interviewees for a 
review and their feedback or remarks. The respondent validation could have enhanced the 
credibility of the interview data. This feedback is also good to create a good rapport with 
the interviewees that might be helpful for further contacts. This was not possible due to 
time constraints.  
 
In case of the field level research, analysis and conclusions could have been more 
rigorous by doing a longitudinal research. One of the major reasons why a longitudinal 
study was not achievable is the lack of time; a lot of time had to be spent in getting access 
to the organizations. However, the field documents and international academic research 
in FM spanning over the last two decades were collected and analyzed to overcome this 





shortcoming. Some of the documents were in the Dutch language and the researcher tried 
to understand them as much as possible with his own basic knowledge of the language 
and with the help of native Dutch speakers (colleagues and friends). Still more documents 
could have been collected and analyzed had they been in the English language.  
 
3.5. Chapter Summary 
This chapter focused on the research methodology and methods. The chapter started with 
an introduction to qualitative field research with its underlying assumption on the social 
construction of reality. Then in the second section the reasons for using qualitative field 
research methodology were explained. In the third section, it was explained how the 
research developed including a detailed description of how data was collected and 
analyzed. Finally, the chapter ended with a short description of the limitations of the 
methodology.  
 
This thesis investigates the change in governance and related change in management 
control at two different levels i.e. field level and interorganizational level. The following 
chapter develops a theoretical framework for understanding the governance change at the 



















CHAPTER 4: GOVERNANCE, MANAGEMENT CONTROL AND 
INSTITUTIONAL THEORY IN SOCIOLOGY (ITS)6 
 
4.1  Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to review the extant literature on ITS and to construct a 
theoretical framework for understanding governance at the level of field. In other words, 
the aim of this chapter is to develop a theoretical framework for understanding the 
process of social construction and institutionalization of ‘new’ governance and 
management control7 constructs by drawing upon accounting literature based on the 
institutional theory in sociology (ITS) and new directions in ITS.  
 
The chapter is organized as follows. First, a brief review of different streams of 
institutional theories is provided and it is explained why ITS is relevant to this research. 
The chapter continues with the latest insights in ITS. Then a theoretical framework is 
constructed. After that the limitations of the framework are discussed. The chapter ends 
with a summary.  
 
4.2 Institutional theories 
There is not one institutional theory. There are several branches. Extant research in 
accounting and control change has drawn upon different branches. Two important 
branches are important: New Institutional Economics (NIE) and Institutional Theory in 
Sociology (ITS). 
 
There are two distinct branches of institutional theory that offer different explanations for 
observed control structures. Institutional economics, particularly TCE (Coase 1937; 
Williamson 1979; Williamson 1985; Williamson 2002) offers explanations in terms of 
efficiency, which means that actors (organizations) are driven by efficiency maximizing 
behavior. Adoption of a new organizational construct takes place because the 
                                                 
6 Here ITS includes both New Institutional Sociology and Old Institutional Sociology. As suggested by institutional scholars, (e.g; Hirsch & 
Lounsbury 1997) the dichotomy between the old and the new institutional theory is false and misleading one. The new institutional theory is 
more structure-oriented while old institutional theory is action-oriented. The reconciliation of the two theoretical currents provides a more 
balanced approach to action-structure duality (Hirsch & Lounsbury, 1997). 
7 The difference between governance and management control was explained in the first chapter.  





organizations want to attain efficiency. ITS, though not exclusively, offers explanations 
in terms of legitimacy.  
 
ITS suggests that organizations adopt new institutional designs in order to conform to 
societal or institutional requirements and, thus, to become legitimate. When many 
organizations pursue legitimacy in a particular organizational field, a similarity prevails 
in that organizational field. Such a situation is called isomorphism. As it will be 
explained in the coming ITS section, isomorphism could be coercive, mimetic or 
normative. More than one isomorphic pressure may be operating simultaneously and 
potencies of institutional pressures may change over time as a result of constantly 
changing endogenous and exogenous factors (Carpenter and Feroz 2001).  
 
4.2.1 NIE  
Efficiency as a concept is paramount in NIE, particularly in transaction costs economics 
(TCE). Origins of TCE stem from Coase’s (1937) work on the determinants of the 
boundaries of the firm and prominent work has been done by Williamson (1979; 1985; 
1996; 2000). This theory concerns the governance of transactions; it is oriented towards 
the governance structure as an institutional framework. TCE aims to answer the question 
why some transactions take place in firms and others in a market or in a hybrid 
arrangement. TCE responds to the assumption of zero transaction costs in neoclassical 
economic models (Hira and Hira 2000). It assumes that markets are efficient governance 
structures at the outset (Williamson 1975) and the existence of alternative governance 
arrangements is explained by transaction costs of markets as governance structures 
(Vosselman and Van der Meer-Kooistra 2006). Critical features of efficient governance 
include three dimensions of transactions and two behavioral assumptions. The 
dimensions of transactions are uncertainty, asset specificity and the frequency of 
transactions. These dimensions influence the transaction costs and, thus, the rationality of 
the governance structure. The behavioral assumptions are bounded rationality and 
opportunism. Bounded rationality is less than perfect rationality, as people experience 
limitations in their knowledge and their information processing capabilities, leading to 
the impossibility of making optimal decisions (cf.  Chaserant 2003b; Simon 1978; Simon 





1987). The boundedly rational actors may behave opportunistically: given the 
opportunity they are occasionally inclined to serve their own interests by using forms of 
trickery and deceit. In sum, the transaction costs of market transactions are not only 
caused by bounded rationality related to uncertainty, but also by potential opportunistic 
behavior of boundedly rational actors. The degree of opportunism is related to asset 
specificity: the more asset specificity, the higher the risk of opportunistic behaviour. High 
asset specificity (many transaction specific assets) weakens exit threats and increases 
interdependence. An individual party may take advantage of the relationship and transfer 
transaction cost to the other party (Vosselman and Van der Meer-Kooistra 2006).So, as 
per TCE, it is the nature of transactions and the associated transaction costs that are of 
prime importance. TCE takes transactions as the primary unit of analysis and argues that 
transactions would be governed and controlled in a firm or a market or a hybrid between 
a firm and a market, The choice is depending on the minimization of the sum of 
production costs and transaction costs. Transaction costs include costs of writing 
contracts, supervision costs, opportunity costs associated with opportunistic behavior and 
costs of investment in specific assets (Van der Steen 2006). In other words, from a TCE-
perspective, efficiency (reduction of costs) is the driving force behind a change in 
governance. It assumes that decision makers in organizations consciously opt for a 
comparatively efficient form. The decision maker shows efficiency-seeking behavior 
(Vosselman and Van der Meer-Kooistra 2006). Although it is good to have the possibility 
of efficiency-seeking behaviour in changing governance and management control in 
mind, TCE is not considered an appropriate theoretical lens for this research project 
because it underemphasizes the process of change (Mahnke 2001). It does not focus on 
the processes through which governance structures and management control structures 
develop, but its focus is on why observed governance structures exist (Vosselman and 
Van der Meer-Kooistra 2006). In other words, TCE would consider governance forms as 
already available the field level without shedding any light where those governance forms 
come from. TCE provides intentional explanations for such structures (Vromen 1995). 
Thus, TCE may not provide an adequate apparatus for understanding the processes of 
governance and control change. Moreover, the focus of this research project is also on 
developments at the level of the field of FM. As TCE’s unit of analysis is the 





transaction(s), its potential contribution would be restricted to the governance and control 
of the transactional relationship. 
  
4.2.2  ITS 
ITS premises that institutions and processes of institutionalization may exist at different 
levels namely a society, a state, an organizational field, a community, an organization, a 
group or an individual (Scott 2008a; Suddaby and Greenwood 2009). The institutions are 
located in carriers such as cultures, social structures and routines (Scott 1995). Cultures 
are interpretive structures, patterns of meaning and rule systems; social structures are 
expectations attached to social networks, formal positions and role systems; and routines 
are the habitualized behaviors, competencies and technologies stored in organizational 
memories (Scott 1995; Thornton 2002). Institutions are both supra-organizational 
patterns of activity through which humans conduct their material life in time and space, 
and symbolic systems through which they categorize that activity and infuse it with a 
meaning (Friedland and Alford 1991). In our research at the level of the field of FM in 
the Netherlands, governance is conceptualized as an institution because the deployment 
of governance entails material social relations or practices as well as communication of 
meanings. The change in the institution of governance, particularly the emergence and 
development of IFM in the field of facilities services, is the focus of this research. Each 
institution is governed by logics, which are a set of material practices and symbolic 
constructions (Friedland & Alford, 1991). The meanings and practices are co-constitutive 
of each other (Mohr 2000). The logic constitutes the organizing principles of an 
institution and is available to organizations and individuals to elaborate (Friedland and 
Alford 1991). Institutional logics are contradictory and may change over time. Thus a 
change in institutional logics entails a change in an institution i.e. both new social 
relationships and new symbolic orders / interpretations of reality. Institutional 
contradictions may serve as the bases for the most important political conflicts and 
institutional change. Individuals and organizations may politicize institutional 
contradictions and transform institutions. Actors who transform institutions are 
institutional entrepreneurs. This thesis is an attempt to understand and interpret the 





change of governance as an institution. It tries to inscribe processes of institutionalization 
(that are essentially processes of social construction) at the level of the FM-field.   
 
ITS advances the argument that formal organizational structure reflects more than simple 
technological imperatives (Lawrence and Lorsch 1967; Thompson 1967) and resources 
dependencies (Pfeffer 1972; Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). This ‘more’ consists of 
institutional forces or rationalized myths (Scott 2008a). As cited in Meyer & Rowan 
(1977, p.341) institutionalized rules are classifications built into society as reciprocated 
typifications or interpretations (Berger and Luckman 1967) and such rules may be simply 
taken for granted or may be supported by the public opinion or the force of law (Starbuck 
1976).Thus, institutions are ‘rules, norms and beliefs that describe reality for the 
organization, explaining what is and is not, what can be acted upon and what cannot’ 
(Hoffman 1999; p.351). ITS suggests that the organizations incorporate institutional rules 
in order to conform to societal or institutional requirements (external environment) and, 
thus, gaining legitimacy, resources, stability and enhanced survival prospects (Meyer and 
Rowan 1977). Legitimacy is ‘a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of 
an entity are desirable, proper or appropriate within some socially constructed system of 
norms, values, beliefs and definitions’ (Suchman 1995; p.574). The legitimacy brings 
support and acceptability in society. Since many organizations in a specific field or sector 
try to become legitimate, this results in isomorphism that is the similarity (of any type) in 
several organizations. Isomorphism may be due to coercive (dependency, legislative 
requirements or cultural expectations in society), mimetic (copying the successful 
companies in uncertainty) or normative (pressures from professionalism) mechanisms 
(DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Powell and DiMaggio 1991). These three types of 
isomorphism are associated with three pillars of ITS that may constrain behavior, namely, 
regulative, normative and cognitive pillars. The regulative pillar influences action 
through coercion and threat of formal sanction, the normative pillar directs action through 
norms of acceptability, morality and ethics and the cognitive pillar guides action through 
the different categories and frames by which actors know and interpret their world (Scott 
1995). However, more than one isomorphic pressure may be operating simultaneously. 
The degree of institutional pressures may change over time as a result of constantly 





changing endogenous (e.;g key decision maker’s norms, values and unconscious 
conformity to traditions and ideologies, motivation, competence and professionalism at 
the individual level; and shared belief systems, power and politics at the organizational 
level) and exogenous factors (e.g; regulatory pressures, public pressures, professional 
norms and values at the organizational field level) (Carpenter and Feroz 2001).  
 
4.3 Developments in ITS 
4.3.1 Bridging institutional economics and institutional sociology 
Critics have stated that TCE provides for an under-socialized account (it gives too little 
emphasis to social relations or embeddedness) whereas ITS provides for an over-
socialized perspective (it pays too much attention to social relations or embeddedness) 
(Granovetter 1985).They argue that the models that combine both institutional 
perspectives might have the potential to provide more balanced explanations. Some 
scholars suggest that there is a tendency of early adoptions of organizational constructs to 
be driven by efficiency rather than legitimacy considerations (DiMaggio and Powell 
1983; Tolbert and Zucker 1983). Such an institutional embeddedness of efficiency-
seeking behavior is also paramount in a framework designed by (Roberts and Greenwood 
1997). They (ibid) incorporate both efficiency and legitimacy aspects in the development 
of a Constraint Efficiency Framework for organizational design adoption. They (ibid) 
have connected elements from TCE and ITS and argue that organizations are efficiency 
seeking under cognitive and institutional constraints, as opposed to efficiency optimizing. 
Efficiency-seeking behavior is thus institutionally embedded. At least to some extent, 
organizations are embedded in both relational and institutionalized contexts and have to 
manage the demands of internal and boundary spanning relations as well as ceremonial 
demands of highly institutionalized environments (Meyer and Rowan 1977).  
 
Previous studies of management control change emphasize legitimacy along with 
traditional economic factors as the drivers of change (For instance Abernethy and Chua 
1996; Covaleski and Dirsmith 1988; Granlund 2001; Granlund and Lukka 1998; Modell 
2001) and relate the diffusion of control innovations to different reasons including 
efficiency and legitimacy (mimetic isomorphism), or a mix of these factors over a period 





of time (Malmi 1999). The institutional and market forces may not be dichotomous but 
rather complementary (Tsamenyi, Cullen, and Gonzalez 2006). 
 
Latest accounting research (drawing upon ITS) indicates that both efficiency and 
legitimacy considerations might operate and that they need not be mutually exclusive 
(Hopper and Major 2007). In other words, legitimacy and efficiency may be intertwined 
(Hopper and Major 2007). Moreover, the social and institutional may create or construct 
the economic and actors may draw on efficiency considerations as a means for attaining 
social legitimacy (Hopper and Major 2007).  
 
ITS scholars also suggest that a decision guided by legitimacy considerations is not 
irrational (or the mimicry is not without any logic) and isomorphism does not necessarily 
mean a-rational mimesis (Lounsbury 2008). It is based on institutional rationality (i.e. 
rationalized myths which refer to broader cultural beliefs and rules that structure 
cognition and guide decision making in the field (Lounsbury 2008; Meyer and Rowan 
1977)), as opposed to individual rationality as it is proclaimed in economics. The 
dichotomy between efficiency and legitimacy, or between the technical and the 
institutional, has also been criticized by contemporary institutional scholars. For instance, 
Lounsbury (2008) argues that the technical considerations (efficiency considerations) are 
institutionally embedded. The two-stage diffusion model, which says that early adopters 
are interested in efficiency and later adopters in legitimacy, has also been challenged 
(ibid). Some scholars argue that efficiency is a social construct and what is perceived to 
be efficient might also be a product of socially constructed categories and 
institutionalized assumptions about the world (Dobbin 1994; Suddaby and Greenwood 
2009). 
 
4.3.2 The progression of institutional theory 
ITS has progressed as a theory over many years since its foundational work in 1977 by 
Meyer & Rowan. The table 10 below summarizes the progress in ITS as discussed by 
Scott (2008a): 
 





Table 108. Development in ITS 
Topics / Issues Earlier Conceptions Progress / Developments 
From looser to 
tighter 
conceptualization 
Stress on the role of habit and history in 
constraining choice or force of moral pressure 
and customs in cementing social order. 
Regulative elements, underpinning rules, have 
received more attention than cultural-cognitive 
elements (underpinning beliefs) and normative 
elements (underpinning norms). 
Emphasis on the importance of symbolic systems and mental maps that 
provide guidelines for the behavior. 
Growing recognition that regulatory system, though more visible, are 




Institutional environments are contexts imposing 
requirements and / or constraints on 
organizations which gives an impression of a 
determinant, top down perspective. The 
organizations are passive to homogenous 
requirements. 
Homogenization pressures strongest in delimited organization fields. 
Organizational fields are fragmented or conflicted and wider institutional 
orders (economy, state, etc.) influence the organizational field with 
competing institutional logics offering competing interpretations and 
solutions to the problems in a given situation and ultimately bring 
institutional change. 
Attention should be deflected from the analysis of extant institutions to 
the processes of institutionalization which is the product of political 
efforts of the actors with varying powers that influence the form of new 
institutions. 





Organizations exhibit ceremonial conformity to 
the institutional pressures and actual practices 
are decoupled from the structural changes.  
Changes in formal rules and structures might seem superficial but they 
become more significant over time. There could be varying degrees of 
decoupling of structure and action. The structural changes may bring 
substantive changes or may shape the roles and identities in subtle ways. 
From assertions 
to evidence 
Institutional effects were often asserted without 
measures that support them. Explanatory 
measures such as legitimacy were unmeasured or 
only indirectly inferred. 
Appropriate and imaginative measures developed to capture changes in 
the rules, norms and belief systems. The indicators employed include 
amount & content of media, types of training programs, types of social 
logics, registration, certification, accreditation, types of regulatory 
legislation, lawsuits filed, etc. 
From 
Organization-
centric to field 
level approaches 
Early sociological work using institutional 
arguments was about case studies of single 
organizations. Too much focus on relational and 
structural features of fields. 
Focus not on the organizations in environments (organization fields) but 
on organization of the environment, with attention to organizations as the 
major players. More attention to symbolic or cultural elements of fields 
and co-production of relational systems and meanings as constituent 
elements. Field may also form around issues rather than common products 







Conflict implied between institutional 
requirements and efficient performance making 
institutional theory socially legitimate and 
relevant to inefficient organizations. Most of the 
research focused on non-profit organizations.  
Extent of market or institutional pressures varies in sectors but all 
organizations operate in both technical (market) and institutional 
environments. Recognition that rules, norms and belief systems undergird 
all stable social systems including economic systems. Institutional 
processes provide rules and norms which govern competition and cultural 





Focus on stability, order and convergent change. 
Concentration on showing the institutional 
effects through primarily cross-sectional studies.  
External (wider systems or neighboring systems; carriers of new 
institutional logics) and internal reasons (inconsistencies; persisting poor 
performance, etc.) change institutional systems. Structuration processes 
should not be neglected. Investigation of the construction of new 
institutional arrangements and deinstitutionalization of existing 
institutions is an important development. Longitudinal studies have been 
proposed for further examination. 
 
                                                 
8 The table has been made by the author of this thesis though it heavily draws from Scott (2008). 






4.4 A theoretical model of the institutionalization of new governance forms 
An analysis of the literature reveals that there has been much emphasis on adoption and 
diffusion of organizational constructs9 rather than on the construction of new institutional 
arrangements. This tendency makes an ITS–perspective similar to a rational choice 
perspective (See also Quattrone and Hopper 2001) because both show the response of an 
organization or an actor to something that is already available at an organization field 
level. Viewing in this way, in the rational choice perspective the modes or institutions of 
governance are just ‘given’ as ontologies that exist ‘out there’. From an ITS perspective 
the governance institutions are also considered to be ‘out there’, albeit socially 
constructed. Extant accounting and control research drawing upon ITS paid much 
attention to an understanding of the conformity individual organizations show in adopting 
new governance institutions, with hardly any attention for the path creating and path 
changing individuals or organizations to whom we refer as institutional entrepreneurs 
(See a special issue on institutional entrepreneurship reviewed by Garud, Hardy, and 
Maguire 2007). We suggest that both sides of the coin (adoption and construction) have 
to be taken into account. Therefore, there is a need for a more comprehensive model on 
the institutionalization of governance. This framework emphasizes the study of non-
isomorphic change preceding the usual adoption or adaptation and diffusion i.e. the 
isomorphic change at field level. Field data may contribute to refinement of ideas 
expressed in this framework.  
 
To a large extent the development of a new governance institution takes place through the 
interplay between the level of the interfirm relationship and the level of the 
organizational field, where networks of organizations and professionals emerge and 
develop. Therefore, the framework to be developed here takes a multi-level focus. It takes 
both the interfirm level and the field level under scrutiny (although the emphasis is on the 
field level). This is an important extension of extant institutional frameworks that focus 
on the level of the individual organization, without much explicit attention to the field of 
organizations to which an individual organization belongs (Exceptions include Dillard, 
                                                 
9 The word ‘organizational construct’ means an organizational form as well as a governance / management control structure. 





Rigsby, and Goodman 2004; Hopper and Major 2007). However, there is an important 
additional extension and that extension concerns the significance of agency and 
institutional entrepreneurship.  
 
In short, the theoretical framework that is constructed allows for both a multi-level 
understanding and for a prominent role for agency, particularly for the role of 
institutional entrepreneurs. Institutional entrepreneurs are skilled actors who use existing 
cultural and linguistic materials to narrate and theorize change so that other social groups 
in the field agree to cooperate in the change process (Greenwood, Suddaby, and Hinings 
2002; Maguire, Hardy, and Lawrence 2004) and try to connect the new practices to 
stakeholders’ routines and values (Maguire, Hardy, and Lawrence 2004). By exploring 
the concept of institutional entrepreneurship we extend the analysis from the adoption of 
‘new’ governance institutions by individual organizations (and, from a field level 
perspective, the related diffusion across organizations) towards the construction of new 
governance institutions.  
 
4.4.1 Incorporating the concept of institutional entrepreneurship in a multi-level 
focus on governance / control change 
Established institutions are stable and persistent. They create path dependencies. 
However, institutions do change with the passage of time. The institutions change as a 
result of functional, political or social pressures (Dacin, Goodstein, and Scott 2002).The 
concept of institutional entrepreneurship is helpful in exploring how actors shape 
emerging institutions and transform existing ones despite the complexities and path 
dependencies that are involved (Garud, Hardy, and Maguire 2007). These institutional 
entrepreneurs can be individuals or organizations. Institutional entrepreneurs are the 
actors who have an interest in a particular institutional arrangement; they leverage 
resources to create new institutions or to transform existing ones (Maguire, Hardy, and 
Lawrence 2004). Institutional entrepreneurs break with existing rules and practices 
associated with the dominant institutional logics and institutionalize alternative rules, 
practices or logics in which they are interested (Battilana 2006; Garud and Karnoe 2001). 
The alternative rule, practice or logic (in our case, the alternative governance) becomes 





institutionalized when it is shared and taken for granted across a wider field and the 
deviation from it is sanctioned or requires appropriate justification. Institutional 
entrepreneurs may explore legitimacy and they may create institutions which are 
appropriate for them and which foster their interests. These agents, having resources, 
bring institutional change and they change the character of the institutions (Dacin, 
Goodstein, and Scott 2002). They are powerful actors who shape the change in a process 
that may be highly political. Sometimes, even less powerful actors may shape the 
institutional change, especially in emerging fields. This is, for instance, demonstrated by 
a study into HIV/AIDS treatment advocacy in Canada (Maguire, Hardy, and Lawrence 
2004). The concept of ‘institutional entrepreneurship’ provides a ground for 
understanding how certain new organizational governance forms emerge and become 
established over time. It reintroduces the concepts of agency, interests and power into the 
institutional analysis of organizations (Garud, Hardy, and Maguire 2007). Institutions are 
not only constraints, but also a platform for entrepreneurial activities. Change is 
embedded in institutions, but is also the result of human and/or organizational agency.  
 
Incorporating the concept of institutional entrepreneurship into the analysis encourages a 
multi-level focus. As is stated before, most of the ITS-informed studies into control 
change have focused on the adoption of control structures (for instance ‘balanced 
scorecards’) at the level of the individual organization. The inherent assumption is, that 
these structures are ‘available’ at field level and that, from the perspective of the field, 
they are diffused across organizations. However, before these structures can be diffused 
and adopted, they have to be designed and (socially) constructed. The design and 
construction takes place in the interplay between the level of the individual organization 
and the level of the organizational field. Though social construction takes place prior to 
adoption and diffusion, every adoption enhances diffusion and as a result reinforces the 
construction. In fact, this is the process of institutionalization. The outcome of an 
institutionalization process is a new or changed institution of governance that is a 
sufficiently powerful suggestion for an efficient solution to the problems experienced at 
the level of individual organizations; or just a sufficiently powerful suggestion of how 
things should be at the level of the individual organization. When a particular institution 





of governance becomes so pervasive that it attains a kind of taken for granted status (e.g 
it is considered to be the efficient and legitimated form) and the deviation from its 
adoption has to be justified, it is called institutionalized. Essentially, the process of social 
construction is a result of the interplay between the field and the firm level.  
 
Institutional entrepreneurs are important in this interplay. They are powerful actors that 
take an interest in a particular institutional arrangement. They deploy resources at their 
disposal to create and empower such arrangements. They bring about change while 
advancing their own agendas (Dirsmith 2007; Mizruchi and Fein 1999). One important 
category of such actors is the category of professionals, often organized in professional 
networks. These actors project new governance forms in the field, support and advertise 
them by explaining benefits and by highlighting disadvantages of the competing 
alternatives. The focus of the framework developed in the following sub-section is on the 
process of institutionalization of new governance forms and, thus, on the interplay 
between the level of the individual organization and the level of the organizational field.  
 
4.4.2 Towards a theoretical framework for the understanding of change in 
governance  
Change in forms of governance could be of two modes: construction and reproduction. 
The construction mode may involve design activity (at the level of a specific interfirm 
relationship) as well as political action in political arenas. Particularly organizational 
fields can be conceptualized as political arenas where power relations are maintained and 
transformed (Clemens and Cook 1999; Lounsbury and Ventresca 2003) and where 
contestation and struggle are at the heart of the construction processes (Garud and Rappa 
1994; Maguire and Hardy 2006). The reproduction mode involves adoption and 
diffusion. The adoption (and further tailor-design) of the governance form in specific 
interfirm relationships reproduces the governance form at the organizational level (or 
interfirm level) as it is already available at the level of the organizational field. Such a 
reproduction might entail (small) changes that affect the original construct and that 
reproduces it (and thus slightly changes it) at the level of the organizational field. Both 





modes of change (construction and reproduction) can be existent at both levels i.e. the 
(inter)firm level and the field level. 
 
Hargrave and Van de Ven (2006) 
We draw on the Hargrave and Van de Ven (2006) model to come up with a modified 
theoretical framework for understanding governance change. Linking the two modes of 
change with the two levels of analyses (the firm and the organizational field), they (ibid) 
describe four perspectives on institutional change: institutional design, collective action, 
institutional adaptation and institutional diffusion. We have made a simple version of 
these four perspectives for the sake of clarity as shown in figure 5. 
 
Figure 5: Perspectives on institutional change 
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In figure 5, looking vertically there are two modes of change namely construction and 
reproduction. Looking horizontally the focus could be on an individual organization or 
multiple organizations (i.e. field). The construction mode of change shows purposeful 
strategies to create or change an institution (governance) to solve a problem or injustice 
either at an individual organization (or interfirm relation) or at field level. The strategies 
are, of course, influenced by the existing internal and external institutions. If the 
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construction is at an individual organization (or interfirm relation) it is called institutional 
design and if it is at the field level it is called collective action. The reproduction mode of 
change implies the adoption of an existing construct either by an individual organization 
or by multiple organizations for any reason (in the form of isomorphism). The adoption 
and further adaptation at the local level to the specifics of a particular context (i.e. a 
particular interfirm relationship) is called institutional adaptation and the spreading across 
many organization in a field is called institutional diffusion. The diffusion process is 
characterized by evolutionary processes of variation, selection and retention. In this 
process, when organizations adopt new practices, they also customize it to their 
circumstances with some variations and over time some practices are selected and 
retained similar to the evolution of the nature. This concept comes from organizational 
institutional ecology literature (e.g; Carroll and Hannan 1989; Hannan and Freeman 
1989). The four perspectives on institutional change are not only alternative perspectives 
on a single phenomenon but also represent different temporal phases of one complete 
institutional change process.  
 
From figure 6 the important additional observation can be made that human agency is 
particularly important in the construction mode of change. It comes in the form of 
purposeful action and it entails (social) construction and political action. Political action 
involves conflict and power. Power also shapes behavior and thus efficiency-seeking or 
legitimacy-seeking behavior may not be the only causes for an institutional change at the 
local level. Instead, the actions may be driven by the desire to maintain power. 
 
4.4.3 A theoretical framework 
To develop a framework that is capable of offering a comprehensive theoretical 
understanding of a development towards the construction of new governance forms , we 
use the four perspectives of Hargrave & Van de Van (2006). We focus on an explicit 
inclusion of professionals and professional networks as field level institutional 
entrepreneurs. . We also add a time line to show that these processes take place over a 
period of time. The modified model is depicted in figure 6. 
 





Figure 6: Theoretical Framework        
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Starting from the construction mode, figure 6 can be explained as follows The interaction 
between professionals and professional networks and a local organization’s purposeful 
strategy to change governance (institutional (re)design) precedes field level social 
construction (collective action). Essential in the process of getting socially constructed and 
institutionalized is the local design of a new governance mode. The new local governance 
can spread to other organizations once it is socially constructed in a specific filed of 
organizations by the professionals and other important field level organizations. As the 
number of local organizations adopting the new governance form increases, the governance 
form starts to get more legitimacy. Other local organizations feel isomorphic pressures 
(coercive, mimetic and normative) and start adopting such a form. Such isomorphism is at 
the basis of institutional diffusion, something that takes place at field level. So, construction 
initiates reproduction in the form of local adoption and may entail diffusion (as a 
consequence of several local adoptions) at field level. At the same time, each reproduction 
reinforces construction. There is interaction between construction and reproduction. While 





in prior studies the emphasis has been on reproduction in the form of isomorphism (right 
hand side of the figure 6), our focus is on the construction aspect (left hand side of figure 6). 
 
We suggest that professionals such as consultants and facilities management professionals 
are important institutional entrepreneurs shaping institutions of governance. They are 
organized in professions and professional networks that encompass organizations such as 
academic institutes, non-academic practitioner platforms and other organizations used for 
disseminating ideas and making contacts. The professionals and their networks play active 
role in constructing (or in helping to construct) a specific governance institution at the level 
of an organizational field. They mediate not only in construction but also in local 
reproduction., for instance, by consultancy services, conferences, seminars, publications and 
training programs. In short, they frame the institution of governance and they construct 
networks and coalitions in order to create its market (and, thus, the perception of efficiency) 
and its legitimacy. They affect both modes of change (construction and reproduction) and 
are active at both the level of field and the local level. They need not necessarily be the 
originators of a new governance form though. The new governance form might originate at a 
specific (inter)firm level, looking for a solution to a problem it experiences, or seeking for 
more efficiency. The design activity at the local level may also be induced by some other 
factor, for instance a change in management. Furthermore, the new form may also originate 
in an interaction between locals and professionals. But the innovation (originating either 
from the local or from the interaction between the local and professionals) may not get 
further constructed at field level without the support of professionals and their networks who 
project this innovation to the field. They theorize or frame the benefits of the new practice or 
institution of governance and make coalitions with big players (other professionals and 
major organizations) in the field (Greenwood, Suddaby, and Hinings 2002). In other words, 
the construction at field level calls for collective action (Hargrave and Van de Ven 2006). 
 
During the collective action of the construction process, the professionals theorize the 
governance form. Such theorization essentially is a process through which organizational 
failings are conceptualized and linked to potential solutions (Greenwood, Suddaby, and 
Hinings 2002).The professions and professional networks theorize a new alternative; they 





endorse local innovations (provide success stories of companies which use that particular 
governance form) and shape the construction and further diffusion of that governance form 
(Greenwood, Suddaby, and Hinings 2002; Scott 2008b). Of course, there might be conflict, 
power or politics among the professions themselves regarding the utility and legitimacy of 
the innovation. This might hinder or slow down the social construction of the new 
governance form. 
 
The time line in the diagram shows that this interactive process of construction and 
reproduction takes place over a longer period of time. But construction is necessary prior to 
reproduction, although each reproduction also reinforces construction, at least in the 
beginning. It has to be emphasized that some innovations do not institutionalize, while 
others do. Professions and professional networks play important roles as institutional 
entrepreneurs. They are central to the process of institutionalization. Yet, they are not the 
only ones. Also a local adopting organization may create a new governance form during a 
translation process. Nevertheless, field level construction of any governance form heavily 
depends on the role of professionals and professional networks. Even the evolutionary 
changes as a consequence of the various local translations are communicated to the field by 
the professionals and their networks.  
 
The above framework is useful but it has some limitations also. It seems that the 
organization that is involved in institutional design is somehow free of the influence of the 
institutional environment and that it can come up with efficient solutions. This shows a kind 
of instrumental rationality wherein actors (organizations) can strategically respond to the 
institutional pressures (Lounsbury 2008; Oliver 1991). The following section explains how 
another kind of rationality, called institutional rationality, also influences the choices made 
by the individuals and organizations. In other words, the framework did not elucidate why 
the professionals and professional networks or individual organizations pursue the 









4.5 Limitations of the theoretical framework: instrumental rationality and 
institutional rationality  
This section explores the limitations of the theoretical framework developed in the previous 
section and also discusses the two different concepts of rationality i.e. instrumental 
rationality and institutional rationality (cf. Lounsbury, 2008). The organizations can 
strategically act in their own interests and react to institutional pressures in different forms 
such as defiance, manipulation, compromise, etc. (Oliver, 1991). Lounsbury (2008) labels 
this kind of rationality as instrumental rationality. The above part explains the instrumental 
rationality of how a new governance form can emerge and develop in a specific field. It also 
revealed the role of some actors as institutional entrepreneurs and the apparent reasons 
(efficiency or legitimacy) for the adoption of a particular governance form across the field. 
Instrumental rationality valorizes the autonomy of individuals to take decisions in ways that 
strategically serve their material interests (Lounsbury 2008) and assumes an institution-free 
conception of interest and power in which actors have objective interests independent of 
their understandings (Friedland and Alford 1991). The framework emphasized the role of 
professionals and professional networks but it did not discuss the influence of existing 
institutions on their actions. The instrumental rationality does not allow a deeper 
understanding of why a field changes. In order to understand why the governance changes in 
the field, we need to look at the institutional rationality that guides the cognition and 
decision of field participants or actors. Institutional rationality is a collective rationality that 
guides individual behavior and is beyond the discretion of an individual or an organization. 
It emphasizes the role of broader structures of meaning without being deterministic 
(Lounsbury 2008). It brings attention to the institutional logics that prevail in the field and 
how these logics are connected to the broader societal logics and orders. Institutional logics 
are, “the socially constructed, historical patterns of material practices, assumptions, values, 
beliefs and rules by which individuals produce and reproduce their material subsistence, 
organize time and space and provide meaning to their social reality’’ (Thornton and Ocasio 
1999; p.804). Institutional logics define the content and meaning of institutions. A focus on 
institutional rationality calls for an approach that focuses on the effects of differentiated 
institutional logics (instead of isomorphism) on individuals and organizations in a larger 
variety of contexts, including markets, industries and populations of organizational forms 





(Thornton and Ocasio 2008). Institutional logics shape rational, mindful behavior and at the 
same time individual and organizational actors shape and change the institutional logics 
(Thornton 2004). Thus, the institutional logics provide a link between institutions and 
action, that is, situated forms of organizing (actions taken at local level) are linked with 
beliefs and practices in wider institutional environments (Thornton and Ocasio 2008). Each 
institution has a central logic which is a set of material practices and symbolic constructions. 
The logic constitutes the organizing principles of an institution and is available to 
organizations and individuals to elaborate (Friedland and Alford 1991). The institutional 
logics are contradictory and may change over time. The core meta-institutions of western 
society are the capitalist market, the bureaucratic state, family, democracy and religion, and 
each of these institutions has a central logic (Friedland and Alford 1991). The typology of 
the core meta-institutions is further developed by Thornton (2004), who states that the 
western societies are composed of six societal sectors- the market, the corporation, the 
professions, the family, the religions and the state (Thornton, Jones, and Kury 2005). 
Because the institutional logics of the aforementioned meta-institutions are inherently 
contradictory, such institutional contradictions may serve as the bases for the most important 
political conflicts and for institutional change. Individuals, groups and organizations may 
exploit these institutional contradictions to transform institutions. The institutional logics 
approach emphasizes that individual and organizational behavior can be understood when 
such a behavior is located in a social and institutional context that both regularizes behavior 
and provides opportunity for agency and change (Thornton and Ocasio 2008).  
 
Furthermore, the above framework still maintains a dichotomy between technical and 
institutional forces because the organization at the institutional design side has a stronger 
focus on technical aspects such as efficiency and the organization at the institutional 
adoption side has a stronger focus on legitimacy seeking. However, the framework does not 
connect the decisions of a local organization with the institutional environment. Lastly, the 
model emphasizes the power of professions and professional networks without explaining 
why such professionals and their networks are behaving in such a way. They have some 
logics of action which may be connected to the institutional environment in the field and at a 
higher level in the society. Thus we need a more penetrating and broader examination of the 





governance change in the field. Such an examination requires the conceptualization of the 
organizational field as containing multiple and competing logics (Friedland and Alford 
1991; Lounsbury 2008). 
 
4.6 Summary of the chapter  
This chapter reviewed extant research that drew upon ITS. There has been an emphasis on 
the need for legitimacy and isomorphism. The individual organization just responds to 
institutional pressures, be they of a coercive, mimetic or normative nature. There is 
isomorphism at the level of the organizational field. The research shows that the 
organizations primarily show legitimacy-seeking behavior instead of efficiency-seeking 
behavior.   
 
This chapter purposefully developed a theoretical framework for the understanding of the 
institutionalization of a new governance / construct at the field level. The framework has 
room for both efficiency-seeking behavior and legitimacy-seeking behavior. Whether 
efficiency is in legitimacy or legitimacy is in efficiency, is an open question that has to be 
answered by field research. But the contribution of institutional theory to the understanding 
of change in control structures is extended by explicitly emphasizing institutional 
entrepreneurship in the social construction at the field level. Such entrepreneurship is 
assumed to be particularly undertaken by professionals such as consultants and professional 
associations. They are the ‘lords of the dance’(Scott 2008b). The professionals design (or 
help designing) the new governance, they mediate in the adoption of this new organizational 
construct by individual organizations and they help to accelerate the institutionalization of 
the construct at the level of an organizational field. The introduction of institutional 
entrepreneurship in the analysis calls for a multi-level focus. The framework regards the 
interaction between the level of the individual organization and the level of the 
organizational field. Following Hargrave and Van de Ven (2006) it distinguishes between 
two modes of change: a construction mode and a reproduction mode. A new governance 
form spreads in the field after construction, whether originally created by an individual 
organization or by the interaction between organizations and professionals. Its origin might 
be driven by technical considerations, by efficiency-considerations and/or by a change in 





external circumstances. After its origination a construct (governance) is socially constructed 
at the level of the organizational field through collective action by institutional 
entrepreneurs, particularly professionals and their networks. Once constructed at the level of 
organizational field, the construct is diffused across many organizations through 
isomorphism (adoption and diffusion).  
 
The following chapter (5), employs this framework to shed light on the social construction 
of a new governance form (IFM) in the field of FM in the Netherlands. Such research may 
provide the answers to important questions like how and why fields change, how is the 
process of field level construction and what are the roles of the parties (individuals or 
organizations) involved (particularly the way professionals ‘theorize’ the change) in the 
social construction of rationalized myths of alternative governance. The construction process 
takes place over a longer period of time and in order to understand the construction process 
at field level, a historical method or a longitudinal study would be adequate. But for the lack 
of time this research is cross sectional although documents collected pertain to a longer 
period of time. It will provide an understanding of how a construct evolved over time along 
with the roles played by different actors in this process.  
 
There are some limitations of this theoretical framework. Firstly, there might be state, 
societal and/or global effects on an organizational field. They may provide opportunities to 
the institutional entrepreneurs for the construction of an alternative governance or may 
change the course of the construction of an alternative governance. Moreover, professional 
networks may involve non-human aspects, for instance, electronic and print media and 
others means of communications. These aspects remain implicit in the framework 
developed. Thirdly, the theoretical framework provides an instrumental rationality 
perspective on the change in a particular field. However, institutional rationality is more 
suited to a deep understanding of why a field changes. The institutional logics of a field are 
connected to wider societal logics and such a connection may provide explanations for the 
changes in a specific field. The institutional rationality challenges the two stage model 
where initial adopters of any governance are efficiency seeking and later adopters are 
legitimacy seeking because it reveals that the technical and institutional forces are not 





separate and distinct. It emphasizes that what is considered to be efficient or legitimate is 
socially constructed. Therefore, these factors were also considered during data collection 


































CHAPTER 5: GOVERNANCE CHANGE AT FIELD LEVEL—FIELD INSIGHTS  
 
5.1. Introduction 
In the first chapter of this thesis, it was outlined that this research investigates governance 
change at the field level as well as at an interfirm level. The purpose of this chapter is to 
reflect on the field level change in governance by drawing on field level data. The 
questions related to the field level study are re-written as follows: 
 
Why and how is governance changing in the field of facilities services in the 
Netherlands? 
How is IFM being socially constructed at the level of the field of facilities services and 
what in particular is the role of institutional entrepreneurs? 
 
In order to respond to these research questions, the previous chapter, particularly the 
theoretical framework developed in that chapter, along with field data (interviews and 
documents) will be used. The field under investigation is the field of FM in the 
Netherlands. This chapter investigates the change in governance (i.e. the emergence and 
further development of IFM). It comprises three sections. Next section (5.2) describes 
and analyzes how the field of FM is changing particularly with reference to IFM. Here, 
the focus is on the instrumental rationality. Particular attention is given to the institutional 
entrepreneurs. This section explains how the institutional entrepreneurs are shaping the 
field of FM and how they are constructing IFM. The subsequent section (5.3) investigates 
why the governance is changing in the field of FM. This section emphasizes the 
institutional rationality with a particular focus on the institutional logics and institutional 
order that influence all the actors in the field, including the institutional entrepreneurs. A 











5.2. IFM Field Description and Analysis: How is the field changing? 
 
5.2.1. Depicting the field 
As the aim of this research is to gain a richer understanding of the process of social 
construction of IFM in the field of facilities services in the Netherlands, it is necessary to 
describe what precisely the field is. A field is not formed around common technologies or 
common industries, but around issues that bring together various field constituents with 
disparate purposes (Hoffman, 1999, p.352). Therefore, in this research the organizational 
field comprises all the organizations that are in some way or another connected to IFM (a 
governance form). Figure 7 below depicts the field as it is the focus of this research. We 
will discuss IFM and all the field participants one by one along with their role in the 
social construction of IFM. 
 



















5.2.2. Constructing IFM  
In what follows, the field is described in more detail. Moreover, this subsection 
demonstrates how the field of FM has been changing over time. Particular attention is paid 
to the instrumental rationality of the institutional entrepreneurs who have been very dynamic 
in the construction of IFM in the field of FM in the Netherlands. How do they strategically 
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respond to the institutional pressures they experience? The institutional entrepreneurs in this 
case were the service providers and consultants, particularly the international ones because 
they initiated the idea of IFM in the Netherlands. The initial client organization that went for 
IFM was also a multinational organization. The precedent set by the international 
organizations was followed and taken seriously by the local service providers and 
consultants which gave momentum to the construction of IFM. The professional 
associations’ have mostly been inclined towards the dissemination of knowledge, concepts 
and best practices. Moreover, these professional associations were the networks used by the 
institutional entrepreneurs in the construction of IFM. The first organization that opted for 
IFM and some other big organizations that followed were used as exemplars in the different 
publications and conferences. The institutional entrepreneurs promoted a way out to cope 
with the cost reduction pressures and labor protection laws. 
 
In what follows significant roles of the different actors regarding IFM are expressed and 
related to the construction and reproduction of IFM.   
 
IFM and TFM: two dominant views of an academic and a consultant 
The term ‘FM’ appeared in the American literature in the beginning of 1980s and in the mid-
1980s the term became popular in Europe, including the Netherlands (Wagenberg 1997). As 
was demonstrated in chapter two, the definition of FM is ambiguous.. It is difficult to give a 
clear cut definition of FM and the contents of FM probably differ among organizations and 
change over time (Van Herk, Diepen-Knegjens, Van der Kluit, and Maas 2006). A similar 
ambiguity was observed with regard to the definition of IFM in the Netherlands: different 
actors in the field have different definitions of IFM. The terms ‘main-contracting’ and ‘total 
facility management (TFM)’ are alternative terms for IFM (Wagenberg 1997; Ytsma and 
Ytsma 2005). In IFM all activities related to housing, services and other means are dealt 
with by one organization (Brat 1996).  
 
As is suggested by one academic knowledgeable in the field, the construct of IFM is linked 
up with the way FM is governed and controlled. In case of IFM, organizations outsource 
their FM, either internally or externally. The FM organization or department is an entity with 





a special focus on facilities management. The word ‘integrated’ means that the internal FM 
organization has the power to plan and control the facilities services that are provided to 
different internal customers. According to him, if the FM department or organization does 
not have the responsibility of planning and control, it is not FM, let alone integrated. He 
strongly conceives FM to be similar to IFM. He states :  
 
“The distinction between IFM, in conceptual terms, and FM for me is the same. FM by definition is 
integrated as an idea. But apparently the market needs to add this word integrated and I think that 
has to do with the devaluation of the idea of FM. Both IFM and TFM are marketing tools” 
 
However, in the field of FM in the Netherlands, it is a wide spread understanding that the 
terms IFM and TFM refer to the same idea and they involve external outsourcing. For 
instance, a consultant describes it as follows: 
 
“When we talk about IFM we are talking about outsourcing. IFM is outsourcing all your facilities 
including management and coordination to one supplier. IF we talk about IFM or TFM we mean 
exactly the same” 
 
Therefore, in this thesis, IFM and TFM are considered to be synonyms and they include 
outsourcing all the facilities services including their management and coordination to a 




Professional associations in the Netherlands that are of big relevance to the IFM field 
include Facility Management Nederland (FMN), Facility Management Excellence and 
Experience (F-MEX) / International Facility Management Expert Centre (IFMEC), 
International Facility Management Association (IFMA) and the European Facility 











 The website of FMN describes it as follows: 
“The FMN is the professional association in the field of facility management. The association 
contributes to the development and promotion of this branch, brings its members together and keeps 
them informed. This benefits both their own performance and that of the organization for which they 
work. FMN’s mission statement is: Professionalization of Facility Management Processes. FMN 
realizes its objectives by organizing meetings and conferences on a national and regional level, 
where distinguished speakers address professional subjects, and where members can make (new) 
contacts. The FMN initiates, promotes and supports scientific research in the field of facility 
management. The FMN supports education in the field of facility management and aims to link 
education with facility practitioners. Within the FMN the sections of Management and organization, 
Health Care, Building (maintenance) Management, Facility Purchase, Park management, and 
Starting Facilities managers, play an active part. These sections all contribute to the development of 
the professional field. On an international level FMN is active in EuroFM, a European network. 
  
Eleven times a year FMN publishes its association journal “Facility Management Information 
(FMI)”. This journal provides information about the FMN, its members and the branch. Twice a 
year FMN publishes “FM Executive” a magazine for the management of the top 2000 organizations 
in The Netherlands. Members receive the FMN-E-zine 22 times a year, so they constantly will be 
informed about activities of the FMN and other relevant development in FM. Once a year the FMN 
publishes a yearbook called the Almanak, which supports the network function by giving information 
on all aspects of FMN's activities and members.” 10 
 
FMN came into existence in 1995 by a merger of three Dutch associations (Inter Service 
Manager (ISM), Facility Management Zorgsector (FMZ) & Nederlandse Facility 
Management Associate (NEFMA)) (FMN 2009). As per FMN Almanak 2009, FMN has 
2,300 members who are facilities managers in big and small organizations; it also has 
members who are advisors, suppliers of facilities services, representatives of related 
associations and facilities management academics and students (FMN 2009). 
 
                                                 
10 The website of FMN: Facility Management Nederland (The text was browsed on 5th Jan. 2009 at 
http://www.fmn.nl/cms/showpage.aspx?id=147) 
 





FMN supports the research in FM and has a named chair in Facility Management located at 
the Management Studies department at the University of Wageningen since 1st January 
2000. Every year approximately 8 students complete graduate research in FM and some of 
them start a PhD project (FMN 2009). The sponsorship of this chair is a joint initiative of 
FMN and a number of organizations11 (business companies, service providers, other 
associations, etc.).  
 
The service providers and consultants regard the FMN to be a trend watcher in the FM 
market, while at the same time considering themselves as the ones who professionalize and 
promote IFM. A consultant expresses his opinion as follows:  
 
“No, FMN is not promoting it. Yes FMN is doing some research at the moment. But it is limited. At 
this moment, most of the efforts in professionalizing this way of organizing FM is done by the main 
service providers and 2 or 3 consultants like us. They do most of the work.” 
 
A manager at a service provider firm has the following to say about the FMN and other 
professional associations: 
 
“I think professional associations are followers. The service providers are leaders. They are forced 
to be the leaders. If we (service providers) have the best idea in the world we are not going to tell 
FMN. We are going to tell our clients. Then we implement the magnificent idea and then tell FMN, 
‘Look what we did’.” 
 
One facilities manager thinks that FMN members are strongly focused on operational issues 
and lack a strategic focus. 
 
“FMN is much more on an operational level. I was a stranger in FMN because the ideas I was 
talking about were not understandable to them. They were talking about light bulbs and French fries 
always. They are talking about cooking and cleaning. Much more on the operational level and not at 
a higher level.” 
                                                 
11 Some of these organizations are KPN Operations Vaste Net, Facilicom Service Group, Arcadis Aqumen facility management, Strukton 
Worksphere, Vereniging op het gebied van projectverhuizing (PVV), Ondernemmersorganisatie Schoonmaak- en Bedrijfsdiensten (OSB) and 
OCE Business Services Lennartz, R. and R. Veeke. 2009. "De markt van integraal facility management in beeld gebracht: Een verkennend 
onderzoek naar de stand van zaken." Significant & Facility management Nederland, Barneveld.. 






Another facilities manager has a similar view about FMN: 
 
“But a problem with FMN is that there are not many members working at a strategic level. Many 
members are working on an operational level. So if you want to talk about future strategic 
developments, you could wonder if FMN is the right group to be engaged with.” 
 
According to one academic the influence of FMN is declining and the service providers and 
consultants together are changing the field of FM. FMN has focused on in-house FM. 
 
“Well, FMN’s objective is to professionalize the field and the emphasis has been on in house FM and 
facilities managers and it becomes more and more difficult for them because they also see that the 
driving forces are more outside FM than in house. If they continue to operate as they do, I am 
convinced that their influence will decline. So you can see that the people who are directing, for 
example, the [name of a service provider] is now a billion Euro company, they (that director) get 
into contact with already multinational and large corporations on the level of senior management. 
So they start to get influential. Its above the FM responsible person within an organization that these 
connections start to be established and I think business consultants are facilitating that. 
 
He further narrates: 
 
“It is very complex situation in which the in-house FM group is at the moment. They have powerful 
suppliers who circumvent them. There is always tension between business units and the top of the 
organization and that is also having an effect on the possibilities and the role they have in the 
company. Good FM is really understanding all these forces. And knowing to get them work a little 
bit together instead of all against each other. Now there is too much influence of suppliers. 
……..More and more contracts are made with IFM or TFM companies.” 
 
A representative of FMN thinks that the role of facilities managers has been taken over by 
the service providers: 
 
“No. It is not dominated by the suppliers (service providers) yet. But there is a movement that facility 
mangers are going to the service providers and in that role they are members of FMN. So I think the 
function of facilities managers in the companies is being taken over by the service providers.” 
 





Summing up, FMN is the biggest professional association in the field of FM in the 
Netherlands. Other parties (service providers, suppliers and consultants) are influencing the 
field and to some extent FMN. FMN incorporates more and more service providers as its 
members. In IFM, the FM employees of the client organizations are transferred to the 
service provider organization. Such individuals remain members of FMN but they become 
employees of the service provider. Almost 25% income of FMN comes from non-individual 
sponsors. The non-individual sponsors are different organizations including service 
providers. The consultants and service providers consider FMN as a follower rather than a 
leader in the field as will be shown later.  
 
F-MEX / IFMEC: 
The website description of F-MEX, another professional association, is as follows: 
“F-MEX was founded on April 21 2006, initiated by Iwan Liem, Facilities manager of the year 2004-
2005, together with two students of the NHTV (a university of applied sciences) Breda. Its goal was 
to bring together companies/businesses, education and upcoming talent in order to increase the 
professionalization of facility management. The power of F-MEX can be attributed to the collective 
intelligence of the facility organization and young professionals. This collective intelligence makes it 
possible to create innovative new ideas and to solve diverse issues. The board of F-MEX consists of 
professionals and young professionals. By means of this collection of people, the board aims to 
connect with different audiences. Finding the "best practice and the next practice" in a facility 
organization is the primary goal of every facilities manager, according to us. To find the "Best and 
the Next practice" we need a platform in which experiences are shared that contribute to our goal. 
FMEX offers participants the opportunity to increase their knowledge network and to come to a 
sharing of knowledge and increase of knowledge (knowledge-development). FMEX focuses on 
development of talent by offering traineeships to young professionals by means of excellent 
traineeships, co-operated with IFMEC (International Facility Management Expert Centre- an 
educational and training institute). The young professional is stimulated to develop himself/herself in 
a timeframe of 3-6 months in which he/she gains experience in a professional FM organization. 
During this project/ trajectory the young professional is coached intensively. FMEX also offers "the 
excellent trainee-trajectory." By this the young professionals can gain important experience during 
their studies and will also be intensively supervised / coached.”12 
                                                 
12 The website of F-MEX: Facility Management Excellence and Experience. (The text was browsed on 19th May 2011 at http://www.f-
mex.com/pages/over-ons.php) 






FMN and F-MEX seem to be not supportive of each other. The representative of FMN 
thinks that F-MEX is not a professional association and his views are as follows: 
 
“F-MEX is a particular initiative. They are training people with FM studies to offer them a kind of 
traineeship. Of course, they are in the field of FM but they are not an association.” 
 
According to the members of F-MEX they have a strategic outlook but FMN is more 
focused on operational issues. 
  
IFMA: 
International Facility Management Association (IFMA) is another professional association 
that is headquartered in Houston, Texas, USA. Its website provides the following 
information: 
 
“IFMA is the world’s largest and most widely recognized international association for professional 
facilities managers, supporting more than 19,500 members in 78 countries. 
The association’s members: 
 Include 125 chapters and 16 industry councils worldwide 
 Manage more than 37 billion square feet of property 
 Annually purchase more than US$100 billion in products and services 
Formed in 1980, IFMA certifies facilities managers, conducts research, provides educational 
programs, recognizes facility management certificate programs and produces World Workplace, the 
world’s largest facility management conference and exposition13.  
 
IFMA’s Certified Facilities manager® (CFM®) credential is globally recognized as the most reliable 
standard for distinguishing the achievements of facility management, reinforcing the Association’s 
claim for facility management and strengthening the CFM’s position as the ultimate authority in 
facility management.  
                                                 
13 IFMA website (The text was browsed on 20th May 2011 at http://www.ifma.com/about/) 





Chapters and Councils: 
IFMA’s chapters and councils offer members unique opportunities for networking and professional 
development and events that complement products and services offered by the Association. Chapters 
and councils also develop a sense of loyalty and passion among members and leverage IFMA’s 
appeal as well as membership growth and retention.  
Education: 
IFMA’s professional development area provides a variety of content-based education to advance the 
knowledge of the facility management practitioner or professional. Courses also are provided in 
convenient formats including classroom (face-to-face), online and audio.”14 
 
According to some of the facilities managers IFMA is not very supportive and appreciative 
of local context. For instance, one facilities manager thinks that he was not heard by IFMA 
because they are not open to different thoughts and because the flow of information is one 
way, i.e. from IFMA to local members.  
 
“ They [IFMA] are not very open to other thoughts. They always think, “ we come and we tell you”. I 
say no, it does not work that way. I am trying to convince them that the things are different. The 
Americans always want to make the whole world a McDonalds or a KFC. That’s the same with 
IFMA. They always send us the information. That’s why IFMA Holland is dying. What’s the added 
value for being a member of IFMA? Nothing anymore. We could not find with IFMA the things which 
really satisfied our needs. I need a peer group to talk with.”  
 
Another facilities manager thinks that IFMA is at a distance from the local context: 
 
“I am a member of IFMA. IFMA is more international and their attention is away from the 
Netherlands.” 
 
European Facility Management Network (EuroFM): 
A final professional organization is EuroFM. The EuroFM website provides the following 
information about itself: 
 
                                                 
14 IFMA website (The text was browsed on 20th May 2011 at http://www.ifma.com/about/strategic-competencies.htm) 





“In 1987 the first exploratory meeting to create a European FM network was hosted by Mr. Bart 
Bleker in The Netherlands. He helped develop the association till 1990. In 1993 the European 
Facility Management Network was officially registered by NEFMA, the Dutch FM association now 
called FMN, the Danish FM association DFM and the British Centre for Facilities Management led 
by professor Keith Alexander. The CIB (International Council for Research and Innovation in 
Building and Construction) had helped develop and found the association.  
From 1993 till 2002 each one of the 27 European national FM markets developed in its own pace 
and direction. In some countries facility management was started by real estate or maintenance 
professionals. In other countries the focus was more on services. IFMA helped develop the European 
FM market by founding national IFMA chapters and organising the World Workplace Europe 
conference in collaboration with EuroFM. Several countries also founded a Centre for Facility 
Management or developed a faculty for FM at universities. 
Today the association focuses on: 
1. Promoting FM across Europe 
2. Adding value to our members 
3. Financial Stability 
4. Dissemination of knowledge and information 
5. To facilitate networking opportunities to share best practice. 
The mission of EuroFM is the advancement of knowledge in Facility Management in Europe and its 
application in Practice, Education and Research. 
At the start of 2011 the EuroFM association represented 100 organisations working in the € 650 
billion large European FM sector. This sector is the largest European Business Services market, the 
second largest European sector (5-8% of GDP) and the largest FM market in the world. January 
2011 sixteen organizations were Corporate Associates (clients and service providers) representing € 
110 billion turnover and 1,300,000 staff. 23 were national associations representing 22.000 
members. The university and educational members represent 14.000 students. The members are 
based in 23 European countries. EuroFM newsletter is read by 65.000 people around the globe. The 
open network of professionals, academics, educationalists, practitioners and researchers generates a 
rich mix of activity. Projects and activities are initiated by four groups:  
 the Practice Network Group,  
 the Education Network Group  
 the Research Network Group 





 the Corporate Associates group.  
These groups form the core of EuroFM. The EuroFM members are involved in an open exchange of 
information and experience through meetings, seminars and workshops, through collaboration in 
research projects, sometimes funded by EC, and through the development of joint educational 
programmes. Proceedings of these activities are disseminated through the association via the 
EuroFM website, an annual conference, two EuroFM Meetings hosted by members and through 
newsletters, research papers and publications.15 
 
In the Netherlands, EuroFM is supportive of local professional associations because the 
members of EuroFM are the professional associations, not the individuals. A facilities 
manager describes it as follows: 
 
“An individual cannot be member of EuroFM because they say they don’t want to compete with their 
local FM groups.……. So that’s a difference because they will never compete with the local FM 
organizations or groups or foundations.” 
 
Role of all the professional associations: 
To summarize, all professional associations try to professionalize the field of FM but there 
are some conflicts also among themselves. For instance, the representative of FMN does not 
consider another professional association to be an association. Similarly, some facilities 
managers consider FMN to be focused on operational issues and ignoring strategic focus. 
Also, the professional association are mainly interested in the professionalization of the 
field, in the dissemination of knowledge, ideas and best practices. In this sense, they are the 
means used by institutional entrepreneurs for constructing IFM. The professional 
associations organize seminars, conferences, publish field reports in collaboration with 
consultants and academics. In other words, they are more like platforms or means for 




                                                 
15 EuroFM website (The text was browsed on 20th May 2011 at http://www.eurofm.org/about-us/about-eurofm/) 





Service Providers: the institutional entrepreneurs 
The service providers are the organizations that are active in the IFM field. The IFM service 
providers could be of three types, as explained below by a consultant: 
 
“Within IFM you can define three different ways to organize. First, there is the self delivery model. A 
(service provider) company delivers the management as well as the operations in house (itself). 
Second, there is the management model in which the service provider to whom you outsource has 
only management capacity in house and he further outsources (subcontracts) all the operations to 
different suppliers. The third way of organizing is more of a broker concept. You outsource your FM 
to a broker and he finds people how to manage that. We don’t know the (last) model here in the 
Netherlands. In the UK this model is often used by management consultants. Johnson Control and 
Arcadis Aqumen are managing companies (second type). ISS is of the first type (self delivery 
model)” 
 
The list of active service providers connected to IFM in the Netherlands till 2009 (Gijsbers 
and Van der Kluit 2008) is as follows: 
i-    Actys 
ii-    Arcadis Aqumen 
iii-    CSG 
iv-    Corporate Facility Partners 
v-    Dalkia 
vi-    D&B Integrated Facility Services 
vii-    Eurest Services 
viii-    Facilicom Facility Solutions 
ix-    Facility Services Netwerk 
x-    ISS Facility Services 
xi-    Johnson Controls Global Workplace Solutions 
xii-    Prisma 
xiii-    Sodexo Altys 
xiv-    VINCI Facilities 
 





The top three and biggest service providers in 2008 were Arcadis Aqumen, Johnson 
Controls and Sodexo Altys (FMN 2009). All these service providers are international 
companies. International service providers and international clients have been the spearhead 
in the field of IFM. The field of FM in the Netherlands has a history of being influenced by 
the multinational companies either as clients or as service providers. For instance, in the 
1980s the move towards centralization of facilities services was started by the multinationals 
as described below by an academic: 
 
“At that time, also in the Netherlands, the multinationals started to see that it was not a good idea, 
from a management and control point of view, to have all these separate activities. They decided to 
put them at least under the responsibility of a manager who had also a higher position in the 
organization. They concentrated all these activities. Basically there was an idea that if you did it that 
way, the magic of management would happen, the costs would go down and a lot of practical 
problems would be solved slowly.” 
 
A consultant also gives a similar view, but about IFM: 
 
“It was all driven by the developments in the UK and in the US. So we have seen UK and US based 
companies doing it first in the Netherlands. IBM was the first case we had in the Netherlands. and 
after that BP and Sun Micro.” 
 
The service providers primarily target the consultants as intermediaries to the client 
organizations. A director at one of the service providers tells as follows: 
 
“We mainly focus on consultancy agencies because they are the intermediaries. So they have to 
know what we can do for an organization which is intending to outsource. These intermediaries need 
to know what we are capable of. That’s how it works.” 
 
An academic also explains how the links between top management (senior to FM executive) 
and the service providers are facilitated by the consultants.  
 





“Its above the FM responsible person within an organization that these connections start to be 
established and I think the business consultants are facilitating that. A[consultant name] is 
facilitating that and B [consultant name] is facilitating that and I have no idea how that works. But I 
am convinced. Sometimes they drop little hints when I talk to them how this is going on.” 
 
The top management of client organizations proves to be interested in cost control and cost 
reduction (especially reduction in head-count). The role of consultants is prominent because 
they benchmark the cost of in-house facilities with outsourced facilities and have success 
stories of clients who outsourced facilities services. Academic research in the field of FM in 
the Netherlands also shows that service providers are more innovative than in-house FM 
departments (Mudrak et al. 2005).  
 
A manager at a service provider firm gives his view how the field has changed over time. 
 
“The field has changed because of the pressure from the top management in organizations and 
because of the role of the consultancy organizations. They started to benchmark and they 
benchmarked the outsourced clients compared to in-sourced facility management and said, ‘hey you 
can achieve 50% lower cost and look what’s happening.’ It’s our core business as service providers. 
We are developing tools and systems on a very higher level with very fast development. We have to, 
because we want to be successful. So we developed a fully automatic system of what you call Facility 
Scorecards for our clients and a single client could not ever invest that amount of money with that 
kind of knowledge to develop something like that. And if they had developed this it was already old 
because we develop these things for 150 clients and implement it and the lessons are learnt. So there 
is a continuous improvement. Not only on the level of cost but especially on the level of 
professionalism of FM. The service providers develop themselves and their profession quite fast”. 
 
The service providers could be labeled as the institutional entrepreneurs because they are 
really shaping the field of FM, including IFM, in the Netherlands. Here is what a consultant 
says about the role of service providers regarding IFM. 
 
“The largest service providers like Sodexo, ISS, Compass were developing fast regarding IFM. ISS, 
a huge cleaning company 10 years ago, is much more developed into an IFM in the coming years. 
Sodexo is, for example, growing enormously in the field of FM. These companies are developing very 





fast and not at the moment but from the last couple of years. And that has shaped the industry as 
well.” 
  
But the foreign service providers and their international clients were the path creators (initial 
organizations) with respect to IFM.   
 
“It was all driven by the developments in the UK and in the US. So we have seen UK and US based 
companies doing it first in the Netherlands. IBM was the first case we had in the Netherlands and 
after that BP and Sun Micro.” 
 
Summing up, international service providers and client organizations were the original 
organizations who brought the idea of IFM in the Netherlands. These client organizations, 
especially their top management teams, were annoyed with lost control of costs and high 
headcount. Service providers provided a solution to that by offering high quality services at 
competitive rates. Besides that, they agreed to take over the employees of the client, which 
allowed the client organizations to cope with institutional constraints. The companies cannot 
just fire their employees because there is a legal protection. But outsourcing IFM provided a 
solution to this legal constraint. The service providers claim that the employees of the client 
organizations receive better career prospects because they move to an organization where 
FM is the core business. The consultants have also been important by benchmarking the 
costs of in-house FM with the costs of outsourced FM and by being an intermediary between 
the management of the client organizations and the service providers. Moreover, the service 
providers get legitimacy through success stories of their clients, benchmarks and 
memberships in professional associations. Service providers and consultants seem to support 
each other and they are the institutional entrepreneurs.  
 
Suppliers 
In this thesis suppliers are organizations that provide one or more operational facilities 
services either directly to the clients or indirectly through IFM service providers. They do 
not claim to be IFM service providers and do not manage overall FM for the client 
organizations. They are only concerned with the operational provision of facilities services. 





Some suppliers have a specialty in providing specific facilities services. One facilities 
manager compares such kind of suppliers with IFM service providers as follows: 
 
“But there are also a lot of cleaning companies, security companies, catering companies that have 
their own specialties and that are not working like ISS, Facilicom or Sodexo as IFM service 
providers. For instance, A [an IFM service provider] does cleaning, catering, security, landscaping 
from one company. A lot of smaller companies just do the cleaning, the security or the catering., For 
our organization, we say that we don’t do business with the IFM companies because we think they 
are not integrated enough. We say that we want to do contract management for the internal customer 
and we choose from one of these single specialty companies because they are very good in serving 
specific companies, for example, banking companies. They fit better. This is our view.”  
 
The facilities manager goes on further as follows: 
 
“Yes, they do things in another way; in a non standard way and that’s why these companies are 
attractive to us. For instance, they are very customer friendly. We wonder what made them so 
special. Their way of approaching attracts us.”  
  
Consultants: the institutional entrepreneurs 
Consultants are the organizations that help other organizations in making decisions and offer 
solutions to the problems experienced by the clients. The consultants are also members of 
different professional associations. The consultants publish market reports and trends in the 
FM market, partly in collaboration with professional associations, particularly FMN. Some 
of them are the members of Netherlands Facility Costs Index Coöperatie (an independent 
organization for facility cost research) and do benchmarking and comparative costs studies 
in the field. Some of the renowned consultants in the field of FM in the Netherlands are 
Twynstra Gudde, Significant, Hospitality Consultants and FMH Facility Management. One 
of the consultants16 describes what they do as follows:  
“Working together with our clients, we develop and implement customized strategies for their facility 
management. Our areas of expertise in this field include Organization, Purchasing, Outsourcing and 
Contract Management, Project Management and Interim management.” 
                                                 
16 Twynstra Gudde website (The text was browsed on 23rd  May 2011 at http://www.twynstragudde.com/tg.htm?id=8626) 





The consultants play a vital role in the social construction of IFM in the Netherlands. They 
keep an eye on the market and try to create market for new products and services; IFM is 
one of the new services. They are not always the creator of innovations but they can 
propagate a new practice and make it acceptable in the field. IFM was, at least in the 
Netherlands, not created by consultants but they played a role in its social construction. This 
is suggested through the quote of a consultant as follows: 
 
“I attended a conference in Barcelona approximately 13 years ago and in this conference a case 
study was presented by Johnson Controls how they became responsible for FM within IBM in the 
Netherlands. Coming home in the Netherlands I immediately wrote an article in one of the most 
important magazines in the Netherlands in which I stated that everything would l change within 5 
years. We thought that service providers like Johnson Controls (and we had at least 5 other names), 
would l come to the Netherlands and everything would be outsourced to them. Well that was not 
happening at least within 5 years time. Still, we had some cases in all these years; very few cases. 
May be 5 to 10 contracts in a time frame of 10 years. So nothing was happening fast but the last 
couple of years 3 to 4 years most of the large corporate companies are interested in this way of 
organizing FM. So, they all do studies, they all outsource; they all are looking for parties. So it’s a 
very positive and popular way of organizing FM in the last couple of years especially for the middle 
to large sized companies. Not for the smaller ones and not for the government, educational facilities. 
Its only the private sector.” 
  
They organize conferences, seminars and workshops in order to create awareness and a 
market. For instance, the facilities manager of a big organizations describes the situation as 
shown below: 
 
“You see seminars, for instance, at Kluwers (a consultant). They just want to pick up the trends for 
which topics they get all the seats sold. But you see now serious training institutes have a real course 
on that part. What you see is that there are sponsored courses. When you look at Kirkman (again a 
consultancy) who are in sourcing business, they are making sponsored courses with ROI (Regionaal 
Ondernemings Instituut),with Arcadis (a service provider), with IFMECs (a professional FM 
training institute). I have seen them with hospitality consultants. I have seen them with Twynstra 
Gudde (a consultant). I have seen them with ROI. And with those companies who want to have a 
market they are organizing seminars about demand management. The suppliers say we have a 





missing link in the market. We give a seminar for free or at a low budget. First of all we can try to 
educate our future customer and we are also contacting new leads because if you go to such a 
seminar perhaps you are interested in outsourcing your FM.” 
 
Another consultant tells about a similar workshop: 
 
“To be honest, we are working on it for already more than a year to get managers together who have 
already outsourced their FM to IFM companies. We call it the IFM council to bring people together 
who have experience with outsourcing to a main contracting company or IFM provider.  
 
Another consultant reveals how they have been creating awareness (cognitive legitimacy) 
about IFM and how they bring international influence (knowledge, experience) in the 
Netherlands through study trips: 
 
“We, 6-7 years ago, made a platform for IFM just to give more information to the market, ‘ what the 
IFM is’ and would name some cases and there were service providers together with consultants in 
this platform. They were active in this field for promoting IFM and sharing, etc. Yeah, we have been 
organizing meetings at least 3 or 4 times a year. Sometimes for the providers, sometimes for 
outsourcing companies and sometimes for both in which we discuss this specific subject in this whole 
process. All have focused to professionalize this way of solutions. We are also organizing a study 
trip to Sweden and Finland in September 2010 for 30 private sector companies and we are going to 
look to the solutions in the field of IFM in Sweden. For example, how has Ericsson outsourced 
everything in Europe to Johnson Controls? How have they organized this? How have they organized 
the demand and supply organization? What kind of control systems are they using?” 
 
Yet another renowned consultancy organization describes a similar collective effort by the 
interested actors (service providers and consultants) to socially construct the IFM in the 
Netherlands. 
 
“This is a sector solution which is upcoming right now. But it is not very professionally organized 
right now, you know. Its developing slow but it has to professionalize much more in the coming 
years. That’s what is happening at the moment. For example, we had a meeting here last week with 
eight of the larger IFM service providers talking about the human relations part in this phase. What 





kind of words do we use? What kind of solutions do we look for in this phase regarding human 
resources? Normally 5-150 people are transitioning from one company to another. We don’t have a 
common language for this part of the process. So that all has to do with professionalizing the way 
how to it works and how we do business with each other.” 
 
But the collective actions have not been very much successful and the social construction of 
IFM has been slow because the service providers hesitate to share information of their 
clients. There is lack of a common language and of professionalism. For instance, one 
consultant assesses the situation as follows: 
 
“There was a ‘main contracting’ platform where all providers were working together. We were in 
that platform as well. We came together 3 or 4 times a year and it was not a big spin off because they 
all had their own cards, their own interest and their own way of going to the clients. For instance, 
Johnson control is looking for the fortune 500s and ISS is aiming at everyone in Holland. The main 
contracting platform does not exist anymore. Simply because you spend time and money and come 
together and say, ‘I don’t tell you my clients and you don’t tell me your clients’.” 
 
An academic also provides for an explanation why the development of IFM has been 
sluggish in the Netherlands:  
 
“The service providers are coming up with new flashy terms. People who should get convinced about 
the viability and the value of the idea have no clue of all this and then these two groups (service 
providers & client organization / facilities mangers) start to talk to each other. I feel very strongly 
that this is one of the reasons why adoption of the IFM idea is going slowly in the Netherlands 
because there is lack of professionalism on both sides. I mean the providers are stupid by doing it 
like this and the clients are not keeping up with all the change.” 
 
The consultants have made a of ranking of service providers as A, B and C. 
  
Summing up, the consultants are also institutional entrepreneurs. They organize seminars 
and training sessions for service providers, client organizations and facilities managers. 
They have made an IFM platform and an IFM council and do international study tours and 
visits in order to spread knowledge and to gain acceptability (legitimacy) of IFM in the 





Netherlands. The process of social construction of IFM has taken more than a decade 
because of the lack of knowledge about IFM and difficult cooperation between service 
providers and consultants and among consultants. But many companies have adopted IFM 
and many now articulate that they plan to adopt IFM governance.  
 
Academics 
The academics include the people connected to the education and research of FM in the 
Netherlands. University of Wageningen, the Netherlands has a special chair in Facility 
Management within the Department of Management Studies since 1st January 2000. Every 
year approximately 8 students complete graduate research in FM and some of them start a 
PhD project (FMN 2009). This chair is jointly sponsored by FMN and a number of 
organizations. These organizations include service providers, client organizations and some 
other organizations. The academics also publish both in academic and professional journals 
and magazines. On the education side, in addition to Wageningen University there are 
universities of applied sciences (Hogescholen) in the Netherlands. These universities of 
applied sciences produce around 1000 FM graduate students annually (Heleen, Visser, and 
Wiedemeijer 2009) and they also conduct some applied research in FM. 
 
In house facilities managers 
The facilities managers are people working in the facilities departments of the organizations. 
These facilities managers might occupy different hierarchical positions in the organizations 
such as in the higher management ranks reporting to the board or as heads of facilities 
departments, or middle management, or as lower management taking positions as team 
leaders or coordinators (Heleen, Visser, and Wiedemeijer 2009). Almost 89% of all the 
facilities managers have a higher education; their level of education has increased (Heleen, 
Visser, and Wiedemeijer 2009).  
 
When an organization chooses to have IFM, most of the employees including managers in 
its FM department are transferred to the service provider. The facilities managers may keep 
their knowledge up-to-date through reading professional magazines (such as FACTO, FMI, 
FMM), through participating in facilities research, by being members of FMN, through 





participation in FM conferences, by (electronic) information from FMN, books, education 
and virtual networking (Heleen, Visser, and Wiedemeijer 2009). As per “De Facilities 
manager Regisseert 2009’, the most important item for the facilities managers (54%) is to 
enhance the insight and management of the facilities organization i.e. to get the facility 
organization ‘in control’. The other important developments (ibid) points are realizing more 
linkage of the facilities with primary process of the organization (42%), and facilities 
organization innovations through launching new products and services (32%). 
 
The decision to outsource IFM is normally made at the board level. The head of the facilities 
department does not have full freedom to decide regarding IFM. In some cases, facilities 
managers may also make recommendations to the board for moving towards IFM. For 
instance, considering the changing situation, in-house FM professionals of one big 
organization themselves proposed IFM to the board: 
 
“We put this on agenda. Our company is shrinking in volume (number of employees) and also by 
number of buildings. So we need less office space.” 
 
The service providers and consultants think the problems they experience with IFM clients 
is that the in-house facilities managers are afraid of losing control and that they lack 
professionalism. The following quote is from a service provider: 
 
“Well they (clients) are afraid of losing control. They are afraid of giving away possibilities to 
control their related services. They want to be in control. They would say the only reason FM is 
working in our company is because they control everything. We have to convince them that that’s not 
true. You can have us doing that and still be in control. It’s another way of control. That’s why you 
see they feel threatened about their jobs. We take over their jobs and for the board members that’s 
fine. The board looks at only cost savings, decreasing headcount, etc. It’s all fine. But now you see 
that larger companies like KLM, KPN are outsourcing and the next phase is that multi-site 
companies are outsourcing and the next phase will be that smaller companies will outsource as well. 
What we see now in the requests for proposal (RFPs) is that they are building a control network on 
one hand and on the other hand they want to outsource their services. But if you outsource you are 
losing control but you get another way of control back. That’s why the people have to get used to it.” 






The consultants also agree with the service providers that the problems lie with the client 
organizations, particularly with respect to the issue of control. It’s a kind of theorizing where 
service providers and consultants link problems of IFM with the client organizations. Here is 
an opinion of a consultant: 
 
“The most important issue is that the clients until they outsourced they were not only responsible for 
‘what is delivered but also ‘how’ it is delivered. The ‘how’ goes to the service provider and it should 
be up to him ‘how’ to deliver the services. It is in the nature of the people that you know how it could 
be and you know your own way of working and its difficult part to leave this thing to the supplier.” 
 
Another service provider: 
 
“There is an issue that also depends on the professionalism of the clients. Is the client able to 
perform professional demand management? Because that’s not FM; we are taking care of FM. To 
control at a higher strategic level on all non core business activities is a new profession. It comes 
with outsourcing and if an organization outsources FM in an integrated way to a company, in some 
cases the facilities manager is still our contact person of the internal clients but we are on the same 
level. It’s never going to work. They have to have different roles as demand manager.” 
 
But some facilities managers think that the service providers are not keeping up their 
performance. As depicted by a facilities manager: 
 
“What I have heard all around is the failure in keeping their performance. They tell you much more 
nicer stories than the real ones. The real story what I hear in our information gathering is that they 
are not in the pain level but in the irritation level. As long as the clients are in the irritation level 
they keep the suppliers. It’s not in a constant satisfaction level. Most of the companies are 
disappointed by the average performance of the service providers. And also they promise you much 
more than they actually sell in the field. The sellers and the marketing managers are telling a 
different story than when the contract is in. You sign the contract and you don’t see him anymore. 
The people who have to do the work are coming and sometimes they don’t have a sense of what is 
going on. Sometimes I discovered that they even don’t know what their boss has agreed on with me. I 
have noticed that the site manager does have the knowledge about the contract agreements. That’s of 





course a disappointment. On the office part we try to outsource to a renowned service provider but 
they don’t even understand what we need. You should talk to the guy at (a renowned organization) 
organization X. They just ended their contract with the main contractor (IFM provider). Now they 
say we have tried with the main contractor .They say it’s a big disaster and now they are going to do 
it themselves.” 
 
IFM is supposed to improve governance but it also entails new governance issues, for 
instance, the issues of control and professionalism mentioned above. Almost all the actors 
(facilities managers, service providers, consultants, etc.) agree that there is a lack of 
experience in dealing with IFM as a new governance form. For instance, a facilities manager 
explains as follows: 
 
“One of the biggest problems is that there is no professional demand management. In my 
perspective, demand management is immature. Everyone is searching how we should do that, what 
are logical KPIs, what are ingredients necessary to have a good relationship with the partner who is 
organizing our FM.” 
 
 A consultant also portrays the problem with IFM governance: 
 
“We are still looking for the way to get their knowledge and experience close to the rest of the world. 
The clients want to sit in the chair of the service delivery company. They want to control how the 
service should be delivered and their focus should be on translating business needs into what should 
be delivered. So they must be professionally translating the business needs instead of telling how the 
service should be done. They are looking for trust but they are not trustful themselves. So they want 
to have a lot of KPIs to measure if the provider is doing well.” 
 
Another consultant also describes his experience: 
 
“What we often see is that the outsourcing company is defining KPIs and the way to measure them 
which is really thinking from one organization and which is not focused on working together. Well, 
Companies do outsource much more now-a- days but getting control of the service providers may be 
one of the most important issues at the moment. So that’s an issue. Really a huge issue at the 
moment” 







The organizations that have already adopted IFM or would like to adopt IFM are the client 
organizations in this research. The initial adopters (and designers) (client organizations) 
were very important in the process of the social construction of IFM because these early 
adopters became precedent in the field; other organizations then followed. Similarly, the 
early service providers, particularly the international ones, have been very pivotal in the 
initiation of social construction of IFM. The service providers expected and still foresee a 
market for IFM and are interested in an increasing legitimacy and a wide spread of this new 
practice. The service providers theorize the problems with prior governance mechanisms and 
explain the benefits of the ‘new’ governance form (IFM). They use the initial adopters (that 
are usually big and famous companies) to legitimize their claims. Amongst the very first of 
such client organization in the Netherlands was IBM. This is expressed by two people, i.e. a 
renowned facilities manager who is an active member of a professional association and a 
consultant who working in a renowned consultancy organization in the field of FM. The 
consultant states: 
 
“I attended a conference in Barcelona approximately 13 years ago and in this conference a case 
study was presented by Johnson Controls about how they became responsible for IFM within IBM in 
the Netherlands.” 
 
The facilities manager recalls that the first case of IFM in the Netherlands was IBM. He 
says: 
 
“IBM was one of first companies which had totally outsourced in 1994-95. This is the first company 
I know.” 
 
He further explains that the reasons for such a decision by IBM were flexibility and 










“In 1995, during a golf course somebody asked me what I was doing. He was the general manager 
at IBM and he was busy with the process of starting with Johnson Controls as their integrated 
facilities manager. But the most interesting perspective is that IBM was in downfall and they had to 
cut costs and they wanted to make their costs flexible and their main goal was actually much more 
the shareholders’ value. They said we can make fixed costs in personnel variable so that we can 
satisfy our shareholders in accounting. That was true, actually. After the outsourcing, Dutch IBM 
value rose because they cut off about 350 full time equivalents (FTEs). The shareholders were very 
satisfied with it. They said, wow, you have made cost flexible.. So it started with that. You see, the 
whole IFM started from much more international companies that are more inclined towards 
shareholders value. That’s why I always said. “when is the urge to outsource more?”. It depends in 
what kind of situation you are as a company. If you are much more sensitive to the international, 
global market (downfall / recession / growth) you have more need to become flexible. If you have a 
huge fixed cost (200 or 250 own staff) that is difficult especially in Dutch Law. If I want to get rid of 
somebody I’ll have to pay 2 years of full payment (salary) to that person. That’s of course a lot of 
money. Companies in Holland make cost flexible like this (for instance, Netherlands Railways, KLM, 
etc.). Just before the merger with Air France, KLM outsourced 300 people only to have a better 
negotiation with Air France.” 
 
The big and multinational organizations are interested in IFM; the medium or small 
organizations are not. A facilities manager’s views on this are as follows: 
 
“The original start was from the companies like Philips and multinationals themselves and not from 
the market. This is very important to say because KLM wants to outsource the personnel and the 
whole system and look at the market who can make the best fit and not the other way around. Only 
the largest companies like KPN look at the market to see who is interesting for their business. When 
you look at the small and medium organizations, there is no company at all that is looking at 
outsourcing.” 
 









“The FM group as it exists at the moment to some degree is always part of two powerful forces. One 
is the clients. Either the clients in terms of the boards taking decisions about them or we see a 
development towards, particularly with multinationals, that it’s no longer the board but major 
business units who have a tremendous influence on what the FM department can do. And on the 
other side tremendously powerful service providers who have actually the power to innovate and 
drive the field. I think they are the driving forces.”  
 
Since some major organizations in the field have adopted IFM and most of them have been 
successful, mimetic isomorphism could be seen in the field as other organizations are 
adopting IFM. A facilities manager in a big organization explains the mimesis as follows: 
 
“This is new for us and this is also new for facility management in the Netherlands. There are only a 
few companies of this size that did this. A lot of companies are thinking: hey if they (a renowned 
company) can do this, why can’t we? So I know that KLM did it, Shell did it. So I know my 
colleagues there. They are ahead in this process. So, of course, we talk to each other. I meet them 
and am trying to learn from them. If they made a mistake, I try to avoid that. Sometimes, they say 
well we did not do this and they are quite curious about how we did this, for example.” 
 
Another facilities manager explains that he plans to move towards IFM in the future and 
legitimizes his future outsourcing decision because other famous organizations are doing 
that: 
 
“I am glad that I started outsourcing in the beginning of 2000 and now I am moving towards a 
demand organization what NS and KLM and all those companies are doing. We are forming a small 
demand organization to make our costs flexible. Our main focus is on contract and account 
management” 
 
The mimesis is not only local but also global. The consultants, facilities managers and 
service providers look at international examples, make trips and seek to copy them in the 
Netherlands. A consultant gives an example of this: 
 
 





“We are organizing a study trip to Sweden and Finland in September 2010 for 30 private sector 
companies and we gonna look to the solutions in the field of IFM in Sweden, for example. How has 
Ericsson outsourced everything in Europe to Johnson Controls? How have they organized this? How 
have they organized the demand and supply organization? What kind of control systems are they 
using? We visit like SAS. They have outsourced everything to a local company. Why and how have 
they organized this? What’s the scope of services? So it all has to do with looking into the world and 
how different countries find different solutions for the same issues.” 
 
A facilities manager also describes his experience of Sweden with an example: 
 
“In December, I was in Stockholm. There is a company in Sweden called Core Services 
Management. Its consists of about 200 consultants coming from McKenzie company, from KPMG, 
coming from all kinds of services brought together in one company and what they do is if a company, 
asks for investigation on their services, in the first place they make a very thorough examination of 
how the company works, what’s the policy of the company, what the primary process consists of and 
then they make an offer to change to IFM. What they do is that they are a kind of broker. They 
choose firms that fit the company profile. Local service provider do not do that because they say we 
have all these things in our company already so we give you a complete package.”    
 
Summing up, this section has shed light on the instrumental rationality of the actors in the 
construction of IFM in the Netherlands. Service providers prove to be important institutional 
entrepreneurs, along with consultants. They strategically respond to institutional pressures. 
They remove institutional constraints that potential clients experience when outsourcing 
IFM. They succeed in making consultants their allies. Inter alia by providing benchmarks, 
consultants to some extent theorize the field. Early service providers, particularly the 
international ones, have furthermore been very pivotal in the construction and reproduction 
of IFM. There is also mimesis in the sense that other organizations follow the first adopters. 
In order to enhance reproduction, the service providers deliberately use early adopters as 
examples.     
 
The following section goes deeper to find out why the field has changed in such a way and 
what is the influence of institutional logics regarding IFM. 
 





5.3 Why is the field changing? 
 
5.3.1. Introduction 
The above part explained the instrumental rationality of how the new governance form has 
emerged in the field of FM in the Netherlands. It also revealed the role of some actors as 
institutional entrepreneurs and the apparent reasons for the adoption of IFM in the field. 
However, in order to understand why the governance has been changing in such a way, we 
need to look at the institutional rationality that has influenced the cognition and decisions of 
the field participants or actors. Instrumental rationality valorizes the autonomy of individuals 
to take decisions in ways that strategically serve their material interests (Lounsbury 2008). 
For instance, the consultants and service providers did well in creating a market for IFM. 
But explanations drawing on instrumental rationality give a picture as if  the actors are free 
from the influence of existing institutions and as if they have independent interests. In order 
to incorporate such influence in the analysis, the notion of institutional rationality is 
introduced. Institutional rationality is a collective rationality that guides individual behavior 
and that is beyond the discretion of an individual or an organization. It stresses the influence 
of broader structures of meaning without being deterministic (Lounsbury 2008). This 
perspective highlights the prominence of the institutional logics that prevail in the field of 
FM. Institutional logics are, “the socially constructed, historical patterns of material 
practices, assumptions, values, beliefs and rules by which individuals produce and reproduce 
their material subsistence, organize time and space and provide meaning to their social 
reality’’ (Thornton and Ocasio 1999; p.804). Institutional logics delineate the contents and 
meanings of institutions. This approach focuses on the effects of differentiated institutional 
logics (instead of isomorphism) on individuals and organizations in a larger variety of 
contexts, including markets, industries and populations of organizational forms (Thornton 
and Ocasio 2008). Institutional logics shape rational and mindful behavior and individual 
and organizational actors also shape and change the institutional logics (Thornton 2004). 
Thus, the institutional logics provide a link between institutions and actions, that is, situated 
forms of organizing are linked with beliefs and practices in wider institutional environments 
(Thornton and Ocasio 2008). The logic comprises a set of material practices and symbolic 
constructions and is the core of each institution. The logic forms the organizing principles of 





an institution and helps organizations and individuals in their activities (Friedland and 
Alford 1991). The institutional logics are contradictory and may change over time. The core 
institutions of western society are the capitalist market, the bureaucratic state, family, 
democracy and religion, and each of these institutions has a central logic (Friedland and 
Alford 1991). The typology of the core institutions was further developed by Thornton 
(2004) who demonstrates that the western societies are composed of six societal sectors- the 
market, the corporation, the professions, the family, the religions and the state (Thornton, 
Jones, and Kury 2005). Because the institutional logics of the aforementioned institutions 
are inherently contradictory, such institutional contradictions may serve as the bases for the 
most important political conflicts and institutional change. Individual, groups and 
organizations may exploit these cultural resources and institutional contradictions to 
transform institutions. The institutional logics approach emphasizes that individual and 
organizational behavior can be understood when such a behavior is located in a social and 
institutional context that both regularizes behavior and provides opportunity for agency and 
change (Thornton and Ocasio 2008). The logics converge the attention of the key decision 
makers on a delimited set of issues and solutions (Ocasio 1997).  
 
5.3.2. Historical developments 
As mentioned in chapter 2 of this thesis, this research draws upon different sources of 
evidence i.e. field documents & reports, interviews and academic research in the field of 
FM. The research articles (from 1995 till 2010) and field documents were important in 
reflecting on the historical development in the field of FM in the Netherlands. In addition, 
some other academic articles about FM in Finland, the UK and the USA were included in 
the analysis.  
 
Prior research on organizational governance focuses on understanding changes in 
organizational design between markets, hierarchies and networks (Thornton, Jones, and 
Kury 2005). However, the institutional logics at wider societal levels have an effect on the 
organizing principles and strategy of action for organizations (Greenwood and Hinings 
1993) including the governance forms. Organizational governance contains the mechanisms 
used by firms in coordinating economic activity (Jones, Hesterly, and Borgatti 1997). In 





order to study the institutional change in governance (in this case the emergence of new 
governance form i.e. IFM), we studied the history (academic articles, field documents and 
reports) of the last two decades. The historical analysis helped in identifying the institutional 
logics prevailing in the field of FM. The research was further supported by interviews with 
different actors in the field. The focus was on the institutional entrepreneurs and the change 
in both form and thought (rationalized meanings and myths) of governance over time. 
Besides, it was examined how different forms of governance (FM staff department, SSC or 
IFM) relate to the dominant logics in the field of FM in the Netherlands and how the wider 
societal level institutional logics influence the FM field logics and the organizational 
governance decisions. 
 
This research revealed that there are two prominent logics in the field of FM namely, the 
logic of rationalization (cost reduction) and the logic of professionalism. The logic of 
rationalization has been dominant in the field. This logic is connected to wider societal 
logics of market and corporations. This logic has influenced the governance decisions in the 
field of FM since the arrival of the concept of FM in the 1980s and during the period under 
investigation. For the purpose of identifying the logics of the field we used various 
documents from the field of FM, particularly the academic research in the Dutch field of 
FM. Studying the historical developments, different forms of governance were found. The 
following table (11) gives the history of developments in the Dutch field of FM and the 
















Table 11. An overview of historical developments and related governance forms 
Time 
period 
Developments / Events Forms of governance 
Pre-
1980s 
- Real estate and facilities management departments were founded because of 
expansion in the business activities (mass-production & growth) in the first 
few decades of the twentieth century (Krumm 2001).  
- Continuous growth, internationalization and transformation of traditional 
functional structures into structures based on geographical distinctions 
(Krumm 2001).  
- Centralized control of activities 
(Krumm 2001) 
- Consistent with structural changes 
there were corporate (central) as well 
as local branches. Such a separation 
also resulted in a division between 




- The recession in 1970s contributed to the breakthrough of FM because it 
forced companies to manage costs more precisely (Barnhoorn 1995). 
Management had lost control by pushing down services (Barnhoorn 1995). 
In the beginning of the 1970s, rising competition and the increasing cost of 
doing business forced corporations to rethink their existing structures and 
strategies (Krumm 2001). 
- Theories of value chain and distinction between primary and support 
functions (Porter 1985) and concept of core competence (Hamel and 
Pralahad 1994), have been driving the companies to focus on their core 
business and outsource support functions like FM (Brat 1996; Jensen 2008). 
Financial control as one of the objectives of FM (Grimshaw 2003). 
- Trends such as back-to-the core, downsizing, outsourcing and right sizing 
(Krumm 2001).  
- Economic history of USA and UK and influence on FM, where the 1980s 
was the time of intermittent recession and consistently vigorous cost-cutting 
in FM and 1990s was the time of, for economic reasons, the rapid rise of 
outsourcing of FM functions (Duffy 2000). 
- Formation of IFMA and FMN (by the merger of ISM, FMZ and NEFMA). 
- Dutch market knew only single service suppliers and no suppliers of integral 
facility packages (Brat 1996). 
- FM Department as ‘traditionale 
beheerorganisatie’ (without outsourcing 
or some outsourcing) or ‘Regie 
organisatie’ (with responsibility for FM 
and control of operational outsourcing in 
the hands of a FM department). For 
instance, Dutch Municipalities 
(Wagenberg 2003) and DSM- a medium 
sized international chemical corporation 
in the Netherlands (Brat 1996). 
- SSCs (internal or external outsourcing). 
For instance, Shell Services International 
(SSI) in 1995 and Ahold’s worldwide 
centres of excellence (Krumm 2001). 
- IFM / TFM (One example in the mid 
1990s where a multinational company 
(IBM) in the Netherlands had an IFM 
contract with an international service 
provider (Johnson Controls)). 
2000-
2009 
- The outsourcing grew in this decade. The outsourced market size was 63% 
in 2009 as compared to 57% in 2000 and the outsourced market growth 
index shows a growth of 8% during the last 9 years (Gijsbers, Van der 
Kluit, and Spijker 2010).  
- The FM market grew first but after the financial crisis it declined. So the 
overall decrease (from 2000 till 2009) is 1% (Gijsbers, Van der Kluit, and 
Spijker 2010).  
- Growth in the number of local and international service providers and 
suppliers. The number of service providers grew from 22, 452 to 25,666 
during this decade (Gijsbers, Van der Kluit, and Spijker 2010). 
- Financial crisis increases the cost reduction pressures. 61% facilities 
managers had to reduce cost in 2010 and the average cost reduction was 
10.5% of the budget. Similarly, 77% facilities managers selected facility 
service providers based on price (Gijsbers, Van der Kluit, and Spijker 
2010). 
- FM Department / Regie organisatie (with 
responsibility for FM and control of 
operational outsourcing in the FM 
department) and demand management 
organization. For instance, Tata Steel 
(Corus). 
- SSCs (internal or external outsourcing). 
For instance DSM’s Facility 
Management Internal-FMI (Brat 1996). 
- IFM / TFM (more organizations adopting 
the concept such as NS, KPN, Philips, 
KLM, etc. 





As it can be seen from the above table (11), historically the field of FM has been influenced 
by the logic of rationalization, i.e. cost reduction. The logic of rationalization has been 
dominant at least since the 1980s. The companies experienced competition, recession and an 
increase in the cost of operations on the one hand, while on the other hand theories that 
supported the rationalization emerged, for instance the theory of the value chain, entailing a 
focus on the core and the outsourcing of the non-core. Similarly, the idea of having an FM 
department with a responsible manager implied imposing financial control. Many authors 
consider cost control to be an important task of facilities managers and some define FM as 
an economic function concerned with ensuring an efficient use of physical resources by 
controlling cost (Duffy 2000; Grimshaw 2003). History shows that a business environment 
that is focused on an adequate return on capital has impacted the practice of FM towards 
cost control and outsourcing over time (Duffy 2000). For instance, a Dutch study (cited in 
Van Wagenberg, 1997) on outsourcing (Groeneweg 1996) indicates that cost reduction was 
the main motive for outsourcing. Similarly, one of the objectives of FM is to facilitate work 
in an efficient way and contain cost (Wagenberg and Vogel 1993). The benchmark studies 
also reinforce the logic of rationalization because one of the major purposes of 
benchmarking is to compare costs and take appropriate actions to reduce cost and to become 
efficient. The latest cost reduction pressures and financial crises has strengthened the logic 
of rationalization. For instance, in 2010, 61% of the facilities managers got cost reduction 
targets of (average) 10.5% from their managements.  
 
The dominance of a logic of rationalization is consistent with the observation that the 
organizations themselves are the main drivers behind the development of FM (Wagenberg 
1997). The big organizations are also, in most cases, multinational and come in contact with 
different fields and logics (Greenwood and Suddaby 2006) . Moreover, the logic of 
rationalization is acceptable to and is compatible with the market and corporate logics. 
That’s why such organizations are often looking for ways to rationalize the non-core and 
enhance shareholders’ value. This is because the logic of rationalization is connected to the 
broader societal logics of market (shareholders’ value) and corporation (profitability). The 
pressure to enhance profitability has included pressure to reduce costs (Krumm 2001). One 
interviewee (a facilities manager) explains how the rationalization logic guided the IFM 





decision of the first (or one of few initial organizations) international organization (IBM) in 
the Netherlands.  
 
“You see the whole IFM started from much more international companies that are in a connection of 
shareholders value. Companies in Holland make cost flexible like this (for instance, NS, KLM). Just 
before merger with Air France, KLM outsourced 300 people only to have a better negotiation with 
Air France. Flexibility and cost reduction are the drivers in a lot of companies.” 
  
An academic also explains the prevalence of the rationalization logic: 
 
“For the multinationals, it was very difficult to control and know what they were spending in FM. 
This was an overhead and the overhead was growing. So a lot of emphasis has been on the cost 
side.”  
 
5.3.3. Contrasting the logic of rationalization with the logic of professionalism 
Unlike other professions, FM is a non-core, relatively young and developing profession. The 
FM profession has developed although rationalization has been the dominant logic in the 
field. The trend towards outsourcing multiple services to a single service providers is 




















The following table (12) gives a summary of the broad characteristics of these two logics: 
 
Table 12. Field Logics 
Logic of Rationalization Logic of Professionalism 
- Efficiency and economies of scale 
- Financial control and cost containment 
- Benchmarking 
- Transparency 
- Standardized solutions (Duffy 2000) 
- FM as a business 
- Increasing profits 
- Building a competitive position 
- Capital committed to market return 
- Market as a control mechanism 
- Reduction in headcount 
- Shareholders’ value 
- Profitability 
- Facilities managers speak the language of  
          suppliers (Duffy 2000) 
- Professionalism is the ethical use of knowledge in the context of action- 
Francis Duffy cited in- (Alexander 2003) 
- FM is a value addition process to the whole supply chain (Alexander 
1999) and value addition is about optimization rather than only cost 
cutting (Roberts 2001). 
- Managers overlook the strategic potential of FM in overall 
competitiveness because they perceive it to be an outsourceable non-core 
(Mudrak, Wagenberg, and Wubben 2005). 
- Professionalism is about a specific knowledge base and skills, high self 
control via code of ethics and recognized social responsibility to address 
the legitimate needs of all the stakeholders in the workplace (Grimshaw 
2003) instead of shareholders only. 
- Users interests and needs be put first and cost cutting to be put in the 
context of greater effectiveness (Duffy 2000). 
- Lack of professionalism creates a rigidly cost controlled workplace 
(Grimshaw 2003). 
- Balance to be struck between traditional profession and new business 
environment which is shaped by global forces (Grimshaw 2003). 
- An integral approach to FM which means a better understanding of total 
costs, of the complexity of facility process and emphasis on the 
contribution of FM to working and living conditions (Brat 1996). In 
outsourcing the working regime becomes more severe (ibid).  
- Performance issues and service providers don’t understand the needs of 
customers. Focus of service providers is on short term earnings. 
 
 
All the actors in the field subscribe to the logic of rationalization, but facilities managers and 
academics also view social and ethical responsibility (logic of professionalism) as an 
important factor. The institutional logics embodied in the professions are antithetical to the 
goals and means of corporations, but the institutional logics of markets are complementary 
to the goals of corporations (Thornton 2002). There is some tension between the logic of 
rationalization and the logic of professionalism. But this tension has also helped the FM 
profession to grow and innovate. The pressures to rationalize and reduce cost and become 
flexible have led to innovative approaches to managing the facilities that support the 





business (Alexander 2003). The severe commercial and competitive pressures on business 
have in a way increased the practical relevance and significance of FM to the organizations 
because the organizations have to realize cost savings and have to focus on the core to be 
competitive (Pathirage, Haigh, Amaratunga, and Baldry 2008; Sullivan, Georgoulis, and 
Lines 2010). While at the one hand the focus is on core and reducing cost, at the other hand 
the facilities are no longer of marginal significance (Pathirage et al. 2008). Thus, the logic of 
rationalization dictated by the economic environment has also helped the professionalization 
of FM. Therefore, the tension between the logics (rationalization and professionalism) has 
somehow facilitated the development of the profession. Yet, the logic of rationalization 
remains to be dominant. The latest FM market report suggests that the criteria for selecting 
the service providers have become tougher in terms of more focus on price (cost savings) 
(Gijsbers, Van der Kluit, and Spijker 2010, p.68,74,100). This is further enhanced by 
financial crisis pressures. Moreover, there is some criticism about the degree of 
professionalism.  
 
Professionalism has been voiced over time but it remains frail. There have been suggestions 
that corporations should go beyond sheer operational efficiency and that decisions regarding 
an in-house department or external service providers should be made on the basis of best 
services delivered. It is about effectiveness, users interests, social and ethical responsibility 
and better living and working conditions. A rigidly controlled work place displays a lack of 
professionalism.  
 
So there is a conflict between these logics though the logic of rationalization has been 
dominant since 1980s. The facilities managers speak the language of suppliers rather than 
users and the profession has not invented and delivered the emerging needs (Duffy 2000). 
FM claims to be strategic but most practitioners work at operational levels; FM wants to be 
at the heart of the organizational development but many FM services are delivered either by 
external consultants or in-house teams set up as internal consultants; FM claims to be 
proactive in managing change but it is reactive in most cases (Ventovuori, Lehtonen, 
Salonen, and Nenonen 2007). The main body of the existing market research focuses on the 
supply side of the market especially on the main FM suppliers’ market. There is a big gap of 





knowledge about the demand side of the FM market across the whole Europe (Moss 2008). 
FM is under-researched and is at an early stage of its development (Nutt 1999; Ventovuori, 
Lehtonen, Salonen, and Nenonen 2007). In academic terms, FM is a comparatively new 
subject area or a field that has grown out of diverse interests from different subjects. It is not 
an academic discipline in a conventional sense (De Bruijn, Van Wezel, and Wood 2001). 
The greater difficulty with FM is that the core subjects of FM were less clearly defined and 
remain to be so and much emphasis is placed on mutlidisciplinarity and vocational relevance 
of FM to the industry (De Bruijn, Van Wezel, and Wood 2001).  
The growing dominance of cost control (rationalization) as a major function of FM has been 
seen as problematic for the practice of FM (Grimshaw 2003).  
 
5.3.4. The presence of different governance forms and the logic of rationalization 
The logic of rationalization is expressed in different forms of practice. In the Dutch field of 
FM, the logic of rationalization legitimizes all the current popular forms of governance i.e. 
an FM department (Facility Management Organization), an SSC or IFM. All the proponents 
of these governance forms claim efficiency or cost savings to be the major objectives. The 
multinational and big national organizations are more inclined towards IFM. Small 
companies, government and non-profit organizations don’t consider IFM to be an 
appropriate choice at the moment. A consultant explains it as follows: 
 
“For the last couple of years (3 to 4 years) most of the large corporate companies are interested in 
this way of organizing FM. So they all do studies, they all outsource; they all are looking for parties. 
It’s not popular for the smaller ones and for the government, educational facilities. It’s only the 
private sector.”   
 
5.3.5. Problems with IFM 
Another consultant tries to explain why IFM might not be the solution for all the companies: 
 
“Well IFM is not the best solution and is not always the best solution. I have many examples where 
all options are good.”  
 





IFM may result in loss of synergies if the service provider does not utilize all its 
competences and/or the in-house unit does not possess the best competence in the market 
(Ventovuori 2007). This drawback of IFM is theorized by both service providers and the 
client organizations when they blame each other for not being professional enough or being 
too much focused on control. The service providers and consultants relate the problems of 
governance to the in-house facilities managers. In-house facility mangers do the opposite. 
 
The service providers and consultants connect the problems to the clients and they think the 
client organizations do not want to lose control and they are not professional. For instance, a 
consultant describes it as follows: 
 
“The clients want to sit on the chair of the service delivery company. They want to control how the 
service should be delivered and their focus should be on translating business needs into what should 
be delivered. So they must be professionally translating the business needs instead of telling how 
they should do the service.” 
 
But some facilities managers think that the IFM service providers are not professional 
enough and the average performance is disappointing.  
 
“Most of them are disappointed in their average performance. They promise you much more than 
they actually sell in the field. The sellers / the marketing manager is telling a different story than 
when the contract is in. You sign the contract and you don’t see him anymore. The real people are 
coming and sometimes they don’t have sense of what’s going on. Sometimes I discovered that they 
even don’t know what their boss had agreed on with me. I have noticed that the site manager does 
have the knowledge about the contract agreements. That’s of course a disappointment. On the office 
part we tried to outsource to a renowned service provider but they don’t even understand what we 
need. One of my friends in a big organization has just ended their contract with the main contractor 
(IFM provider). Now they say, ‘We have tried with the main contractor – renowned one’. They say 











5.4  Towards an extended framework 
Based on the field insights and analysis, the following figure (8) can be drawn.  
 












The above figure (8) differs from the theoretical framework (figure 6, chapter 4) in a number 
of ways. First, the theoretical framework in chapter 4 is focused only on the instrumental 
rationality of professions and professional networks. It does not talk about the influence of 
logics and societal institutions on the actions and strategies of the actors. In other words, it is 
silent about institutional rationality, institutional logics and their effects on the cognition of 
different actors in the field. The dominant logic of rationalization is connected to broader 
logics of markets and corporations and this logic has been very influential in the emergence 





and further spread of IFM in the field of FM. Secondly, as per theoretical framework the 
institutional entrepreneurs exist at field level and there was nothing about their links to other 
national and transnational fields. The field research and analysis (figure 8) reveals that some 
actors (institutional entrepreneurs) cross the boundaries of different fields and that they are 
connected to national and international fields and wider logics. Such boundary or field-
crossing capacity enables them to disseminate new ideas and broader logics in different 
organizational fields. In this research, these field-crossing actors are the consultants, 
professional associations, international service providers and international client 
organizations. They are influenced by the global economic environment (competition, 
financial crisis) and the logics of markets and corporations, and they shape the logics of the 
local organizational field. For instance, the logic of the field of FM in the Netherlands is 
rationalization, which is compatible with the broader logics of market and corporations. The 
boundary-crossing actors, particularly service providers and consultants theorized the 
benefits of a new governance form (IFM), legitimated it with the success stories of 
renowned international client organizations and participated in benchmarking, publications, 
seminars and conferences. The professional associations were used as platforms in addition 
to their own networks. Thirdly, in order to cope with the economic environment different 
theories emerged during the last three decades. These theories also shaped the field. For 
instance, in this case the theories of the value chain, concepts of core competence and 
theories on outsourcing have been influential in shaping the understanding of the people and 
organizations towards rationalization. Fourthly, the framework did not consider the 
influence of the economic environment such as the financial crisis and competition, that also 
shape the organizational fields. Fifthly, the framework still assumes a dichotomy between 
the technical and the institutional environment which means that the organizations designing 
and adopting a new governance form at an early stage are interested in efficiency and the 
other adopter organizations are seeking legitimacy. But it is the institutional rationality and 
institutional logics that guide the decisions of both early and later adopter organizations and 
the institutional logics, in this case, reinforce rationalization (efficiency). Institutional logics 
determine what is or is not efficient. 
  





It is noted that prior research (e.;g Lounsbury and Crumley, 2007) on institutional logics 
explains practice variation as the result of a change in institutional logics. But this research 
shows that new practices (such as new governance -IFM) may emerge without any change in 
the corresponding institutional logics because the rationalization logic has been dominant in 
the field over the last 2 or 3 decades, yet different governance forms and practices (FM staff 
department concept, SSC and IFM / TFM) emerged over time. Different practices may co-
exist in the organizational field at a particular moment in time because they are all connected 
to the dominant institutional logics. Their appropriateness may be dependent on other factors 
such as size or ownership (private vs. public companies). For instance, in this research the 
big organizations find the IFM or demand management organization to be an appropriate 
governance choice, while governmental and non-profit organizations consider having a FM 
department to be an appropriate governance choice. As the research has shown that 
historically the logic of rationalization has been dominant, the variety of governance may 
not necessarily be because of different institutional logics. This finding has an implication 
for ITS, because the practices change though only one logic remains dominant.  
 
It is emphasized that the contribution to the FM domain was not the primary focus of this 
research. Nevertheless, the above mentioned results of the field level research give a social 
and institutional reflection on the change in governance that might be of interest to the 
practitioners in the field of FM. By doing so it tries to expand the knowledge in the field of 
FM that up till now is dominantly focused on technical aspects of FM. This is particularly 
relevant because the logic of professionalism is not dominant in the Dutch field of FM , 
although there have been some ripples of professionalism in the literature. For instance, FM 
is about optimization rather than cost cutting (Roberts 2001) and the rigidly cost controlled 
workplace is because of the lack of professionalism (Grimshaw 2003). User interests and 
needs are to be put first (Duffy 2000) and professionalism is about a code of ethics and a 
recognized social responsibility to cater the legitimate needs of all stakeholders (Grimshaw 
2003) instead of a shareholders only. In other words, the field of FM is focused on technical 
aspects of FM and on rationalization.  
 





This research gives an alternative social and institutional view and pays attention to some of 
the ripples of professionalism in the extant literature on FM. This research also questions the 
all too positive impression of the practitioner literature about IFM and TFM. Only success 
stories of IFM are heard in the publications of the professional associations and other media. 
In this research it was observed that there are also failure cases and governance problems 
with IFM.  
 
5.5  Chapter Summary 
This chapter reveals that a relatively new governance form (IFM) has emerged over the last 
two decades. The field research revealed that some actors transcend the organizational field 
boundaries and that they are connected to national and transnational fields. Such actors bring 
changes in the governance in specific organizational fields into life, which in this case is the 
Dutch field of FM. These field-crossing actors are the multinational organizations that 
include client organizations, service providers, consultants and professional associations. 
Two of these field-crossing actors are prominent institutional entrepreneurs because they 
actively participated in the social construction of IFM in the Dutch field of FM. The local 
service providers and consultants followed the international ones. The professional 
associations were used as a stage to disseminate the ideas through conference and 
publications. In addition, the institutional entrepreneurs used their own networks and the 
initial adopters of IFM (international client organizations) as sources of success stories . This 
further reinforced the concept.  
 
The analysis expresses how IFM has been socially constructed in the field of FM in the 
Netherlands over the last two decades. Powerful actors prove to behave instrumentally 
rational in changing an organizational field. But what enables the institutional entrepreneurs 
to behave instrumentally rational in changing governance? This could be explained by using 
the concept of institutional rationality which takes the role of institutional logics into account. 
This research (through a historical analysis of the academic and practice literature in the 
Dutch field of FM coupled with interviews) shows that the field of FM has been dominated 
by the logic of rationalization (reduction of costs) that is connected to broader logics of 
shareholders value (market) and profitability (corporation). The emergence of the theories of 





the value chain, primary and secondary processes (core vs. non-core) and outsourcing during 
the last three decades reinforced the logic of rationalization. It has further been buttressed by 
the competition and financial crisis over time. Prior literature shows that practices change 
because underlying logics of the field change. But this research demonstrates that different 
practices (different governance forms in this case such as an FM department concept, SSCs 
or IFM /TFM) may survive and endure without change in the dominant logics because the 
governance forms are all compatible with the dominant logic.  
 
Furthermore, as discussed before, the state of the art in accounting, which draws upon ITS, 
has mostly focused on isomorphism and diffusion aspects. But this study explicitly focused 
on social construction and non-isomorphic change.  
 
The chapter also provides a social and institutional perspective for the FM academics and 







































































This chapter and the following chapter (7) reflect on governance at an interfirm level. As it 
was shown in the last chapter, IFM has become a popular way of governing FM in the 
Netherlands. When IFM is adopted, there are at least two organizations involved. These two 
organizations have to deal with each other as a result of the decisions made by the top 
management of each of these organizations. Interfirm governance is therefore closely related 
to the concept of IFM. 
 
At the level of an interfirm relationship the extant literature considers management control 
and / or trust as relevant governance mechanisms. Therefore, this chapter reviews the state of 
the art in the governance, particularly related to the accounting research, of interfirm 
relationships.  
 
6.2 Governance of interfirm relationships: theoretical basis and theoretical ambitions 
There has been a rise of accounting and control studies dealing with interfirm transactional 
relationships during the last decade or so. One of the major drivers is the call from eminent 
scholars in the field that the scope of management control no longer confines within the legal 
boundaries of firms (Otley 1994) and that there should be a more thorough examination of 
the accounting and informational consequences of more explicit concerns with the 
management of supply chains (Hopwood 1996). These calls were in response to changing 
organizational realities, characterized by different forms of interfirm relationships such as 
joint ventures, franchises, joint research and development, long term supply relationships and 
outsourcing relationships.  
 
In this section we will elaborate on the theoretical basis and ambitions. Particularly, we will 
theoretically explore the linkages between governance, (management) control, trust and 
power as follows: 
  






Both control and trust in interfirm relationships may be placed under an umbrella of 
governance. The notion of governance includes the notion of control but it is a wider concept 
(Nooteboom, 1999). Nooteboom (2002) extended the concept of governance quite 
considerably to include issues of trust along with relational risks (Van der Meer-Kooistra and 
Scapens 2008). Governance, therefore, is a broad concept that incorporates both control and 
trust. Effective governance safeguards against the opportunistic behavior of the parties, 
facilitates coordination (Dekker 2004; Kumar and Seth 1998); helps in learning (Makhija and 
Ganesh 1997); and provides stability, predictability and adaptation mechanisms to an 
interfirm relationship (Gulati, Lawrence, and Puranam 2005; williamson 1991). 
 
6.2.2 Control and management control 
Organizational control has been defined as the processes by which organizations govern their 
activities so that they continue to achieve the objectives they set for themselves in an 
efficient way (Emmanuel, Otley, and Merchant 1990). It is a process of regulation and 
monitoring for the achievement of organizational goals (Das and Teng 2001; p.258). 
Management control includes all the devices or systems managers use to ensure that the 
behaviors and decisions of their employees are consistent with the organization’s objectives 
and strategies. The systems themselves are commonly referred to as the management control 
systems (MCS) (Merchant and Van der Stede 2012; p.6). Management control as an 
important element of organizational control aims at influencing actors in order to enhance the 
effectiveness and efficiency of activities. This gives management control a strongly 
behavioral focus and a concern with the effect of behavior on outcomes (Merchant and 
Simons 1986). Though management control issues have been especially studied in the 
context of integrated organizations, there is a comparable set of problems in situations where 
independent organizations cooperate (Speklé 2001; Van der Meer-Kooistra and Vosselman 
2000). The cooperation as such also forms, in some way, an organization, but one in which 
diverging interests could exist that cannot be managed within a hierarchical context. 
Therefore, management control is not restricted to relations within organizations with various 
degrees of decentralization of decision making (see also Otley 1994). 
  





The control could be formal and/or informal. In building theory on the ‘accounting-control-
trust’-nexus, Vosselman and Van der Meer-Kooistra (2009) adopt Eisenhardt’s distinction 
between external measure-based control and internal value-based control (Eisenhardt 1985). 
External measure based control is related to formal control and internal value based control is 
related to social control. It is suggested that through formal controls either the output of 
employees (output control) or aspects of their behaviors (behavioral control) (Ouchi 1979; 
Thompson 1967) are measured. So, formal control is linked up with external measure-based 
control. More generally, formal controls relate to the establishment and utilization of formal 
rules, procedures and policies to constrain and/or monitor and reward desirable performance. 
These formal rules, procedures and policies may take the form of performance management 
systems, written down in a contract or in service level agreements. Social control pertains to 
the establishment of organizational norms, values, culture and internalization of goals to 
encourage desirable performance and behavior (Das and Teng 2001). Involvement in the 
decision making process, rituals, ceremonies, orientation programs and networking within 
and between organizations are examples of social controls. 
 
6.2.3 Trust and power 
Prior research has suggested that in addition to the formal control mechanisms, trust may act 
as a social control mechanism in interfirm relationships (For instance, Bachmann 2001; 
Bijlsma-Frankema and Costa 2005; Das and Teng 1998; Das and Teng 2001; Inkpen and 
Currall 2004; Nooteboom, Berger, and Noorderhaven 1997; Nooteboom 1996; Poppo and 
Zenger 2002; Sako 1992; Zaheer and Venkatraman 1995).  
 
According to Free (2008), research in accounting and control suffers from a lack of attention 
to the nature and effects of trust, conflicting conceptualizations of trust, inadequate 
understanding of the relationship between trust, its antecedents and consequences, and the 
distinction between trustworthiness and trust. It is, therefore, important to carefully define 
and explain trust, trustworthiness and interorganizational trust. There are several definitions 
of trust. For example, trust is “a type of expectation that alleviates the fear that one’s 
exchange partner will act opportunistically” (Bradach and Eccles 1989; p.104) and it is also a 
“psychological state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based upon positive 





expectations or behavior of another” (Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, and Camerer 1998; p.395). It is 
also “a predilection to assume the best when interpreting another's motives and 
actions”(Uzzy 1997; p.43) To Tomkins (2001), trust is the adoption of “a belief by one party 
in a relationship that the other party will not act against his or her interests, where this belief 
is held without undue doubt or suspicion and in the absence of detailed information about the 
actions of that other party” (p. 165). This definition is a bit similar to the definition of Mayer 
et al., (1995) that trust is “the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another 
party based on the expectation that the other will perform a particular action important to the 
trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that other party” (p. 712). The 
definition of trust given by Mayer et al., (1995) will be used in this thesis because this 
definition has been used by other supply chain scholars (cf. Free 2008). 
 
According to Mayer et al., (1995), there are three characteristics (not trust per se) of the 
trustee that determine trustworthiness and that lay foundations for the development of trust. 
These are ability, benevolence and integrity. Ability is that group of skills, competences and 
characteristics that enable a party to have influence within some specific domain (p.717). 
Benevolence is the extent to which a trustee is believed to want to do good to a trustor, aside 
from an egocentric profit motive (p.718). Integrity is the trustor’s perception that the trustee 
adheres to a set of principles that the trustor finds acceptable (p.719). They (ibid) propose 
that the effect of integrity on trust will be most salient early in the relationships prior to the 
development of benevolence. Data and effects of perceived benevolence on trust will 
increase over time as the relationships develop.  
 
There is a difference between trust and trustworthiness; trust is a relational concept that 
always depends on trustworthiness (Free 2008). Hardin (2002; p.37), as cited in Free (2008), 
distinguishes trust and trustworthiness as follows, “Trust and trustworthiness are not 
analogous or symmetrical, because one can be disposed to trustworthiness without any risk. 
A relationship cannot make you worse off if you are merely trustworthy in it. It can, 
however, make you substantially worse off if you are trusting in it.”  
 





Contextual factors, such as stakes involved, the balance of power in the relationship, the 
perception of the level of risk and the alternatives available to the trustor, may also influence 
the level of trust (Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman 1995). 
 
“Interorganizational trust represents an organization’s expectations that another firm will not 
act opportunistically when dealing with that organization” (Gulati and Sytch 2008; p.165). 
Blois (1999) differentiates between trust and reliance by saying that trust has an emotive 
element which becomes apparent when we are let down. Thus, trust can only be granted by 
the individuals because it has an affective element and it is hard to make sense that an 
organization trusts as there is nobody doing the trusting (ibid). Therefore, 
‘interorganizational trust’ is to accept that this is a shorthand for ‘two sets of individuals each 
of which is trusting the organization of which the others are members’ (Blois 1999).  
 
Another important concept that influences the form of the interfirm relationships is power. 
Like trust, power is a mechanism that can coordinate expectations and that can control the 
dynamics of a social relationship (Bachmann 2001). The difference between power and trust 
is that power can be used as an instrument to manipulate the other party into desired 
behavior. When power is used, partners are unable to engage in opportunistic behavior, while 
when trust is in place partners voluntarily sacrifice the possible benefits of opportunistic 
behavior (Hardy, Philips, and Lawrence 1998). Most of the definitions of trust relate it to 
predictability and such an approach ignores that power is, in fact, a functional equivalent of 
trust, serving to ensure predictability in coordination (Lane and Bachmann 1996). For 
instance, if two organizations cooperate and remain in an interfirm relationship because of 
non-availability of the alternatives or high stakes involved does not necessary mean that there 
is trust in the relationship. Trust is a communication process of shared meanings and values 
and in case of asymmetrical power relations, parties can take advantage of their power 
position and manipulate this communication process (Hardy et al., 1988). Thus, power could 
damage trust between parties. Power and trust are both ways to produce cooperation between 
organizations, but each coordination mechanism has different implications for the nature and 
outcome of that cooperation. Interfirm relationships that are controlled by power look on the 





surface like they have trust, but this is only an illusion that is created to secure the goals of 
one of the partners at the expense of others (ibid).  
 
The choice between power and trust to control the relationship is dependent on the 
institutional environment in which the cooperation is embedded (Bachmann 2001). Summing 
up, power and trust are interrelated and both can be instrumental in the governance of an 
interfirm relationship.  
 
6.2.4 Control and Trust 
Partner’s confidence (trust) in each other maintains stable interfirm relationships or prevents 
their failures (Das and Teng 1998). Trust also encourages partners to accept bigger risks and 
enlarge the scope of the interfirm relationship (Inkpen and Currall 2004). Furthermore, trust 
can reduce costs of coordination and monitoring, enhance the performance of partners, or 
result in an increase in investments in the relationships (e.g; Dekker 2004; Langfield-Smith 
and Smith 2003; Van der Meer-Kooistra and Vosselman 2000). In other words, it is 
suggested that trust as a social control mechanism can provide benefits similar to formal 
control such as reducing risks of opportunism and facilitating adaptation (e.g; Bradach and 
Eccles 1989; Granovetter 1985; Macaulay 1963; Macneil 1978; Uzzy 1997) and it could thus 
be an efficient governance mechanism in interfirm relationships (Dyer 1997). But trust 
cannot be instituted instantaneously as it is developed over time (Nooteboom, Berger, and 
Noorderhaven 1997). 
 
To a large extent, extant literature on management control of interfirm relationships (see 
recent reviews; Berry, Coad, Harris, Otley, and Stringer 2009; Caglio and Ditillo 2008; Van 
der Meer-Kooistra and Vosselman 2006) discusses the concepts of control and trust as either 
substitutes or complements. Both control and trust have been suggested to be instrumental in 
absorbing uncertainty and behavioral risks (e.g; Dekker 2004; Emsley and Kidon 2007). As 
substitutes, control and trust are inversely related. Transactions characterized by high 
complexity and high uncertainty may necessitate partners to draw more heavily upon trust 
instead of formal control (Van der Meer-Kooistra and Vosselman 2000). As complements, 
trust and control may be mutually reinforcing. For instance, the formal sharing of accounting 





information in the beginning of interfirm relationship may produce positive expectations 
about future behavior and, hence, control could contribute to trust building (Emsley and 
Kidon 2007; Tomkins 2001). Control may also show a complex and changing relationship 
with trust over time (Tomkins 2001). Therefore, the simple complements-substitutes 
dichotomy needs further analysis (Puranam and Vanneste 2009). Trust and control may be 
conceptualized as a trust/control duality which implies that trust and control assume 
existence of each other, refer to each other and create each other, yet remain irreducible to 
each other (Möllering 2005). This duality perspective is similar to the interaction perspective 
that Vosselman & Van der Meer-Kooistra (2009) take on control and trust. In order to 
compensate for legitimate mistrust that arises as a consequence of divergent interests, parties 
negotiate a (contractual) governance structure that incorporates formal controls. The 
governance structure is a basis for thin trust, but is insufficient for realizing a stable and 
durable relationship. To that end, trust has to be ‘thickened’ by a self-regulating process of 
relational signaling, driven by ‘enlightened self-interest’(Chaserant 2003a). Although parties 
act out of self-interest, it is the long term that they have in mind and therefore, as long as they 
value the relationship, they will demonstrate a willingness to forego short term opportunistic 
behavior for the sake of cooperative behavior. It is theorized that formal controls and trust 
building interact: up to a certain threshold, formal controls are both a necessary condition and 
an accelerator for the building of thick trust, while the presence of thick trust accelerates 
changes in formal controls. 
 
6.2.5 Concluding Remarks 
Prior studies examined the influence of formal control systems on trust (Colleti, Sedatole, 
and Towry 2005; Vélez, Sánchez, and Álvarez-Dardet 2008) and how trust could affect 
control (e.g; Vosselman and Van der Meer-Kooistra 2009). This study seeks to further build 
on theory on the dynamics of both control and trust in a specific interfirm relationship. It 
responds to calls for more in depth studies, on the relationship between control and trust 
(Caglio and Ditillo 2008; Free 2008). Particularly, it seeks to build further theory on the 
interaction between accounting, control and trust (building). Free (2008) questions the 
romanticized notion of trust and describes a field study where a power-based relationship 
was cloaked in trust. He calls for more in-depth studies, for acquiring deeper understandings 





of the interplay between accounting, trust and relationship development over a time horizon 
of several years. Our study on how governance, in a specific interfirm relationship, is shaped 
through the development of control and trust over time and how accounting is implicated in 














































CHAPTER 7: GOVERNANCE AT AN INTERFIRM LEVEL- A LONGITUDINAL 
FIELD STUDY 
 
7.1  Introduction 
This chapter presents the results of a longitudinal study into how, in a particular interfirm 
relationship, governance is shaped through the development of control and trust and how 
accounting is implicated in this development. 
 
A substantial number of studies has touched on the relationship between control and trust. To 
a certain extent, prior studies into control and trust in interfirm relationships took a 
rationalists approach (inter alia a transaction cost economics approach) and aimed at 
discovering mechanisms, archetypes or patterns of control (e.g; Dekker 2004; Emsley and 
Kidon 2007; Langfield-Smith and Smith 2003; Tomkins 2001; Van der Meer-Kooistra and 
Vosselman 2000). However, there have also been performative studies that discussed and 
investigated control ‘in the making’ by drawing upon actor network theory (For instance, 
Chua and Mahama 2007; Mouritsen and Thrane 2006). In a rationalists approach, both 
control and trust are considered to be instrumental in absorbing uncertainty and behavioral 
risks. This research draws upon the rationalists approach.  
 
Recent contributions (e.g; Vosselman and Van der Meer-Kooistra 2009) take an interactive 
perspective rather than a rather simple ‘and/or’ or ‘and/and’ perspective, thus shifting the 
focus towards the dynamics of the relationship between control and trust. In an interactive 
perspective, the focus is on how (mis)trust produces control and how control produces 
(mis)trust. Such a perspective opens up possibilities to include the question as to how 
accounting is implicated in these dynamics, i.e. how accounting is implicated in the 
(re)shaping and use of formal controls and in the building (or destroying) of trust. Although it 
is tempting to connect contractually agreed upon accounting information with contract-based 
formal controls, while connecting voluntarily shared accounting information to trust building 
(as is implicitly assumed by Vosselman and Van der Meer-Kooistra, 2009), this chapter 
demonstrates a more complex relationship. Particularly, it is demonstrated how (changes in) 
the formal accounting and control system may also help producing cooperation and trust. In 





doing so, not only the monitoring, supervising and rewarding aspects of control are revealed, 
but also its more salient aspects of coordination (Vélez, Sánchez, and Álvarez-Dardet 2008) 
and the (related) aspects of relational signaling that could help in building trust (Vosselman 
and Van der Meer-Kooistra 2009). As for the monitoring, supervising and rewarding aspects 
of control we suggest that they have the propensity to mitigate relational risk (Seal, Cullen, 
Dunlop, Berry, and Ahmed 1999) by compensating for legitimate mistrust and by producing 
thin trust through relational signals (Vosselman and Van der Meer-Kooistra 2009). As for the 
coordination and relational signaling aspects of control, the analyses and interpretations 
particularly suggest that control related accounting information (both formal and informal) 
indeed is important for the building and maintenance of trust in the relationship.  
 
The interaction between control and trust and the implication of accounting in that interaction 
does not take place in a vacuum. There are contextual, including history, factors influencing 
this interaction. Therefore, by presenting a field study concerning the long term outsourcing 
of the management of facilities services by a big semiconductor company, this chapter aims 
to contribute by demonstrating the interaction between control and trust in a specific 
interorganizational context and over a specific period of time.  
 
The main theoretical implication from the field study is that the institution and practicing of 
explicit control (formal and informal controls) in the interfirm relationship both help 
producing and may be produced by trust or an implicit control structure. Trust as an implicit 
control structure is tacit and consists of a frame that, at the one hand, defines the situation in 
the relationship as a cooperative one in which short term self-interest is subordinate to the 
interest of the relationship and at the other hand, guides decisions and actions by the parties 
involved. Together and in interaction, the explicit control structure and the implicit control 
structure govern the relationship. The explicit control structure provides safeguards, 
incentives and constraints, while the implicit control structure both reflects trust and 
influences the operation of explicit controls. The cooperative frame in the relationship is the 
result of a trust building process through which parties express their desires for a stable and 
durable relationship. It produces positive expectations about each other’s behavior and it 
induces cooperative behavior, thereby fueling the development of the interfirm relationship. 





It is theorized that the way the implicit and explicit control structures interact is highly 
dependent on the norms and values and the embedded agency of so-called boundary 
spanners. Essentially, both explicit and implicit control structures are the result of voluntary 
local decisions and actions taken and executed by the boundary spanners. It is demonstrated 
how the values, norms and (embedded) agency of boundary spanners are critical to the 
development or destruction of trust. As the field study will show, management of the 
outsourcing organization developed a trusting relationship over a period of more than two 
years. It succeeded in maintaining such a relationship by using formal controls and informal 
activities to develop the interfirm relationship. As a consequence, an implicit control 
structure emerged and the intensity of the formal control system and the information needs 
were decreasing. Hence, an interactive relationship between explicit and implicit controls 
was identified. Then a new management team took over and a mismatch between the norms 
and values of the new management team with the contractor developed. Incidents of 
opportunistic behavior occurred and, moreover, the ability of the contractor was questioned. 
Thus, a relationship based on trust turned into a power-based relationship in which the 
outsourcing organization proved to be more powerful and in which there was more explicit 
control. This also demonstrates that a prior trusting relationship may turn into a mistrusting 
relationship. 
 
A further theoretical implication of our field study is, that an effective (successful) 
interaction between explicit and implicit control requires a certain context. Particularly, the 
boundary spanners prove to be of great importance to the development of the interfirm 
relationship. The agency and reflexivity of the boundary spanners may be influenced by the 
implicit control structure (or trust). Although the boundary spanners (i.e. the managers) may 
think that they are not being constrained by explicit controls, they nevertheless might become 
shackled in the invisible constraint of trust (the implicit structure). When the context 
changes, (in this case when the new boundary spanners arrive), the implicit structure (trust) 
shatters and opportunism, power and control emerge. 
 





This chapter is organized as follows. First, a longitudinal field research (a case study) is 
described and analyzed in the section two. Then, theoretical implications of the study are 
discussed in the next section. The last section concludes the chapter. 
 
7.2   Field study: on the governance of facilities services  
 
7.2.1  The parties 
In order to maintain confidentiality pseudonyms have been used for the companies. This field 
study is about an interfirm relationship between a Client Firm (CF) and a Management Firm 
(MF). The relationship relates to the outsourcing of facilities management.  
 
CF is a leading semiconductor company founded by the Parent Firm (PF) more than 50 years 
ago. Headquartered in Europe, the company had about 29,000 employees working in more 
than 30 countries and posted sales of USD 5.4 billion (including the Mobile & Personal 
business) in 2008. CF creates semiconductors, system solutions and software that deliver 
better sensory experiences in TVs, set-top boxes, identification applications, mobile phones, 
cars and a wide range of other electronic devices. CF is a multinational company having its 
operations and customers in different countries in Europe, Asia and North America. In the 
Netherlands, the company is located at two sites, i.e. the production site and the headquarters. 
 
MF is an Anglo-Dutch organization, located in the Netherlands. This organization possesses 
specialist knowledge of and has experience in the provision of management solutions for 
facilities services, appropriate for both public and private sector clients. The company strives 
to become the market leader in the European Total Facilities Management (TFM) market. 
17MF is a joint venture between a UK-based company and a Netherlands-based company. It 
was founded in 2002 and currently has various ongoing multi-million Euro contracts with 
international companies located in the Netherlands. Their first substantial contract was with 
the PF.18 
 
                                                 
17 Browsed the website of MF  
18 Browsed on the web 





7.2.2 The nature of the relationship 
MF has a managing agent contract with CF. It does not provide facilities services itself. 
There are various suppliers that provide facilities services and the contracts for facilities 
services are concluded directly between CF and different suppliers. MF only supervises and 
manages the contracting and delivery of facilities services. Hence, MF manages the 
relationships between CF and various suppliers of CF. A manager of CF depicted this 
relationship in a triangle as shown in figure 9. 
 
Figure 9. The relationship triangle 
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    Contract  No Contract 
 
 
       Contracts 
 
CF   Suppliers 
 
As shown in figure 9 below, there is a contract between MF and CF for the management of 
the contracts between CF and suppliers. There is no direct contract between MF and the 
suppliers, but MF has a relationship with the suppliers to manage on behalf of the CF. A 
pictorial explanation of the relationship that also shows the focus of this study is given in 
figure 10 below. It is emphasized that the focus was on the relationship between CF and MF 




























The contract between CF and MF is about the management of facilities services in the 
Netherlands for two sites, one at production site and the other at headquarters. The 
outsourcing contract included the transfer of five employees from CF to MF. Some examples 







                                                 
19 I would like to thank Reinald Minnaar for drawing this figure. 





Table 13: The Outsourced Facilities Services 
 
Major type of Service Description 
Building and Environment  Fire prevention system, heating ventilation and 
air-conditioning (HVAC), environment and 
safety, technical maintenance, water 
management, energy and utilities management 
 
Office Services Cleaning, reprographics, cleaning rooms 
cleaning, reception, parking, planting, data 
management and office supplies 
Projects Capital works, space management, relocations 
and change management 
Communications Multi client service desk, mail, telecom, courriers 
and signage 
 
Hospitality Catering, conference, audiovisual services, 
flowers and event management 
 
Table 13 reveals that the services are rather simple of nature. They can be programmed 
easily. Most of the services (cleaning, heating, ventilation and air-conditioning, energy and 
utilities, catering, conference management and event management) are characterized by a 
relatively high task programmability. The output of the services can be measured to some 
extent, although accurate measurability is difficult. There is relatively low asset specificity, 
because no specific investment had to be made for this relationship. Some services are highly 
repetitive (e.g; building and environment and office services) and some are less repetitive 
(e.g; hospitality). So, there is a mix of service transactions with a relatively high frequency. 
A service provider is called an integrated service provider (Ventovuori, 2007) if it provides a 
package of different facilities services. We claim that in this case MF is an integrated service 
manager and not an integrated provider because MF is managing the contracts between CF 
and various suppliers and not directly providing facilities services. The management of 
facilities services is rather difficult to measure and it has a relatively low programmability. 
Although the asset specificity is relatively low and, as a consequence, there would be 
switching possibilities for CF, in reality the switching possibilities are low because of a very 
small number of companies that provide similar management services.  
 





CF does not outsource all the required facilities services. Facilities services in CF fall apart 
into two types of services. These are the facilities services for offices and buildings at one 
hand and facilities services for wafer production and fabrication units (FABs) at the other 
hand. The contract between CF and MF relates only to the management of facilities services 
for the offices and buildings (called soft services). The department within CF responsible for 
the soft facilities services is Real Estate and Facilities Management (RE&FM) Netherlands 
and the department responsible for hard facilities services to FABs is called Industrial Center 
(IC). The management of hard facilities services requires technological knowledge and is 
critical to the manufacturing processes. The management of facilities services of IC has not 
(yet) been outsourced to MF. Facilities services for FABs are managed in-house. As far as 
there are contractors involved in IC facilities services, they are supervised and managed by 
the CF’s own engineers and staff and not by MF. The services handled by the IC include 
piping, chemical supplies, gases, maintenance of cleaning room and green filling drums.  
 
Both the critical nature of the IC facilities services and the main consideration regarding the 
governance of these services is expressed by the managing director, as follows: 
 
“Facilities management in the factory is crucial. If FABs close down for an hour, losses are huge. It 
takes us three days to run FABs again so FABs can’t be stopped. It means you need facilities 
management that has such a high quality that you know that FAB will never stop.” 
  
But, he thinks that even IC facilities services are not core operations: 
 
“On the other hand, I still think that other companies might do it better than us. Because it is not our 
core competence we are not spending sufficient management time to these kinds of services.” 
 
The choice to outsource soft services but not to outsource hard services is consistent with 
transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1979; 1991). In the latter case, asset specificity, 
particularly business process specificity, is high. However, the doubt expressed by the 
manager opens up future possibilities for outsourcing. As will be demonstrated later on, the 
building of trust in the relationship with the external manager of the outsourced soft services 
enhances that possibility. 






The terms of the relationship between CF and MF are laid down in a contract and in service 
level agreements (SLAs). The department at CF responsible for the relationship with MF and 
for developing SLAs, is the Real Estate and Facilities Management (RE&FM). Hence, for 
this research project, the inter-firm relationship between RE&FM CF and MF has particular 
importance in addition to the some other departments / functions. The partial 
(inter)organizational chart of CF showing RE&FM Netherlands and its relationship with MF 
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Different actors (managers of the CF and outside organizations i.e. MF and suppliers) 
directly involved in the interfirm relationship are shown in italics and bold in figure 11. In 
CF, there is a Board of Management and a Chief Financial Officer (CFO) at the top and the 
Country Manager Netherlands is reporting to this Board. The Country Manager (managing 
director) is responsible for all the operations in CF within the Netherlands (NL). The head of 
the RE&FM NL department is reporting to the country manager. Furthermore, there are two 
facilities managers for both sites, that is, the production site and the headquarters, who are 
reporting to the manager RE&FM NL and are also dealing with MF on an operational level. 
Further, at the bottom MF is managing the contracts concluded between CF and different 
suppliers. MF is responsible for the management of facilities services at both of the sites. The 
production site has semi-conductor fabrication units (FABs) and the buildings are owned by 
CF here. The headquarters is in another city in a building which is not owned by CF, but 
rented. 
 
7.2.3 The development of the relationship 
 
a- Pre CF period (PF Semiconductors) 
The relationship between CF and MF started in May 2006. At that time CF was a part of the 
Parent Firm (PF) and it was called the business unit PF Semiconductors. So, the original 
decision to enter into the relationship was not made by an autonomous CF but by PF, 
particularly PF Real Estate Management and Services. The contract between PF 
Semiconductors and MF was concluded in 2006 and it spans a four years period. The 
contract expires in 2010.  
 
The decision by PF Semiconductors to outsource the management of facilities services to MF 
was closely related to prior experiences of PF with MF. A prior contract was signed between 
PF and MF in July 2003, which included the provision of facilities management services for 
650,000 square meters of building space as well as the management of different types of 
services such as technical maintenance, security and catering. Approximately 60 employees 
of PF's facilities management operations were transferred to MF. 






Based on the prior relationship PF Real Estate Management and Services decided to 
outsource the management of facilities services of PF Semi-conductors (now CF) in May 
2006. This decision was mainly driven by top management’s strategic consideration that the 
focus should be on core operations and that non-core operations should be outsourced. PF 
Semi-conductors (now CF) did not participate in the decision; the contract was just handed 
over to PF Semiconductors’ management by the PF. One CF manager expresses the process 
in this decision as follows: 
 
“We started out as part of the PF organization and the decision to go to MF was a decision at a 
higher level, within PF. Focusing on core activities, that was the main reason to outsource at that 
time. The business case was not the reason to do the outsourcing to MF”. 
 
In September 2006, PF Semi-conductors was sold to a group of private equity investors and 
CF came into existence. In its early stage the relationship between CF and MF did not work 
properly because most of the managers in CF did not approve the earlier decision to 
outsource the management to MF. Even the managing director resisted. 
 
The account manager from MF also recalls that MF experienced problems in the relationship. 
Apparently, in his view CF’s management did not feel ownership of the outsourcing 
relationship.  
 
b- CF and MF 
At the start, the relationship between CF and MF was not working well. The manager of IC 
speaks of a drama: 
 
“And in the beginning it was a drama, the first years of this outsourcing project was a drama for both 
parties because we didn’t know how to manage an outsourced activity and MF was also looking for 
let’s say the ways how to do this and to deal with this environment.” 
 
The MF account manager expressed a similar problem,  
 





“The first half year was a struggle because we didn’t get any support from the Facilities Manager.” 
 
There were different reasons why the relationship was not working. First, the initial contract 
was not made between CF and MF but between PF Real Estate & Services and MF; it was 
just handed over to CF (PF Semi-conductors at that time). The purchase manager at CF 
expresses it as follows: 
 
“Yeah. Our management made some decisions and said this is the way to go. But this example was 
one step beyond that. Even the contract was presented as ‘take it or leave it’. It’s perfectly okay if 
management says this is the way to go because that’s the input you expect from management. If 
management goes one step beyond that and says that okay that’s the direction we go and that’s how 
we are going to do it, then indeed people feel bad. Feel that they don’t have influence actually on how 
to go and how to proceed in the direction. The decisions were taken two levels higher in the 
hierarchy. It’s not just me who thinks like that, I think I am representing a lot of people here. They 
said okay, ‘we have learned to be what we are. We are paid to add value to this company and our 
management makes a decision. That’s perfectly okay but management also fills in that decision. The 
management should have stepped back and let others make the operational decisions.’ A lot of people 
now seem to have stepped out of the process and say ‘let them bounce against the stone wall and they 
will see what happens then’. In fact that was how it worked, which perhaps is not good but it’s 
perfectly human.” 
 
Secondly, facilities managers were expecting MF to do all the work itself. There was a lack 
of cooperation and coordination on the part of CF facilities manager. Thirdly, managers in 
CF thought some conditions in the contract were not appropriate for a good relationship and 
a good execution of the work. An example why the initial contract was not encouraging is 
pointed out by the purchase manager, when he tells us that the incentive for the contractor 
apparently was too weak: 
 
“[if] savings were 100% then we could, according to an incentive in the contract, get 80% of those 
savings and 20% was for them. That’s how the old contract was written. It didn’t work…. It didn’t. 
They had to get more” 
 





A facilities manager also sees a lack of detail, clarity and comprehensiveness in the original 
contract. He suggests that a good contract and formal control system can help in better 
coordinating the interfirm relationship:  
 
“It was not clear for everybody what should be reached, who should do it, [who] is responsible for 
which actions. And if you look at savings, savings is always a nice issue, uh who initiated it? Who is 
responsible for the results? Who gets paid for it? And if you do not make that very clear you will 
always have discussions and it makes it very difficult to work together. So that was one big problem 
with the previous contract.” 
 
Apparently, interests were not properly aligned in the contract. Then in the beginning of 2007 
a new managing director as well as a new facilities manager joined CF. These new managers 
(here we call them the boundary spanners), especially the managing director, RE&FM and 
purchase manager had several discussions with MF and revised the contract. This was the 
beginning of a better interfirm relationship. A manager of CF expresses it as follows:  
 
“Then he [new Facilities Manager] came, a different person let’s say and he was let’s say more of a 
team player. Also he’s better than his predecessor and that helped a lot, because then he started 
investing into the community first here to understand ok how are things looked at and are there 
sensitivities and are there people unhappy, that kind of things. He invested in the community you 
could say. In the meantime we also had another let’s say brand manager [Managing Director] who 
was also more at the practical side, pretty hands-on as a manager and the Purchasing Manager, you 
can say, is also quite a practical guy, let’s say logged in to that as well and they started restoring the 
relationship with MF, but at the same time also bringing the ambition level of MF down.” 
 
CF concluded a new contract with MF. Given the developing situation, (herein we call the 
institutional context) CF did not really consider switching to another company. There are five 
aspects in the institutional context that need to be addressed. Firstly, the present contract with 
MF was still valid (until 2010). Secondly, some employees had already been transferred from 
CF to MF as per previous contract. Therefore, there would be legal and procedural 
implications in case of breach of the contract with MF. Thirdly, MF had competence 
reputation in the market and had big customers in the FM market in the Netherlands 





including PF. In fact, according to FM Market Report 2008 published by the Facilities 
Management Netherlands (a professional association in the field of facilities management 
which professionalizes facilities management in the Netherlands), MF was the number one in 
the top three IFM providers in the Netherlands. Thus, it was appropriate to have a new 
contract with MF. Fourthly, the intra-organizational context had also changed because of the 
replacement of the facilities manager and the managing director. These new executives 
(boundary spanners) thought that CF itself was partly responsible for not properly managing 
the ‘demand management’ function. Fifthly, an important reason for remaining with the same 
MF was that CF was suffering from decline in sales and profits and it wanted to become and 
stay flexible by reducing fixed cost and saving on non-core operations. It also wanted to 
economize on transaction costs. MF firm was one of the few companies which could manage 
the integral mix of facilities services. A switch towards another supplier would have entailed 
much effort to invest in the new relationship, thus implying transaction costs.  
 
The new contract was concluded between CF and MF. The manager RE&FM labeled the 
relationship as a ‘partnership based on mutual respect and trust’. According to him, three 
important aspects of the relationship are ‘operational excellence’, ‘added value’ and ‘clear 
and open agreement’.  
 
In the period before and after the revision of the contract in the beginning of 2007 there was 
frequent cooperation, coordination, communication and information sharing between CF and 
MF at different management levels. They formalized a meeting structure in the interfirm 














  Table-14 Meetings and Communication between CF and MF in 2007 
   
Meetings Frequency Description 
Strategic  Yearly XX 
Tactical  Quarterly  Overall contract review 
Operational  Monthly  CF Netherlands 
Savings Fortnightly CF Netherlands 
Regular  Weekly Per site 
Quarterly 
Review 
Quarterly  Evaluation report (PMS-KPIs i.e. End user 
customer satisfaction, Performance of MF, 
Client satisfaction and Performance of the 
contractors / suppliers ) 
Finance Quarterly  
Yearly 
Budget Tracker (Open book) 
Budget  
Purchasing Monthly  Suppliers / contracts 
 
Table 14 shows much communication between CF and MF where the frequency of 
interaction ranged from a weekly to a yearly basis. This frequent interaction made the 
relationship more effective and durable. MF also has a help desk at both sites.  
 
Since the beginning of 2008, the format of meetings has been changed. Now there are fewer 
meetings now. There is a monthly review meeting that is called a ‘road map discussion’ and 
a quarterly review. The manager RE&FM describes the monthly review called ‘Roadmap’ as 
follows: 
 
“Road map I mean what’s the desired development where we are going to discuss strategy, 
operations, savings and finance. These four items. And that’s me with two demand managers, the 
account manager from MF and the operations manager from MF. So the five of us are sitting down 
and sharing things we are feeling. If I have got the feeling that their organization is too poor 
[meaning doing poor], we discuss it. And I ask them to present change proposals, to come up with 
new ideas and strive after improvements. So you finally come up with an improved process and are 
very clear about what you want to focus at. Actually we made one sheet with line items, the same line 
items, technical, facilities management, demand management, savings, finance, euh operation and we 
defined the 1st situation, the current situation and where we want to be within one year. And also 
where we want to be in two years when the contract ends. And, so we are very focused on line item 
level where we want to have the improvements.” 
 





7.2.4 The future of the relationship  
Since the revision of contract in 2007 CF and MF developed a very trusting relationship and 
therefore they want to move to the next step. At present, according to the parties in the field 
the relationship between CF and MF is at a Sourcing Solution level, wherein MF handles the 
operational part and most of the relational part. It does not handle the contractual part, 
however. One of the possibilities is, that CF would move to a complete Management Solution 
wherein the operational, the relational and the contractual part of facilities management is 
handled by MF, while the strategic part remains with the outsourcer (CF). This is also called 
Total Facilities Management (TFM). This will improve CF’s flexibility and efficiency, but 
may increase dependency. 
 
A similar prediction is made by the MF manager,  
 
“We are now looking at possibilities to make it a total FM arrangement so we can also take over the 
contracts so we can work on things as having more leverage because we have several accounts so 
maybe on more accounts we can challenge suppliers to do something about the tariffs and something 
like that.” 
 
Although managers express (in their own words) a weigh off between flexibility and 
efficiency at the one hand and transaction costs at the other hand, the level of trust in the 
present relationship indicates a decision for further outsourcing. This not only regards the 
movement towards a more complete outsourcing of management (that includes the 
contracting part), but also regards the possibility to outsource the hard facilities services to 
FAB’s. The latter is not only related to the level of trust between the parties, but also to the 
fact that production is falling and is also moving to Asia. It might even be that FABs is 
closed within a couple of years. As the managing director (country manager) indicates: 
 
“But due to the fact that FABs will be closed in the next couple of years it means we get problems that 
a number of people in facilities management have to get fired, looking at the size of FABs”  
 





7.2.5 Accounting, control and trust in the relationship 
All operational accounting issues are handled by MF. The suppliers send invoices to MF that, 
in turn, sends one or two monthly invoices to CF. This implies that all the costs are running 
through the books of MF. The invoices, sent to CF by MF, have three components, i.e. cost 
of services, organization cost and management fee. The costs of services correspond with the 
payments to be made to the suppliers and, to a large extent, these costs vary with the volume 
of work. Organization cost is a fixed fee charged by MF. The organization cost is agreed 
upon on a yearly basis. The management fee is 8 to 10 percent of all the costs running 
through MF’s books. Any change in the management fee percentage has substantial 
consequences because it is calculated on total costs. Management fee is at risk when MF does 
not achieve cost savings targets. This is in fact an incentive- and penalty system. The system 
incentivizes the search for cost savings. If MF achieves the targets, it receives the complete 
fee. If MF does not achieve cost saving targets, the management fee is reduced accordingly. 
In case of savings that are higher than the target, both CF and MF share the excess savings 
equally. So, there is a strong incentive to search for savings.  
 
MF is doing all the calculations and reporting for CF in this relationship. The manager of MF 
expresses:  
 
“CF isn’t making any calculation. We are doing everything for them. We are making the business 
cases, we are trying to find out how it could be smarter, cheaper, more efficient than now […] we 
make a quarterly report what we have done this quarter, we tell them about the financial situation, we 
tell them about the KPI set and the levels we are at, we tell them about the savings, we tell them about 
the operations how we are doing our business, how satisfied the end user is and we ask them how 
satisfied they themselves are. So we will have a what we call … Client Satisfaction Survey, we tell 
something about how suppliers are doing their business as well as about our actions for 
improvements.” 
 
Sometimes, there are disagreements between MF and CF. Although these might have caused 
problems in the relationship, it proves they helped turning the relationship into a partnership 





where issues are discussed and solutions are agreed upon together. CF has positive 
expectations about the abilities, intentions and integrity of MF.  
 
The manager RE&FM recalls that their relationship is better than the relationship PF had 
with the suppliers. It is not only self-interest, reflected in a price, that counts, but effective 
and efficient facilities management proves to be strongly dependent on commitment to a 
stable and durable relationship. He seems to be benevolent because he considers that MF has 
the right to make money as follows: 
 
“In PF purchasing, the ‘pushing’ was the way to go. The PF purchasing department actually pushed 
the suppliers so deeply in their price levels, that they were not able to earn money. And you can do 
this, in some cases for some suppliers that’s right, but on the other hand if you don’t allow them to 
make money, they will never give you the right service, because they are simply not able to deliver the 
right quality of service. Traditionally the PF purchasing department always worked in this way. Push, 
push push. And finally, being surprised that you don’t get a quality service. That is all quite different 
from the situation in the current relationship” 
 
One of the facilities managers of CF also has a good feeling about the relationship, 
 
“[..] that’s one part, the contract changed, but also the way of working changed. There was more 
working together, more co-operation, more discussion, more communication, more respect.” 
 
Now CF and MF have (and aim at further building) a trusting relationship as is reflected in 
the following remarks of the country manager (managing director) of CF: 
 
“This moment we have been working with MF for two years. I fully trust them. But I say well you do 
for me the whole purchasing part for me. Don’t care about it. You choose the right supplier. Of 
course, we agree on a kind of cost down targets year after year.... Therefore, you have to build trust 
that takes time.” 
 
He further adds, 






“Yeah [..] when you outsource an important activity to a partner, you know you are becoming totally 
dependent on your partner. Such dependence is both ways, so both parties feel the need to build trust. 
A large part of MF’s revenue is from CF company and if that drops because we kick them out and ask 
someone else to do it, it is very bad for them. Then they will feel it in their bottom line. So as soon as 
you start to outsource important activities, you get interdependence between companies and you have 
to manage that interdependence. That’s why I know the boss of MF. We have a review two times a 
year and we ask ourselves whether we (still) have a trustful relationship. We also discuss possibilities 
of extending the outsourcing relationship, being fully aware that trust is a necessary precondition for 
that.” 
 
Although the reference to the dependence of MF on CF indicates that the managing director 
of CF considers a certain balance in dependency to be a kind of a safeguard in the 
relationship, the quote reveals that the manager views trust building to be a solution for 
growing interdependence.  
 
From the perspective of MF, trust building is inter alia reflected in the existence of a 
transparent open book system. Anyone can log into that system. The manager of MF says, 
 
“Every client from CF, every demand manager can look in CF PMS[performance measurement 
system]. Through KPI [key performance indicator] systems they can see everything. So they can click 
on high level and then they can click through to the bottom.” 
 
Apparently, by completely opening up the books, MF seeks to show its commitment to the 
relationship and its willingness to act cooperatively in the interest of the relationship. 
The Accounting & Finance department of CF does not show much involvement in the 
relationship between MF and CF. As per controller: 
 
“To be very honest, I mean as a controller or finance guy, we are being interested in getting the right 
services at the lowest cost. That is what I am here for. So whether it’s MF or anybody else, it’s really 
not something I should be worried about. It’s not my responsibility” 







“But we are not decision makers. We are decision supporters. The final decision is to the Manager 
RE&FM and the country manager [Managing Director]. Very straightforward.”  
 
Different formal (contractual) and informal (non-contractual) sets of activities used to govern 
the relationship are shown in table 15: 
 
      Table 1520 : Formal and informal (accounting) activities 
 
Formal or contractual activities  Informal or non-contractual activities 
Contract & Service level agreements and 
setting of target of saving of 500,000 Euros 
every year 
Participation in company events and 
ceremonies 
PMS (KPIs) and Incentive-Penalty system 
(Gain sharing system) 
Continuous flow of communication and 
coordination 
Quarterly report Roadmap discussions  
Monthly Review meeting (strategy, savings 
& control, operations, finance) 
Personal interaction 
Open book system Shared offices and help desk 
 Budget tracker, commitment list and 
Benchmarking suppliers 
 Joint development of business Cases 
 Signals of sharing attitude  
 Signals of ownership & commitment to the 
relationship 
 
Table 15 shows that both formal and informal control activities are being performed by both 
CF and MF. MF is doing all formal accounting and control activities in the relationship with 
the suppliers (including performance measurement using key performance indicators (KPIs) 
and quarterly review) for CF. ‘Budget tracker’ is a monthly overview of cost of commitments 
to suppliers and the actual expenditures. This is prepared by MF. Similarly, the ‘commitment 
list’ is also prepared by MF. This list comprises the phone calls made on a location 
(production site or the headquarters) to the service desk of MF. Regarding benchmarking, 
actual benchmarking of MF is absent since MF provides a rather unique and custom-made 
                                                 
20 The table has been made just to make a vague distinction between formal and informal control.  Formal and informal are 
intertwined. For instance during a monthly meeting or a quarterly review meeting many informal signals are given and much 
informal information is shared between the parties that can affect the relationship positively or negatively. 





service: the management of a mix or package of different facilities services. The managerial 
‘product’ delivered by MF carries a mix of activities, the output of which is hard to measure. 
As shown in the table, there are some external measure based (formal) controls in place, in 
the form of cost saving targets (objectives) and result-oriented incentive system. An open 
book system is also part of the formal control. There are also informal (non-contractual) 
activities. They take the form of regular roadmap discussions, participation in the CF’s 
informal events and ceremonies, personal interaction, shared offices, joint development of 
business cases and signals of sharing attitude and commitment. Moreover, there is voluntary 
action at MF to enhance transparency. MF benchmarks the suppliers of facilities services by 
transparently comparing the bids of different suppliers. A demand manager of CF can log 
into the PMS and immediately see the state of affairs. Furthermore, MF signals that it aims to 
help CF in producing a good business case and that it really tries to reduce costs. The MF 
manager: 
 
“We are making the business cases, we are trying to find out how it could be smarter, cheaper, more 
efficient than now [..] we tell them about the states of the savings, we tell them about the operations 
how we are doing our business, how satisfied the end user is and ask them how satisfied they 
themselves are[…] we tell something about how suppliers are doing their business as well as about 
our improvement activities.” 
 
 In addition, CF also seeks to keep MF informed about future plans and strategies and to 
manage each other’s expectations. As per RE&FM manager: 
 
“In the relation with MF it is very important that they are also involved and that they know where we 
are going to. That they are able to step on the train instead of missing the train. And we have found a 
way, in the form of a meeting structure, to communicate about developments. In these meetings we 
also ask MF about their own developments, strategies and ambitions. Where does MF want to be in a 
few years?” 
 
To sum up, both parties express that they have a stable and trusting relationship. It proves 
that there is both formal and informal (accounting) control. The contract is important in this 
regard, yet parties show additional commitment to the relationship by voluntary agreeing to 





additional informal control and by voluntary decisions to increase transparency. It is 
important that interests are aligned properly, yet safeguarding behavior is not up front. 
However, building a stable and trusting relationship is. Accounting controls predominantly 
prove to serve coordination requirements and the building of trust. As far as there are 
appropriation concerns, they are in the background.  
 
7.2.6 Developments in the governance of facilities services: a summary 
Table 16 chronologically summarizes the important events: 
 
         Table 16: Timeline of the relationship 
 
 
The timeline summarizes the history in terms of major events. In May 2006 the original 
decision to outsource the management of facilities services of CF was made by the PF. PF 
had a prior relationship with MF and as a result they also outsourced the management of 
facilities services of PF Semiconductors to them. The decision to outsource the management 
of facilities services was made just four months before PF sold PF Semiconductors to a group 
of private equity investors in September 2006. The local management (PF Semiconductors) 
was not involved in the outsourcing decision amid the news of sale of the PF 
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involvement in the decision had a negative effect on the interfirm relationship between CF 
and MF. At that time, the country manager and the facilities manager did not show 
cooperative behavior towards MF. As a result, in the beginning the relationship between CF 
and MF was not working properly. Then, at the end of 2006, there was a change in the local 
management of CF. A new manager RE&FM and a new country manager entered the 
organization.  
 
In the beginning of 2007, the new local management revised the contract with MF. The 
revision took place in a certain institutional context: the current contract was still not expired, 
MF had a good market reputation, five people of CF had already been transferred to MF as a 
part of the deal, new boundary spanner entered the scene and a switch to another service 
provider was not appropriate considering the cost reduction pressures at that time. Therefore, 
the antecedents and initiators of a good interfirm relationship and a subsequent building of 
trust were as follows: 
• New boundary spanners and contracting process 
• Change in the formal control system (e.g; clarity in the contract, an appropriate incentive 
system) 
•  Reputation of MF in the market (competence & integrity) 
• Implications of a breach of the contract (the contract was valid till 2010 and employees 
had already been transferred to MF) 
 
This point in the time line strongly affected both formal control and the building of trust. As 
for the formal control, the contract revision re-aligned interests of CF and MF by credible 
commitments in the form of cost savings targets, a performance measurement system and an 
incentive system. As for the incentive system, it was agreed that savings above target would 
be shared equally, thus producing contractual trust between partners. Because local 
management was actively involved in the process of contract writing, it produced ownership 
in the relationship. Therefore, the contract revision no doubt produced thin trust (Van der 
Meer-Kooistra and Vosselman, 2009) by realigning interests. But the contract revision (i.e. 
the change in the formal control system) also affected the cooperation and the building of 
thick trust (Vosselman and Van der Meer-Kooistra, 2009). Positive expectations about the 





abilities, intentions and integrity of MF increased. Such a building of trust is expressed by the 
managers and is reflected in a decrease in the information flow during 2008 in the form of 
only one monthly meeting. Moreover, the formal accounting and control practices stemming 
from the new contract helped building trust. All the formal reports, financial or non-financial, 
were prepared by MF. At the end of 2007 MF met the cost savings target and that 
achievement enhanced the level of trust. For although the reduction in costs is very small as 
compared to the total operating costs of CF, the facilities management department was able 
to present good results in terms of cost savings in facilities services to CF’s senior 
management. In this way, the relationship with MF facilitated them in contributing to CF’s 
overall strategy aiming at a reduction of manufacturing facilities and reduction of operating 
costs. MF proved to be a good ally in the positioning of the facilities department in CF.  
The year 2008 brought another problem for CF in the form of a financial crisis. CF suffered 
huge losses in its core business. However, the relationship between MF and CF produced 
‘super savings’ (beyond the target savings), thus further contributing to trust building.  
 
In sum, the performance of MF and the way the formal accounting and control practices were 
used in the two years 2007and 2008 produced a track record of competence and integrity. 
They therefore built thick trust in the relationship by creating positive expectations for the 
future. These positive expectations were reflected in many discussions taking place in 2009. 
For instance, both parties aimed to enhance the scope of the relationship by handing over 
even the contracts of suppliers (i.e. by further moving towards Total Facilities Management). 
Both parties showed a strong commitment to the interfirm relationship. 
  
Succinctly speaking the trust developed as follows: 
 
• MF’s prior good relationship with PF could not be transferred in the relationship between CF 
and MF because of constraints on boundary spanners’ agency (willingness & ownership); 
•  A contract revision and changes in the formal control system, along with the arrival of new 
boundary spanners and their agency provided a basic trust;  
•  The market reputation of MF added to this basic trust; 
• Voluntary actions of boundary spanners from their local positions and interactive use of formal 
controls contributed to further trust building 






7.2.7 Breakdown of trust and the emergence of power in the interfirm relationship 
At the end of the first round of interviews it proved to be a very promising interfirm 
relationship based on trust and mutual benefits. But before the start of the second round of 
interviews in the middle of 2010, some organizational changes took place. First, the country 
manager (managing director) passed away and a new country manager was appointed who 
was also responsible for real estate and facilities management worldwide for the CF. 
Secondly, the hard and soft facilities management departments merged into one facilities 
management department. Thirdly, the manager RE&FM was fired and another manager with 
a background of IC facilities services (hard facilities services related to the manufacturing 
operations) was appointed as the head of RE&FM. Fourthly, the old contract expired in 2010 
and new contract negotiations were in progress when the second round of interviews started. 
So, there was a new local management (new boundary spanners). This was a setback for the 
relationship as described by the account manager of MF as follows: 
 
“I think he [the old manager RE&FM] really wanted to have a relationship with MF and it was 
really one of partnership and he wanted us to do as much as possible. When soft and hard facilities 
services were merged into one department, he was fired so that was huge because he disappeared 
from one day to another ; he wasn’t here anymore, nobody spoke about it and after six weeks they 
told us that he was fired. So there was a trust between us and he was my demand manager.” 
 
The negotiations of the next contract are tough because the new management has a different 
view on the relationship. They do not seem to be very much interested in building trust; they 
want to have a relationship that they term as ‘business relationship’. The new managers have 
a background of the FABs/IC facilities services and have expertise in facilities services in an 
environment where there is more focus on cost, control, processes and detailed information. 
They call it the FABs culture. Furthermore, because of their training and experience in 
industrial facilities services they always compare the work of MF with their standards and 
expect MF to be proactive. In FAB FM the proactive attitude is critical otherwise the losses 
are huge.  
 
It appears that the new boundary spanners are in a powerful position.. They use the word 





trust very sparingly and are critical of previous managers’ way of working with MF. MF is 
providing more and more information and seems to be subjected to the power of CF. MF 
managers also talk about trust, although they see that it is not what is in fact present in the 
relationship. Both parties have economic interests and both to a certain extent showed 
opportunistic behavior as will be shown in the following paragraphs. The trust is used as an 
instrumental and ritual expression.  
 
During the second round of interviews the following important issues emerged: breakdown 
of trust, an emerging powerful position of CF, a change in boundary spanners and an 
emerging downside of trust.  
 
- Breakdown of trust 
The second round of interviews reveals that the trust did not develop further and there were 
instances in which the ability and integrity of the MF was questioned. Besides, both parties 
have shown opportunistic behavior and there is more emphasis on control; trust appears to be 
less relevant. The new RE&FM manager comments on the ability of MF as follows: 
 
“I don’t see it developing into a total facility management contract because I can see that they have 
problems delivering the service because of lack of skills and experience. May be some activities are 
outsourced to MF and some, for example maintenance, will be done by us.” 
 
According to him, with other suppliers there is an open discussion, but this is not the case 
with MF: 
 
“I always tell our suppliers if we do something wrong you tell me and say it blunt but with respect, 
have an open discussion, you can put anything on the table. It should be an open discussion. So, you 
can expect it. With MF we are not in that situation.” 
 
The suppliers managed by MF also question the ability and value of MF in the relationship. 
The suppliers, moreover, disclose the weaknesses of the MF to the CF. For instance one of 
the suppliers has the following to say about this: 
 





“We are providing reports for 100% or 99% and we hand it over to MF and they give it formally to 
CF. It is our work, our report, our digits, our research. That is really strange. They should manage 
the supplier, but now it is the opposite. The supplier is managing MF and sometimes we are 
wondering what is the benefit of MF in the relation between the supplier and CF. They are just 
playing a paper role. At this moment, MF isn’t able anyway to handle information and data about 
maintenance, because they don’t have it and they aren’t able to handle the data as well. Our 
[suppliers]influence is growing. So in the last years MF was able to tell to CF, ‘Well, maybe the 
performance isn’t really right and it’s caused by this supplier or the other suppliers.’ Now we are 
moving up and displaying this kind of examples. It will not help to improve the performance between 
both. It isn’t optimal.” 
 
Furthermore, both parties have been opportunistic and have not been honest. They told lies 
and acted out of their self-interests. For instance, the new manager RE&FM gives his 
remarks on the negotiations process as follows: 
 
“So, I convinced my boss we will scare them with a tendering process in order to have a good 
commercial deal.” 
 
Similarly, the purchase manager gives an example of a kind of trickery or deceit 
(opportunism) where MF offered a longer term contract which was more beneficial to MF: 
 
“They presented to us in an opportunistic way, a contract for 5 years knowing that we would not 
accept that. But also knowing that if they gave us a 5-year contract, it would commercially look more 
interesting to them. What they did is very smartly go to our management with that and say: ok guys 
we can offer you a new contract with nice incentives and a nice cost reduction, but it is for 5 years. In 
fact what they did, waving the red flag for the bull by saying that this is interesting.” 
 
The MF is also at the lowest ebb in terms of trust. They are sharing information but do not 
have positive expectations and have fear of opportunistic behavior by the CF. Despite having 
a more than 4 years relationship, the CF is asking for more and more information which 
decreases or destroys trust in the relationship. For instance, the senior facilities manager of 
CF discloses it as follows: 
 





“The way in which we are treated by CF in the sense that they posing questions and more questions 
and more questions and more questions, I sometimes think they want it all from us in the knowledge 
sphere and they might say in the end, thank you for everything and we are going to do it ourselves or 
they could use the information for a tender.” 
 
The new CF managers consider trust as something that is outside the sphere of business. 
They prefer to have a business relationship. 
 
“I understand your relationship theory. On the other hand there is a business why we have a 
contract. […] Sometimes you have to be in your formal role because otherwise all rules are gone.” 
 
The new boundary spanners have more focus on control and they don’t want to lose control 
over the suppliers. The purchase manager hints to such a risk of losing control in TFM:  
 
“If you close a TFM contract with a supplier and he has back to back contracts with other suppliers 
doing the work. Because that essentially doesn’t change, we have nothing to say about the suppliers 
selected by the service provider.” 
 
The new country manager also explains that controlling culture prevails in the CF: 
 
 
“It’s also a culture in the organisation. If you have a culture of controlling in the organisation, the 
changing of such a culture is a long process. Fabs organization’s focus is on being lean, mean and 
less costly.” 
 
The same tendency (having more control and information) of the new boundary spanners is 
expressed by the account manager of the MF: 
 
“Because of the change to IC management, they are detail-minded and we also now have different 
meetings such as an incident meeting, review meetings, cost saving meetings. Previously, it was once 
in a month or once in a quarter there was one meeting and then it was okay. Perfect. There’s more 
control than was with previous RE&FM” 
 





The senior facilities manager of MF also describes the control tendency of the CF which 
shows that they still don’t want to opt for TFM: 
  
“I think they want to have full control. They are not as far as to say, um, please make all the 
arrangements for me. They want to have the complete insight of what we are doing and what third 
parties are doing for them.” 
 
One supplier also describes the inclination of the CF towards control as follows: 
 
“CF, formerly PF, was a party who wanted to control, wants to control very strongly subcontractors, 
the performance, etc. They don’t dare to let it go. They want to control” 
 
Summing up, the questioning of the integrity and the ability of the MF, the display of 
opportunism by both parties and the focus on excessive control are indications of the 
breakdown of trust. At least, trust has not developed further despite the prior relationship 
spanning over more than 4 years. One can say, perhaps, it is only the beginning of a 
relationship with new boundary spanners and it will gradually change. But the interesting 
point is that the new management (new boundary spanners) has a tendency to control in a 
way that conforms to the norms that are quite established (institutionalized) in the FABs 
facilities management.  
 
- CF gets more powerful in the interfirm relationship 
The CF has high standards of performance and has expertise in technical facilities 
management of FAB. They impose different and high standards of performance on MF. 
According to the new management, CF’s previous managers and MF had been managing the 
performance through matrices but the internal users within CF were not satisfied with the 
performance. For instance the new country manager has the following to say about this: 
 
“If you're just managing at your yellow, red or green then it looks from the outside very professional, 
but I think you don't have the right people for managing that part of the business.” 
 
One of the reasons why new boundary spanners have power over the MF is that they have IC 





facilities management experience and an IC mindset. They have high standards of 
performance and they expect MF to attain those standards of quality along with cost 
reduction. Secondly, CF also questions the performance of MF and the parameters used to 
measure that performance. According to CF managers, the performance by MF is not 
reflected by the KPIs (control system). In some cases, even the supplier is more capable of 
handling a specific facility service than MF. For instance, one supplier exemplifies: 
 
“We are sitting together around the table and it’s CF, MF and us. We are presenting the report, not 
MF and CF is asking questions about one KPI, that is the KPI about the report turnaround time and 
the data handling. Well, that’s done by MF, so it’s a strange situation. The question is asked to us, 
and we have to explain, well, that’s the performance of MF.” 
 
According to the new country manager, the control system in place showed good scores on 
performance, yet the customers were not happy with the performance of MF. He even 
questions the interfirm relationship: 
 
“I'm questioning the whole relationship and I'm thinking, actually, yeah, the people did, to their 
knowledge, they had the score charts. Everything was green. At the same time, you know, people in 
organisations were not happy with the relationship, so something is wrong. And for that reason, you 
cannot blame only MF for that. But, actually, it's more that people don't care anymore and they say, 
you know, [blows raspberry] it doesn't matter anymore. So also with these types of relationships, if 
people have to give their complaints to a system, but that system doesn't respond to them anymore as 
a human person, then, actually, you know, people who are not happy, they will simply not say 
anything.” 
 
The same response comes from the new manager RE&FM, as follows: 
 
“To me, the problem was when I was interviewed by MF as a customer. I already told them there is 
no way I can be angry and achieve a score of unsatisfactory. It's always good. So there's something in 
your questioning that doesn't add up to a good result. Now I'm in charge, I can do something about it. 
What we will do is also perform another way of interviewing customers to get direct feedback on 
things they see, just, like, walking around.” 
 





According to the new managers, the open book was just financial and it was not focused on 
the people. It was just managing ‘red, yellow or green’, which looks professional from the 
outside. So, they think MF was managing the metrics but not the real performance. 
But the account manager of MF points out that during the last few years the focus had been 
on savings only. Now they have changed the focus to service excellence: 
 
“Yes, because now we’re talking about service excellence and how are we doing that. But in the last 
years we only had savings, savings, savings and now they say why don’t they clean the table 
anymore? Because there was a saving there two years ago, we don’t want it anymore, so it’s difficult, 
and it’s difficult to have a relationship in that part because there’s a risk that you’re going to blame 
each other.” 
 
The CF has been powerful in getting information and dictating the MF in the negotiation 
process. Perhaps MF expects a contract and has an economic interest in the relationship and 
they yield to the power of CF. The senior facility manager of MF describes how they yield to 
the demands of CF despite the indication by the CF that the MF is not the only party who is 
in the race for the contract.  
 
“Well, it is a matter of trust of course. In the beginning we said, we give them some information and 
we give them our offer. Of course, when you put your offer on the table, they have questions and in 
the beginning our management team has said, well there must be a moment in time when CF says, we 
will work together for a new project and you will be the sole party, please give us more information. 
But now it is the other way around. Please give us more information and they are not saying that we 
are the sole party. And in the beginning our management said, we are not going to do that. So we are 
in this process and I think it is good. I don’t see any signals that they won’t take us for another 
period, but it is a bit strange.” 
 
The CF has been putting pressure on the MF for higher performance though they pay for a 
certain level. The senior facilities manager of the MF highlights this point as follows: 
 
“The excellent service experience, which was introduced by one of the senior managers in 
headquarters. They want us to outperform our contract as if we performed on a higher level, ah, for 
cleaning and for maintenance or anything, um, although they know that they have bought a certain 







CF wants both higher quality and reduced price. As explained by the account manager of 
MF: 
 
“We have 9% savings together in partnership and then they say we want 15%.” 
 
Summing up, the CF has become more powerful in the interfirm relationship after the arrival 
of new managers. Perhaps it is the nature of the services (rather simple facilities services as 
compared to rather complex IC facilities services) that makes trust less relevant because for 
the suppliers of critical facilities services of IC, CF considers trust as something that is 
relevant. Furthermore, the performance of MF has been an issue which makes MF less 
powerful in the relationship. Lastly, there are economic interests of getting a contract and 
staying in the relationship. That is why, MF gives in to the demands of the CF. 
 
- Boundary Spanners 
It becomes clear that the managers who are managing the interfirm relationship (at both 
corporate and operating levels) have a critical stance towards the development of the 
interfirm relationship. A change in the boundary spanners proves to change the shape of the 
relationship. It also became clear that there is a distinction between trust between managers 
at the one hand and trust between organizations at the other hand. For instance, the old 
boundary spanners had trust in each other. The formal control system was instrumental in 
generating trust between a number of managers, particularly the boundary spanners. 
However, some of the managers of the CF who were internal customers were not happy with 
the performance of MF. They felt that it was more ‘managing at a distance’ than managing 
‘flesh and blood’. So we may conclude that trust between boundary spanners does not 
necessarily imply trust between organizations.  
 
- The downside of trust—an implicit control 
Trust may influence and constrain the managers and make them complacent. In this sense, 
trust generates an implicit control. Such an implicit control was observed because the old 





boundary spanners were very positive of the future of the relationship; they would have 
extended the contract with the MF without a long negotiation. With the new boundary 
spanners, the negotiation has already taken more than 6-7 months. The contract had not yet 
been awarded when the researchers completed the second round of interviews. 
 
The contract manager of MF thinks that they would have easily got a new contract without 
much negotiation had there been the old manager RE&FM, because there was trust. But the 
new boundary spanners need detailed and specific information: 
 
“Yes the new boundary spanners have a completely different point of view as compared to old 
boundary spanners. I think if we had the contract negotiation with the previous manager RE&FM, 
the contract would have already been concluded. It was like a cat in the bag. He would have said, ‘It 
is done, it is okay. You did a good job and you start’. There was more trust. Now you see they have 





“He [old RE&FM] trusted the MF. He trusted it blindly. Okay? When we said it’s A, then he says, 
okay, it’s A, it’s okay, go, but now it’s, okay, convince me and let me see why and show me the details 
and explain it to me and don’t explain it to one, explain it to everybody, you know. So, it’s much more 
effort now to convince them about something and sometimes it’s really difficult, yes” 
 
The account manager of MF thinks that their performance is good and is the same as it was 
before, but the new managers are not satisfied: 
 
“For him [old manager RE&FM] we did things good, but now this changed; so this changed and 
sometimes they say you don’t do well, it’s not good, but we do the same as what we did when he was 
there - so it’s very difficult for the people in the location.” 
 
The above quotes suggest the previous managers were to some extent under the influence of 
implicit control (a structure) of trust and they were very much positive about the relationship. 





This shows a downside of trust. Trust may make people complacent and less critical. In such 
a situation, trust as an implicit control may limit the agency and freedom of the actors. The 
purchase manager of CF has the following to say about this: 
 
“You can’t be all positive. And people who say it is all positive they are not right. There is always 
something to improve. We have to develop and if you accept everything and if you don’t think about 
the things that need to be improved then you are off the scale. Off the learning curve”.  
 
The new RE&FM points out as follows: 
 
“And my approach is different. He [previous RE &FM] was satisfied with MF but he was managing 
the contract from a larger distance. I’m closer to the MF. I hear all the things than he did, or more 
things or different things than he did.” 
 
7.3  Theoretical implications 
This longitudinal field study has a number of theoretical implications. This section explores 
and, to a certain extent, builds upon them.  
 
7.3.1 The relevance of trust: extending contingencies  
While Van der Meer-Kooistra and Vosselman (2000) theorize that trust is particularly 
important and may be a replacement for control in transactional relations that are 
characterized by high complexity and environmental uncertainty, this study reveals that 
whether trust is of significance in transactional relations may not only be dependent on 
complexity and uncertainty but also on the experience and mindset (values and norms) of the 
boundary spanners. For instance, the old boundary spanners viewed trust as a relevant thing 
and built trust in the relationship, but the new boundary spanners, having a background in 
facilities services of a highly technical nature (FABs culture), focused more on explicit 
control. The norms and values (established ways of working, for instance the FABs culture) 
of the boundary spanners prove to be important in how they value the formal control system 
and the ‘explicit controls’ that stem from it.  
 
 






7.3.2.  Contracting and control practices as opportunities for the expression of 
commitments to the relationship 
Earlier work (e.g; Dekker, 2004; Van der Meer-Kooistra and Vosselman, 2009) theorizes that 
formal control structures (in the form of performance management and incentive systems) are 
deliberately written down in a contract in order to align interests and, thus, in order to cope 
with appropriation concerns. However, this study suggests that contracting not only serves 
the purpose of safeguarding interests, but also the inducement of commitment. This is also 
consistent with Woolthuis et al. (2005) who argue and demonstrate that contracts serve 
various purposes. Starting from rather autonomous positions, by (re)negotiating a contract 
mutual ownership of the relationship is created or lost. Furthermore, the accounting and 
control practices that stem from a formal contractual base (performance measurement and 
management) also induce the building of trust as was observed with the old boundary 
spanners (though the trust was limited only to the operating boundary spanners and did not 
extend to some of the internal users in the outsourcing organization). Apparently, both 
contracting and control practices are opportunities for expressing commitments to the 
relationship and, thus, for building trust. They shape expectations for stable and durable 
relationships. External measure based control therefore not only provides explicit incentives 
or constraints, but also provides opportunities for joint evaluations and joint problem solving. 
They may provoke dialogue and improve commitment to the relationship. 
 
However, The recontracting process was dominated by safeguarding behavior and pursuit of 
self-interest after the arrival of new boundary spanners. 
 
7.3.3 Trust, mistrust and power 
Another theoretical implication of this study is that the talk of trust may hide power and 
opportunism. This is consistent with Free (2008). As was observed in case of the new 
boundary spanners, CF emerges as a powerful partner and dominates contract contents and 
execution (Woolthuis et al. 2005). Since trust building is a communication process of shared 
meanings and values (Hardy, Philips, and Lawrence 1998), there was a match between the 
values of the old boundary spanners of CF and the managers of MF. The use of the formal 





control system to measure performance was part of such shared understandings. Hence, there 
was trust between the boundary spanners. But there was a mismatch between the meanings 
and values of the new boundary spanners at the CF and the managers of MF. The new 
boundary spanners did not like the ‘managing at a distance’ through the formal control 
system. They wanted a proactive attitude of MF and MF’s presence close to internal 
customers, instead of the presentation of good measurements on KPIs. The new boundary 
spanners questioned the performance and required more and more information, reduction in 
cost and increase in quality. FABs culture was incompatible with the ways of working of 
MF. The MF had to submit to the power of the CF.  
 
Much of the literature on trust between organizations classifies trust as ‘good’, pacifying 
uncertainty and creating stability and mistrust as bad (Free 2008). However, apparently trust 
may bring inertia, reduce incentives for innovation, adaptation and change. For instance, the 
new management and the managers of MF thought the old managers were too much positive. 
Apparently, the MF managers were of the opinion that the contract could have been awarded 
without much questioning. The new boundary spanners (particularly from the side of CF) 
were of the opinion that the existing implicit control structure (trust) was not adequate. 
Explicit control gained space from implicit control under the assumption that this would 
improve performance and would lead to better commercial deals. 
  
The implicit control (trust) also proves to be replaced by power when there is a lack of trust 
(the ability and integrity is questioned) or when the context of the interfirm relationship 
changes. Such power influences and is influenced by the explicit controls and the voluntary 
actions by the boundary spanners. 
 
7.3.4 Trust as implicit control rather than social control 
Another implication of the study is that trust building should be conceptually distinguished 
from the design and use of informal (social) control. Through different trajectories, both 
formal control and informal (social) control are instituted in the relationship and as we 
demonstrated and theorized, they both can be vehicles for producing trust or mistrust. They 
are both explicit in the relationship. Social (informal) control induces desirable behavior 





through soft measures (Das and Teng 1998). The nuance is that social control21, that 
encompasses solidarity, information exchange and participative decision making (Dwyer and 
Oh 1988), becomes easier and more effective if there is trust between exchange partners 
(Sengün and Wasti 2009; p.45). Conversely, the absence of trust may make social controls 
less effective. This is consistent with ‘hard’ external measure based control or formal control. 
As theorized by Vosselman and Van der Meer-kooistra (2009) and illustrated by our case 
study, ‘hard’ control practices and trust building interact. So, trust building is associated with 
both hard controls (external measure based controls) and social control. In addition, the 
building of trust may be associated with voluntary actions of the boundary spanners; actions 
that are not directly connected to hard or soft explicit controls. The boundary spanners are 
under the influence of formal and informal (social) control structures, but given these 


















                                                 
21 The formal and social control are categorized as explicit control in this research though some of the social controls 
may not always be very explicit 





7.3.5  Explicit control, implicit control and embedded agency 
As shown in figure 12, given explicit controls structures, this freedom to act (agency) is also 
critical to the development or destruction of trust:  
 
 
Figure 12. Explicit controls, implicit controls/ power and embedded agency 










Figure 12 is explained as follows. Explicit control and voluntary actions produce trust or 
distrust (or power). Once trust is at a certain level, as was the case with the old boundary 
spanners at CF, it proves to reduce the intensity of control practices. It is suggested that the 
institution and practicing of explicit control, and agency of boundary spanners produce trust 
or implicit control that, in turn, reduces the felt need for much focus on explicit control 
practices. Although parties enter the relationship out of self-interest, it is through trust 
building that they show their willingness to act in the interest of the relationship and, thus, to 
constrain and guide their behavior. The resulting trust embeds agency by producing implicit 
frames or implicit structures at the level of the relationship that define the situation as a 





cooperative one and that guide and constrain actions by individual parties in such a way that 
the relationship remains stable and durable. Similar to explicit control and related practices, 
this implicit control prevents actors from acting opportunistically. Viewed from this 
perspective, the implicit control may be seen as a strong mobilizing force for the 
maintenance and development of the relationship. It complements the safeguarding stemming 
from explicit control structures with positive behavioral expectations of parties’ future 
behavior. It may be viewed as a form of ‘control’ but not control in the sense of safeguards, 
incentives and explicit constraints, but in the form of voluntary cooperative behavior. It 
guides behavior without much focus on the explicit institution and practicing of controls. As 
is demonstrated with the old boundary spanners, trust as an implicit control structure may be 
the result of both the institution of (changes in) control structures through a contracting 
process and control practices (e.g; the use of KPIs). However, trust building is not restricted 
to such institution and practicing. It may also stem from voluntary actions out of local 
positions, actions that are not directly induced through explicit control structures and 
practices.  
 
Essentially, human agency as embedded in explicit and implicit control is at the heart of trust 
building At the other hand, such agency mobilizes the practicing and further institution of 
formal and informal controls and, through that, trust may be built by giving positive 
relational signals (Vosselman and Van der Meer-Kooistra, 2009) to the relationship. Yet, 
agency (voluntary actions of the boundary spanners) also mobilizes the building of trust not 
though the practicing and institution of controls, but in a more direct way. For example, MF’s 
attention for potential improvements in the business processes at CF was not induced by a 
formal nor an informal control, but was an act of agency. The informal controls were 
vehicles through which commitment could be expressed, not initiators. It is suggested that it 
was a deliberate act by MF out of free space, driven by enlightened self-interest (Chaserant 
2003a; Vosselman and Van der Meer-Kooistra 2009). MF sought to cooperate appropriately 
in order to serve its long term interests. 
 
Thus, it is concluded that an implicit control may both be created by the institution and 
practicing of explicit controls and by a self-regulating process of relational signaling. Such an 





implicit structure embeds agency in a tacit way and such tacit control has the potential to fuel 
the development of the relationship. As it was observed in case of the old boundary spanners, 
the implicit structure produces voluntarily constrained behavior that is oriented towards co-
operation and, thus, reflects and produces positive behavioral expectations. It does not 
produce explicit safeguards, but it adds to them. This does not imply that social uncertainty 
or doubt about potential behaviors of other partners is completely eliminated. There always 
remains a free space that can be used opportunistically by a partner. Therefore, as is theorized 
in earlier work (Vosselman and Van der Meer-Kooistra, 2009), parties involved will 
continuously search for signals that the others stay committed to the relationship. In turn, the 
institution and practicing of explicit controls (and, thus, the direct alignment of interests) are 
in need of an implicit (tacit) control. The institution of a governance structure (a contract) 
that incorporates controls needs a certain level of positive expectations about each other’s 
future behavior. Therefore, both the creation of an implicit structure and an explicit structure 
have a similar base: embedded agency (Garud and Karnoe 2001; Giddens 1984). The one is 
embedded in an explicit structure, the other in an implicit one. The implicit control may also 
influence managers and limit their freedom and autonomy. This might have positive as well 
as negative consequences. Through their inclination towards explicit control, the new 
boundary spanners show their views that the existing implicit control was not adequate. In 
their opinion, the former managers became complacent and had low incentives to innovate, 
adapt and change. Although such a situation creates stability, it might not be efficient in an 
economic sense. 
 
The implicit control (trust) proves to be replaced by power when there is a lack of trust (the 
ability and integrity is questioned) or when the context of the interfirm relationship changes. 
Such power influences and is influenced by the explicit controls and the voluntary actions by 
the boundary spanners. 
 
Summing up, the discussion shows the interactive nature of control, trust and power. Formal 
control, informal control and voluntary actions of boundary spanners may either produce 
trust (implicit control) or power in the interfirm relationship. In turn, the implicit control or 





power may also influence the formal control, informal control and the agency of the 
boundary spanners.   
 
7.3.6 History and context of the interfirm relationship  
Another important theoretical implication of the study is that certain contextual factors are 
very important for the development of an interfirm relationship. The contextual factors, in 
this case, include the role (values, norms and agency) of boundary spanners, the influence of 
the legal environment in the country and the special circumstances (or changes therein) in the 
interfirm relationship over time. Boundary spanners as representatives of each of the partner 
organizations process information in the interfirm relationship (Aldrich and Herker 1977; 
Janowicz-Panjaitan and Noorderhaven 2009; Perrone, Zaheer, and McEvily 2003). In the 
hierarchy of an organization there can be boundary spanners at least at two levels: the 
operating level and the corporate level. The initial award of the contract to MF by PF was 
done by the corporate boundary spanners based on their strategy to save costs and focus on 
core operations, on their own prior experience with MF and on MF’s reputation as one of the 
market leaders. PF’s corporate boundary spanners concluded the contract and handed it over 
to the operating boundary spanners (local management of PF Semiconductors). The local 
management (operating boundary spanners) had no influence whatsoever on the contracting 
process. As a consequence, local management did not feel ownership and failed to further 
build structure in that relationship. As the original contract was not the result of local 
management’s agency, the relationship could not develop appropriately. Only when new 
boundary spanners entered the CF, both organizations renegotiated the contract and 
ownership came into existence. The revision of the contract, however, was not the result of 
unconstrained agency. There were two clear institutional constraints. One was that the extant 
contract had not expired yet. The other was that employees had been transferred to MF and 
such transference also resulted in a constraint because of the labor laws (legal environment) 
in the country.  
 
Before the latest change in boundary spanners, in the pre-renegotiation period, two years of 
trusting and successful relationship produced positive expectations. Apparently, control 
affected trust and both the parties were looking at extending the scope of the contract. At the 





other hand, trust also affected control. A decrease in the frequency of meetings, at that time, 
indicates a decrease in the exchange of information. This suggests effect of trust on control 
(Wicks, Berman, and Jones 1999). Moreover, as a consequence of the mutual development of 
more effective KPIs implicit control resulted. Therefore, the mutual development of explicit 
control created more trust in the relationship and thus further influenced control (see also 
Langfield-Smith & Smith, 2003). 
 
Another point is that there was trust between old boundary spanners but some of the 
managers were of the CF were not satisfied with the performance of and the use of 
performance management systems. This raises a question as to what trust between 
organizations means. Is it trust between the boundary spanners or between the organizations?  
 
Then, there was another change in the CF, new boundary spanners arrived. They had 
different views of the relationship. They did not like the use of KPIs as something that 
reflected performance of the MF. According to the new boundary spanners (particularly from 
CF), MF was not efficient, proactive and trustworthy. Their view of the work did not match 
with the way of working of MF. They wanted more and more information, higher quality and 
a reduced price. They also acted opportunistically by threatening MF that they might offer a 
tender to another organization as well. MF was accepting all the demands of the CF. Implicit 
control (trust) was no longer there and CF became more powerful in the relationship and was 
dictating the MF. 
 
In sum, the study suggests that the role of boundary spanners is critical to the development of 
the interfirm relationships. Trust is not an objective condition and it varies between 
individuals, even those in otherwise identical conditions (Nooteboom et al., 1997). Moreover, 
this study suggests that it is important that the boundary spanners act from a rather 










7.4  Concluding remarks  
This field study produces knowledge on the shaping of governance in an interfirm 
relationship. Particularly, it theorizes that the interaction between control, trust and power 
may be seen as an interaction between explicit control and implicit control / power and that 
such interaction is embedded in the developments in an interfirm context. It does so by 
reflecting on a specific outsourcing relationship regarding (the management of) facilities 
services. 
 
This longitudinal field study reveals that an interfirm relationship may experience both trust 
and power at different periods of time. While for more than two years when there were old 
boundary spanners there was a trusting relationship, later the trust was lost and power 
emerged as a result of the arrival of new boundary spanners. The cross-sectional studies, 
conducted at the time of the old boundary spanners, would give only a partial picture of the 
state of the affairs. Contrary to much of the extant literature, this research suggests that a 
prior trustworthy relationship may be questioned and may not entail a further development of 
trust.  
 
Although it is tempting to consider accounting to be related to formal control or external 
measure-based control, this study demonstrates that accounting also serves trust building and, 
thus, the framing of cooperative behavior. Accounting practices not only serve safeguarding, 
but also help produce tacit cooperative definitions and guidance in the relationship. In other 
words, accounting practices serve both formal control and trust building. Moreover, 
consistent with prior theoretical work (Vosselman and Van der Meer-Kooistra, 2009) our 
field study reveals, that trust or power interact with the institution and practicing of formal 
control directed to the alignment of interests. Explicit control structures interact with implicit 
control structures. The background, norms and values of boundary spanners prove to be 
influential critical in the use of formal and informal controls. If there is a mismatch with the 
values and norms of the boundary spanners, the implicit control structure (trust) may not 
develop and power may emerge. Such power leads to more control and associated 
safeguarding behaviour.  
 





The study also indicates that the production of “thin” trust through an alignment of interests 
by a contractual agreement on safeguards, constraints and incentives, and the production of 
“thick” trust by signaling commitment to the relationship (see Vosselman and Van der Meer-
Kooistra, 2009) cannot be isolated from each other. The (re)creation of safeguards, 
constraints and incentives in the context of interest alignment is driven by the need for salient 
cooperative frames as well as by appropriation concerns. Apparently, the institution of an 
explicit control structure and the voluntary actions of the boundary spanners produces either 
trust or power.  
 
The interaction between implicit and explicit control structures in our field study emerged in 






























































CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 
FUTURE RESEARCH  
 
8.1 Overview of the Research 
The purpose of this thesis is to understand governance at two different levels, that is field 
level and an interfirm level. For the purpose of this thesis governance is conceptualized as a 
‘package of practices’ that regulates lateral relations regarding the execution and the 
management of facilities services, both at field level and at the level of intra- and interfirm 
organizational relationships. The thesis started with the aim to investigate the following 
research questions: 
 
1- Why and how is governance changing in the field of facilities services in the 
Netherlands? 
2- How is IFM, as an institution of governance, socially constructed at field level and what 
particularly is the role of institutional entrepreneurs? 
3- How is governance in a specific interfirm relationship shaped through the development 
and interaction of control and trust, and how is accounting implicated in that 
development? 
 
The first two questions relate to the field level research and the third question pertains to the 
interfirm level research.  
 
For the purpose of investigating the field level research people from different organizations 
were interviewed. These organizations include service providers, consultants, professional 
associations, client organizations, suppliers and an academic. Fourteen semi-structured 
interviews were conducted with these different field actors. In addition to interviews, field 
documents, in the form of different reports including market reports, presentations by 
consultants and books, were also used. Further, the academic literature on FM (between 
1995-2010), particularly relevant to the Netherlands, was also consulted in order to get a 
more reliable view of the field and of the developments in governance. The Internet websites 
were also browsed for collecting information about the field of FM. For instance, the 





websites of professional associations of FM were read, investigated and used for the 
description of the field of FM.  
 
 ITS was the theoretical lens for this study. ITS is suitable for the investigation of field level 
institutional change in governance. So, it was considered the best choice for the field level 
analysis unlike TCE which would consider the governance forms as already available at the 
field level without shedding any light where those governance forms come from. Governance 
(as a package of practices) is an institution because it provides order and meaning to a set of 
activities. It is a package of practices that is fundamentally interpenetrated and shaped by 
broader cultural frameworks (Bourdieu 1977; Lounsbury and Ventresca 2003; Mohr 2000). 
 
For the interfirm level research on governance, nineteen semi-structured interviews were 
conducted with managers occupying different hierarchical positions in both firms. The 
documents in different forms such as annual reports, presentations by managers, roadmaps, 
performance reports and organization charts were also utilized for the description and 
analysis of the field study. In this field study two rounds of interviews were organized in 
order to follow the developments of the interfirm relationship over time. In addition to the 
interviews, four general meetings were arranged in order to get access to the organizations 
and to discuss the results of the first round of interviews with the participants. The 
organization and management theory, particularly the state of the art related to management 
control and trust in interfirm relationships, was the theoretical foundation of this study 
because the concept of governance at an interfirm level is strongly connected to management 
control with a focus on influencing the managerial behavior towards efficiency and 
effectiveness (Minnaar and Vosselman, forthcoming). 
 
8.2   Theoretical contributions  
The contributions of this thesis add to the knowledge in the academic fields of accounting 
and control as well as facilities management, although the primary focus has been on the 
accounting field. In the accounting and control discipline, this thesis contributes to two 
streams of research, that is, an institutional perspective on governance change at field level 





and a management control perspective on control change in the interfirm relationships. The 
specific contributions are as follows: 
 
8.2.1 An Institutional Perspective on Control (Governance) Change 
Firstly, this field level research is a first and distinct study that has paid attention to two 
different concepts of rationalities in ITS, that is, instrumental and institutional rationality (cf. 
Loundbury 2008). The instrumental rationality approach was adopted by different 
institutional scholars (e.g; Kraatz and Zajac 1996; Oliver 1991). In this approach some actors 
in the field called institutional entrepreneurs bring about institutional change by responding 
to institutional pressures. For instance, in this study two field level actors (consultants and 
service providers) get the character of institutional entrepreneurs because of their active 
participation in the social construction of IFM in the field of FM in the Netherlands. The idea 
of IFM came into the Netherlands through a multinational client organization and a 
multinational service provider. We label these actors as field-crossing actors because they are 
connected to the national and global fields of organizations instead of only local organization 
field. This field crossing ability enables these actors to bring new ideas, concepts and 
governance to specific fields. Though the idea was brought in the field of FM in the 
Netherlands by an international client organization and a foreign service provider, the local 
service providers and consultants pursued the governance concept very actively. IFM has 
been explained as a rational response to the existing conditions, characterized by cost 
reduction pressures in different forms and legal constraints regarding lay off employees, by 
the institutional entrepreneurs. They state that the employees get better career prospects when 
they move to the service providers due to IFM because FM is the core business of the service 
providers. They have been illustrating the success stories of the initial renowned 
organizations and later adopters to underline the importance of IFM. There are different 
professional associations that are connected to other professional associations and the field 
actors. Some organizations are local like FMN, F-MEX, some are transnational such as 
IFMA and EuroFM. The professional associations have mainly been interested in the 
dissemination of knowledge, best practices and new ideas. The professional associations are 
a kind of professional network as described in the theoretical framework developed in 
chapter 4. The professional associations have been helpful to the institutional entrepreneurs 





in the construction of IFM because institutional entrepreneurs participate in and contribute to 
the publications and conferences organized by the professional associations.  
 
The institutional rationality explains the influence of the (broader) institutional logics or 
institutional orders on the actions and understandings of all the field actors including 
institutional entrepreneurs. IFM gains acceptance in the field and guides the cognition of the 
field participants because it resonates with the logics prevailing (logic of rationalization) in 
the field of FM in the Netherlands and also the broader logics of (market and corporations). 
The historical analysis of the academic and professional literature in the field of FM in the 
Netherlands in combination with interviews revealed the dominance of the ‘logic of 
rationalization’ (reduction of costs) in the field of FM. The ‘logic of rationalization’ has been 
reinforced over time by the ‘performativity’ of theories of the value chain, lean and mean 
production, and outsourcing. It is added that the ‘logic of rationalization’ has become 
powerful by competition and the financial crisis over time. 
 
Secondly, this thesis focuses on both the field level as well as on the (inter)firm level and 
thus responds to the call for multi-level analysis (e.g; Hopper & Major; 2007; Lounsbury, 
2008). Further, the construction at field level (O’ Dwyer et al., 2011) rather than adoption at 
the organizational level is investigated, so the contributions add to the scarce number of ITS 
based studies in accounting that focused on the field level (e.g; Dillard et al. 2004; Hopper 
and Major, 2007; Ezzamel et al., 2007; O’Dwyer et al., 2011). Besides, this research also 
reacts to the calls for more studies on institutional entrepreneurship (e.g; Garud, Hardy, and 
Maguire 2007). 
  
Thirdly, the idea underlying the institutional logics literature (e.g; Lounsbury & Crumley, 
2007; Thornton, 2002) is that practices like governance change and new practices emerge 
because underlying logics of the field change. However, this thesis demonstrates that 
different governance forms and practices (FM staff department concept, SSC and IFM / 
TFM)) emerge over time without change in the dominant logics. This is because all the 
governance forms are compatible with the dominant logic. The emergence of new 
governance forms occurred over time in the field of FM though there has been only one 





dominant institutional logic of rationalization. Different practices co-exist in the 
organizational field at a particular moment in time because they are all compatible with the 
dominant institutional logics. Their appropriateness may be dependent on other factors such 
as size, ownership or private vs. public companies. For example, the big organizations 
consider IFM or a demand management organization to be a suitable governance choice, 
while governmental and non-profit organizations opt for an FM department concept.  
 
Summing up, this research has revealed that historically the logic of rationalization has been 
dominant and that the emergence of a variety of governance practices may not necessarily be 
because of different institutional logics. This finding has an implication for the ITS 
regarding the explanation of practice variation in a field. 
 
Lastly, this research confirms the criticism (e.g; Hirsch and Lounsbury 1997; Palmer, 
Jenning, and Zhou 1993) of the dichotomy between the technical and the institutional 
environment (e.g; Tolbert & Zucker, 1983) which entails that organizations designing and 
developing a new governance form are efficiency-seeking and that the later adopter 
organizations are legitimacy-seeking. As this research shows, it is the institutional rationality 
and institutional logics that guide the decisions of both early and later adopter organizations. 
It is a coincidence that the rationalization (efficiency) was a dominant logic in this research, 
but it does not have to be efficiency in all other cases. In other words, institutional logics 
determine what is or is not efficient. 
  
8.2.2 An Interfirm Perspective on Control (Governance) Change 
The second part of this thesis produces knowledge on the shaping of governance in an 
interfirm relationship. Particularly, the research theorized the interaction between control, 
trust and power as an interaction between explicit control, implicit control and power. It is 
demonstrated that such interaction is embedded in the historical developments in an interfirm 
relationship. A specific long term outsourcing relationship regarding (the management of) 
facilities services is investigated. This research particularly responds to the calls for 
longitudinal research into the evolution of accounting, control and trust (e.g; Free 2008; 
Caglio and Ditillo 2008; Gulati 2010).   






In contradiction to much of the extant literature (e.g; Gulati 1995a; Gulati 1995b; Vélez, 
Sánchez, and Álvarez-Dardet 2008), this research suggests that a prior trust in a long term 
relationship may become questionable and may not develop further.  
 
Moreover, this study demonstrates that accounting and control practices serve as a trust 
building devices and encourage cooperative behavior. In other words, accounting and control 
practices not only provide for safeguarding but also help in producing a cooperative and 
trusting relationship. Furthermore, consistent with prior theoretical work (Vosselman and 
Van der Meer-Kooistra, 2009) our field study reveals, that trust positively influences the 
institution and practicing of formal control directed to the alignment of interests. Once built, 
the trust also becomes a control but then an implicit one that influences the behavior of the 
managers. Thus, explicit control interacts with implicit control. However, the critical element 
in this interaction is the background, consisting of norms and values of the boundary 
spanners of organizations in the interfirm relationship. The mismatch between the values and 
norms of the boundary spanners may result in power instead of trust or implicit control and 
trust may not develop further.  
 
This research also points out that the production of “thin” trust through a contractual 
agreement on safeguards, constraints and incentives for the purpose of aligning interests, and 
the production of “thick” trust by signaling commitment to the relationship (see Vosselman 
and Van der Meer-Kooistra, 2009) cannot be isolated from each other. In the field study, the 
(re)creation of safeguards, constraints and incentives in the context of interest alignment 
proves to be driven by the need for both appropriation concerns and cooperative frames.. The 
design and operation of an explicit control structure as well as the deliberate actions of the 
boundary spanners produce either trust (an implicit control structure) or power. During 
renegotiation, the parties were talking about trust ritually but the cooperation and 
coordination were driven by power instead of trust.  
 





The interaction between implicit and explicit control structures in our field study emerged in 
a specific institutional and historical context where specific boundary spanners proved to be 
influential.  
 
8.2.3 Contribution to the FM Field 
A theoretical contribution to the FM domain was not the main focus of this research. 
Nonetheless, this research reflects on FM and the governance of FM, particularly in the 
Netherlands. The field level study adds an alternative (social and institutional) perspective to 
the field of FM. The extant FM research is, to a large extent, focused on technical aspects of 
FM.  
 
The reflections could direct the attention of the practitioners that the ‘logic of 
professionalism’ requires attention so that the profession could develop holistically. Though 
some research in FM generates waves of professionalism (Duffy 2000; Grimshaw 2003; 
Roberts 2001), the field would be better off with more FM research. 
 
The all too positive impression regarding IFM needs further investigation. Only the success 
stories of IFM were found in the professional publications although, in this research, it was 
observed that there are also failure cases and governance problems with IFM. For instance, 
the values of market sizes for 2000, 2003, 2005 and 2007 appearing in the market report of 
2008 differ from the amounts of the same years in the market report of 2010. Secondly, the 
market report of 2010 shows conflicting opinions of the facility managers about the future of 
IFM in the Netherlands. This observation is consistent with Moss (2008) who casts doubt 
about the research methodology and market size of FM in the market reports of the UK FM 
industry. 
 
Regarding the interfirm level research, this study adds to the FM literature on contracting, 
control and trust because it responds to the calls for more in-depth research on control 
aspects of integrated (total) service contracts (Kadefors 2008). 
 





Lastly, it is stated that we only explain how IFM has been constructed. The purpose of this 
research is not to give a specific opinion on the functionality of IFM.  
 
8.3   Limitations  
Two different theories were used to explain the governance at two different levels. This is 
consistent with some of the prior research (e.g; Hopper & Major, 2007; Lounsbury, 2008). 
For instance, Hopper & Major (2007) drew upon ITS to explain field level change and actor-
network theory to explain the implementation of activity based costing (ABC) in a 
telecommunication company.  
 
For the field level research, ITS was used and for the interfirm level research, the governance 
and control theory was a theoretical base. In this regard, it is stated that ITS is appropriate for 
understanding the field level change. It was considered the best choice for the field level 
analysis because it sheds light on the emergence of new practices. At the level of the 
interfirm relationship, ITS could also have been used (as already done by some researchers). 
This thesis avoided the use of ITS at interfirm level because at this level the issues of 
controlling and managing the interfirm relationship were seen more interesting and were 
driving the attention of the actors in the interfirm relationship. This is not to deny that the 
influence of the background values and norms of boundary spanners on the interfirm 
relationship and the concept of an implicit control structure reverberates the implicit 
consideration of ITS in the interfirm level research. 
 
Regarding methodology, the field level research, analysis and conclusions could have been 
more rigorous by doing a longitudinal research. One of the major reasons why a longitudinal 
study was not doable is the lack of time; a lot of time had to be spent in getting access to the 
organizations. However, the field documents and international academic research in FM 
spanning over the last two decades were collected and analyzed to overcome this 
shortcoming.  
 
Another limitation regarding methodology is that the interview transcripts were not sent to 
the interviewees for a review and their feedback or remarks. The respondent validation could 





have enhanced the value of the interview data and created a good rapport with the 
interviewees.  
 
8.4   Recommendations for future research 
The researcher drew upon both practitioners’ and academic documents to overcome the 
limitations of the field level research. It is suggested that a future research spanning over a 
number of years and with the involvement of Dutch native speakers be conducted to gain 
better insights into the developments in the field of FM. A similar research could also be 
conducted in some other countries. 
 
Furthermore, this research questions a very positive character of the FM literature 
(particularly practitioner literature), especially about IFM/TFM. It is suggested that future 
research in FM may also highlight the problems with different governance forms.   
 
For the interfirm level research it is suggested that more field studies covering a number of 
years be undertaken. The interfirm relationship studied in this thesis has a specific context 
and history, especially regarding change in the management or boundary spanners. It would 
be interesting and useful to study the renegotiation of a contract without a change in 
management or in a different institutional context. 
 
Moreover, the services involved were of a relatively simple nature. For instance, there was 
low asset specificity. It would be of interest to study a long term interfirm relationship that 
involves high stakes from both the parties. 
 
For interfirm level research in FM, renegotiation without a change in management may be 
further investigated. The role of formalized meetings and monitoring was perceived to be 
important for non-strategic services like FM services (Kadefors, 2008) but as depicted by this 
research, there was a focus on the relationship building. Thus future research in FM may 
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Appendix A: (Brief description sent to the potential interviews for collection of 
interfirm level data) 
 
Research into the developments in the control of outsourcing relationships 
 
Chair:  professor Ed Vosselman 
 
Researchers: Kaleem Hassan MSc 




The aim of the research is twofold: 
 To gain a richer understanding of the processes that are at the basis of the developments 
towards outsourcing; 
 To gain a richer understanding of the (changes in) governance- and control structures and 




To a great extent, the research takes the form of case studies and field studies. We aim to build 
theories on the basis of insights into the developments in real-life organizations. In turn, these 
theories might affect developments in real-life organizations. At core, case studies consist of 
interviews with officers playing roles in the governance and control of facilities management. 
With each organization involved, agreements will be made on the identity of the persons to be 
interviewed. Furthermore, we would appreciate the accessibility to relevant documents (minutes, 
notes, contracts etcetera). 
 
Each interview will last about one hour, sometimes a little bit longer, but never exceeding one 
hour and a half. In most cases the interviews will be semi-structured: the researcher is extensively 
prepared, but tries to bring about fluent interaction with the interviewee, enabling him or her to 
bring in topics. The topics the researcher wants to bring in will be communicated to the 
interviewees in advance. The researcher will ask permission to tape-record the interview. 
 
Confidentiality 
There will be complete confidentiality. The researchers will not publish anything without the 
permission of the organization. If desired, we will make the organization unrecognizable by 
replacing the name by a pseudonym. We will not communicate any specific and sensitive 
information without an explicit fiat of the organization. 
 
Topics in the interviews 
During the interviews a number of topics may be discussed: 
 Mobilizing forces behind the development towards integrated facilities management: external 
influences (consultants, fashions, fads etc.) and internal influences (such as strong leaders, the 
search for efficiency, the call for excellent quality etcetera); 
 Problems risen in the development/implementation; 
 The development of (or the absence of) service level agreements (SLA’s), the clauses that 
they include and the processes through which SLA’s play active roles in governing and 







 The role of accounting in governing and controlling (billing, budgeting?) 
 The role of performance management (for instance balanced scorecards and key performance 
indicators)  
 Cultural aspects and evaluative styles; 
 Co-ordination problems concerning the relationship; coordination and (client) specificity of 
the activities; 
 (Potential) opportunism of parties involved; 
 The role of a market mechanism (benchmarking, possible abundance of captive buying and 
selling) in governance; 
 The role of trust in governing and controlling; sources of trust, if present 
 The way the contact between the demanding business units (internal clients) and the center is 
organized (demand management? Supply management?) 
 Non-programmable events and circumstances influencing the development of the relationship 
 Possible unintended consequences of the development towards outsourcing the management 
of facilities services 
 
 





































Appendix B: (Brief description sent to the potential interviews for collection of field level 
data) 
 
Research into the construction (development) and diffusion of the integrated facility 
management (IFM) and total facility management (TFM) 
 
Chair:  professor Ed Vosselman 
 
Researcher: Drs. Kaleem Hassan  
   
Aim: 
The aim of the research is to gain a richer understanding of the processes that are at the basis of 
the developments towards the (integrated) facility management outsourcing in the Netherlands. 
We want to talk to the main players (most likely major suppliers, customers, consultants and 
professional associations like FMN) and study their role as to how they are involved in the field 
of facility management. How their identity is changing and/or how they are changing the identity 
of the field and which strategies and means are used by them in this process. We would also like 




We want to study how this movement towards IFM / TFM outsourcing started and how it has 
become so much influential that many companies have been following this. We are interested in 
exploring what consequences this movement of IFM / TFM outsourcing has brought to the field 
and also to accounting control. How has it affected the way of working? We are also interested in 
the likely future of this movement. The economic efficiency and intra-organizational benefits 
may not be the only reasons why the companies opt for this alternative. There may also be other 
institutional and sociological issues and reasons, which compel organizations to go for FM 
outsourcing and these are not usually discussed in the literature. This alternative view is 
important because the organizations do not exist in isolation and they interact with other 
organizations and professions, and society at large. The organizations face extra-organizational 
pressures. For instance, sometimes, an organization depends on other organization(s). As a result 
the dependent organization changes in order to survive and continue receiving support and 
resources. Another reason is that the organizations try to maintain their faces to appear that they 
are acting rationally by adopting an organizational arrangement, which has been adopted by a 
successful organization. They want to appear responsible in the eyes of the stakeholders and they 
adopt a new organizational arrangement. However, at times, the professions (consultants, 
advisors, etc.) advertise a new organizational arrangement to be good and organizations follow 
because of the recommendation of the experts in the area. 
We argue that both intra-organizational benefits and the effects of the field of organizations 
(exogenous effects) are intertwined and are important to understand the change process. An 
interesting question is to identify and describe the main players who project the innovative 
practices at the level of organizational field. By organizational field we mean those organizations 
that, in the aggregate, constitute a recognized area and include key suppliers (outsourcing 
companies, consultants), consumers, regulatory agencies and other organizations that produce 
similar services or products. In other words, organizational field comprises the organizations that 
interact with each other frequently and fatefully. We have developed a model wherein we suggest 
that there are some major players who contribute to the construction of the influential 






(consultants, suppliers, etc.) and national and international professional networks (FMN, 
EuroFM, IFMA) and renowned customer organizations (industry leaders). The professions act as 
mediators and accelerators by providing consultancy services and conducting practical 
conferences, seminars, publications, training programs, etc. Being in a position to interact with 
different organizations in different sectors, they are instrumental in the construction and diffusion 
of practices and innovations at the level of the field of organizations. The innovation may 
originate at the level of an individual organization striving for efficiency or solution to a problem 
or it may be the result of any other change (e.g; change in management) at the level of an 
individual organization or it may stem from the work of professionals (interacting with many 
organizations) at field level. This shows a discursive relationship between an individual 
organization and professions and professional networks at field level. Both interact with each 
other in the creation of an innovation like IFM and TFM. The innovation at an individual 
organization may not get constructed at the field level without the support of professions who 
project this innovation to the field level and theorize / frame the benefits and make coalitions with 
big players (major suppliers and other networks) in the field. In other words, a collective action 
starts at the field level. Theorization is an important stage in the construction of innovative 
practices at the field level. It is a process whereby organizational failings are conceptualized and 
linked to potential solutions. The professions and professional networks theorize change; endorse 
local innovations and shape the construction and diffusion of innovations. The innovation of a big 
player (organization considered industry leaders or central to a sector) or adoption of innovation 
by the big player and the display of benefits may also strengthen the construction of innovation at 
the level of field.  
 
We are interested in using field research to identify the actors, specifically major suppliers, 
consultants, renowned customers, Facilities Management Association Netherlands, to study the 
development and the diffusion of IFM. In other words, it is intended to see how the practice 
stands in relation to our theoretical framework. We want to reflect on the field. 
 
Interviews questions / topics: 
 
- What are the mobilizing forces behind the development towards integrated facilities 
management outsourcing (functional, political or social): external influences (consultants, 
fashions, fads etc.) and internal influences (such as strong leaders, the search for efficiency, 
the call for excellent quality etcetera); 
- What is the philosophy of IFM and TFM? What are shared understandings? 
- How did IFM and TFM start in the Netherlands? Who were the original supplier, customers 
and consultants? 
- What is the current trend in FM at present? Who are the major players in the field and what 
they do? What are the reasons for such a trend? 
- What are the problems being faced in the field? Who are offering the solutions and how? 
Nature, types and operation of the solutions. 
- Any problem/ trend related to control? 
- Is there any role of trust and how do you define it and why is it needed? 
- What consequences this movement has brought? 
- Why are some companies adopting IFM and others not? 
- What are the problems being faced by the companies in practice in implementing IFM or 
TFM? Especially related to management control. 
- What are possible risks (for instance, (potential) opportunism of parties involved and co-
ordination problems concerning the interfirm relationship? 
- How can the risks associated with these important decisions be minimized? 






- How are the changes being managed successfully? 
- What could be the further development? 
- Do we really need these changes? 
- The development of (or the absence of) service level agreements (SLA’s), the clauses that 
they include and the processes through which SLA’s play active roles in governing and 
controlling the activities; the role of senior management and top management; 
- Cultural aspects of facility management and evaluative styles; 
- The role of performance management (for instance balanced scorecards) and incentives with 
regard to the relationship; 
- The role of accounting in governing and controlling the relationship (billing, budgeting?) 
- Is there any change in the role of accounting control as a consequence? How is accounting 
done for FM? 
- Possible unintended consequences of the development towards facility management 
outsourcing; 
 
How we do it? 
To a great extent, the research takes the form of case studies and field studies. We aim to build 
theories on the basis of insights into the developments in real-life organizations. In turn, these 
theories might affect developments in real-life organizations. At core, case studies consist of 
interviews with officers playing an active role in the interview. Since the focus of our research is 
to understand how changes took place in the field of FM and how different actors played their 
role in this process, we would like to conduct interview with managers of 4 major suppliers 
(preferably renowned ones) with only one interviewee from each supplier. The interviewees 
could be managers at the strategic level. We would also like to conduct interviews with at least 
one customer of each the four suppliers. The interviewees at the customer organizations should be 
the managers who are responsible for the FM function. We would also like to conduct two 
interviews with at least two renowned consultants of the facilities management.  
  
Each interview will last about one hour, sometimes a little bit longer, but never exceeding one 
hour and a half. In most cases the interviews will be semi-structured: the researcher is extensively 
prepared, but tries to bring about fluent interaction with the interviewee, enabling him or her to 
bring in topics. The topics the researcher wants to bring in will be communicated to the 
interviewees in advance. The researcher will ask permission to tape-record the interview. He will 
write detailed minutes of the interviews that have to be approved by the interviewees. We would 
come only for interviews.  
 
Furthermore, we would appreciate the accessibility to relevant documents in the form of reports, 
minutes, notes, contracts etc. This is an excellent source of information to study the changes over 
a period of time. We would also appreciate previous industry reports and references to important 
news that tell about the formation of any organization (both academic and professional) related to 
FM. It may also include news about success or failure stories relating to FM implementation. The 
news might have appeared in the professional magazines or in daily newspapers. Any report 
showing growth or decline of the number of FM suppliers over last few years. 
 
Benefits to interviewees: 
We will share the results of our research with you. Further, we will explicitly acknowledge the 










There will be complete confidentiality. It is very important to mention that we would keep all the 
data and information confidential. Our analysis would most probably be published in research 
journal and we shall get your approval before submitting any written material for any publication. 
The researchers will not publish anything without the permission of the organization. If desired, 
we will make the organization unrecognizable by replacing the name by a pseudonym. We will 
not communicate any specific and sensitive information without an explicit permission of the 
organization / person. 
 
Profile of researchers. 
 















































I am writing this email with reference to Ms. …….. email to you few weeks ago regarding my 
research project. Just to summarize that my research focus is on the development of integrated 
facilities management in the Netherlands i.e. on the antecedents, processes and outcomes along 
with the role of key players in the field. Further, since the research is in the area of accounting 
and I am studying management control systems in interfirm relationships, I would also like to 
discuss the topics on control as well as trust between suppliers and clients of IFM. I would highly 
appreciate if you could spare time for an interview during April. The talk would take between one 
hour and one and a half hours. I would like to emphasize that the interview information will be 
used for research purposes and will be kept confidential. I have attached a brief description of my 








































Sr.# Name Description 
1 2010 De Nederlandse Facility Management 
Markt- Een overzicht van cijfers, trends en 
ontwikkelingen by Ellen Gijsbers, Arne van ’t 
Spijker & Jelle van der Kluit 
2010 FM Market in the Netherlands—a joint publication 
of Twyndstra Gudde, Adviseurs & Managers (consultants)  
and FMN (Facility Management Nederland)—a 
professional association.  
2 2008 De Nederlandse Facility Management 
Markt- Een overzicht van cijfers, trends en 
ontwikkelingen by E. Gijsbers & J.P.C van der 
Kluit. 
2008 FM Market in the Netherlands—a joint publication 
of Twyndstra Gudde, Adviseurs & Managers (consultants) 
and FMN (Facility Management Nederland)—a 
professional association.  
3 Facility Management in the Netherlands- Market 
Analysis 2006, by Manon van Herk, Corrina van 
Diepen-Knegjens, Jelle van der Kluit & George 
Maas. 
Twyndstra Gudde, Adviseurs & Managers (consultants).   
4 De markt van Integraal Facility Management in 
Beeld Gebracht- Een verkennend onderzoek naar 
de stand van zaken 2009 by Richard Lennartz & 
Rob Veeke 
A joint publication of Significant-advies- en 
onderzoekbureau (consultants) and FMN (Facility 
Management Nederland)—a professional association.   
5 The view of Facility Managers about Integrated 
Facility Management 2008 by Ellen Gijsbers. 
Master thesis.  
6 Responsiveness of Total Outsourcing of Facility 
Management, 2007 by T. Bensdorp Bsc. 
Master thesis jointly supervised by two academics and a 
manager from a renowned service provider firm. 
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Summary of the Thesis (English) 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to understand governance at two different levels, that is field 
level and interfirm level. In this thesis, governance is broadly conceptualized as a ‘package of 
practices’ that regulates lateral relations regarding the execution and the management of 
facilities services.  
 
For the purpose of investigating field level governance a model of the institutionalization of 
new forms of governance is developed. Such institutionalizing occurs in an interaction 
between construction at field level and adoption and reproduction at the level of 
organizations and interfirm relations. The development of the model was theoretically 
informed by institutional theory, particularly by institutional sociology. Institutional Theory 
in Sociology (ITS) was considered appropriate for the investigation of the field level change 
in governance because it provides insights into the emergence and development of new 
governance forms. This is in contrast with new-institutional economics (such as TCE) which 
would consider the governance forms as already available at field level. In terms of ITS, 
governance, as a package of practices, is an institution because it provides order and meaning 
to a set of activities. 
 
In the field study people from different organizations were interviewed. These organizations 
include service providers, suppliers, client organizations, consultants, professional 
associations and the academic world. Fourteen semi-structured interviews were conducted 
with these different field actors. In addition to interviews, field documents in the form of 
different reports including market reports, presentations by consultants and books were also 
used. Further, the academic literature (between 1995-2010) in the FM field, particularly 
relevant to the Netherlands, was also studied in order to get a more reliable view of the field 
and of the developments in governance. The Internet websites were browsed for collecting 
information about the field of Facilities Management (FM).  
 
For the interfirm level research on governance an interfirm relationship was investigated and 
nineteen semi-structured interviews were conducted with managers occupying different 






annual reports, presentations by managers, roadmaps, performance reports and organization 
charts were also an important source of information. In this field study two rounds of 
interviews were organized in order to follow the developments of the interfirm relationship 
over time. In addition to the interviews, four general meetings were arranged in order to get 
access to the organizations and to discuss the results of the first round of interviews with the 
participants. The organization and management theory, particularly the state of the art related 
to management control and trust in interfirm relationships, was the theoretical foundation of 
this study because the concept of governance at an interfirm level is strongly connected to 
management control and trust. 
 
Theoretical contributions  
The contributions of this thesis add to the knowledge in the academic fields of accounting 
and control as well as facilities management, although the primary focus has been on the 
accounting field. In the accounting and control discipline, this thesis contributes to two 
streams of research, that is an institutional perspective on governance change at field level 
and a management control perspective on control change in interfirm relationships. The 
specific contributions are as follows: 
 
An Institutional Perspective on Control (Governance) Change 
Firstly, this field level research is a first and distinct study that has paid attention to two 
different concepts of rationality in ITS, that is, instrumental and institutional rationality (cf. 
Lounsbury 2008). The instrumental rationality approach was adopted by several institutional 
scholars (e.g; Kraatz and Zajac 1996; Oliver 1991). From the perspective of instrumental 
rationality some actors in the field (called institutional entrepreneurs) bring about 
institutional change by responding to institutional pressures. For instance, in this study two 
field level actors (consultants and service providers) get the character of institutional 
entrepreneurs because of their active participation in the social construction of IFM in the 
field of FM in the Netherlands. The idea of IFM entered the Netherlands through a 
multinational client organization and a multinational service provider. We label these actors 
as field-crossing actors because they are connected to the national and global fields of 






with the local. This field crossing ability enables these actors to bring new ideas, concepts 
and governance to specific fields. Though the idea was brought into the field of FM in the 
Netherlands by an international client organization and a Foreign Service provider, the local 
service providers and consultants pursued the governance concept very actively. The 
institutional entrepreneurs explain IFM as a rational response to the existing conditions, 
characterized by cost reduction pressures in different forms and legal constraints regarding 
lay off employees. They state that the employees get better career prospects when they move 
to the service providers due to IFM because FM is the core business of the service providers. 
They illustrate and spread the success stories of the initial renowned organizations and later 
adopters to underline the importance of IFM.  
 
There are a number of professional associations that are connected to other professional 
associations and the field actors. Some organizations are local, like FMN, F-MEX, and some 
are transnational such as IFMA and EuroFM. The professional associations have mainly been 
interested in the dissemination of knowledge, best practices and new ideas. The professional 
associations are a kind of professional network as described in the theoretical framework 
developed in chapter 4. They have been helpful to the institutional entrepreneurs in the 
construction of IFM because institutional entrepreneurs participate in and contribute to the 
publications and conferences organized by the professional associations.  
 
A perspective of institutional rationality explains the influence of the (broader) institutional 
logics or institutional orders on the actions and understandings of all the field actors 
including institutional entrepreneurs. IFM gains acceptance in the field and guides the 
cognition of the field participants because it resonates with the logics prevailing (logic of 
rationalization) in the field of FM in the Netherlands and also the broader logics of (market 
and corporations). The historical analysis of the academic and professional literature in the 
field of FM in the Netherlands in combination with interviews revealed the dominance of the 
‘logic of rationalization’ (reduction of costs) in the field of FM. The ‘logic of rationalization’ 
has been reinforced over time by the ‘performativity’ of theories of the value chain, lean and 
mean production, and outsourcing. It is added that the ‘logic of rationalization’ has become 






Secondly, this thesis focuses on both the field level as well as on the (inter)firm level and 
thus responds to the call for multi-level analysis (e.g; Hopper & Major; 2007; Lounsbury, 
2008). Further, the construction at field level (O’ Dwyer et al., 2011) rather than adoption at 
the organizational level is investigated, so the contributions add to the scarce number of ITS 
based studies in accounting that focused on the field level (e.g; Dillard et al. 2004, and 
Hopper and Major, 2007; Ezzamel et al., 2007;  O’Dwyer et al., 2011). Besides, this research 
also reacts to the calls for more studies on institutional entrepreneurship (e.g; Garud, Hardy, 
and Maguire 2007). 
  
Thirdly, the idea underlying the institutional logics literature (e.g; Lounsbury & Crumley, 
2007; Thornton, 2002) is that practices such as governance change and new practices 
emerge because underlying logics of the field change. However, this thesis demonstrates that 
different governance forms and practices (FM staff department concept, SSC and IFM / 
TFM)) emerge over time without change in the dominant logics. This is because all the 
governance forms are compatible with the dominant logic. The emergence of new 
governance forms occurred over time in the field of FM though there has been only one 
dominant institutional logic. Different practices co-exist in the organizational field at a 
particular moment in time because they are all compatible with the dominant institutional 
logics. Their appropriateness may be dependent on other factors such as size, ownership or 
private vs. public companies. For example, the big organizations consider IFM or a demand 
management organization to be a suitable governance choice, while governmental and non-
profit organizations opt for an FM department concept. This research has revealed that 
historically the logic of rationalization has been dominant and that the emergence of a 
variety of governance practices may not necessarily be because of different institutional 
logics. This finding has an implication for the ITS regarding the explanation of practice 
variation in a field. 
 
Lastly, this research confirms the criticism (e.g; Hirsch and Lounsbury 1997; Palmer, 
Jenning, and Zhou 1993) of the dichotomy between the technical and the institutional 
environment (e.g; Tolbert & Zucker, 1983) which entails that the early organizations 






technical environment) and that the later adopter organizations are legitimacy-seeking 
(emphasizing the institutional environment). As this research shows, it is the institutional 
rationality and institutional logics that guide the decisions of both early and later adopter 
organizations. In this case, the logic of rationalization determines both the dominance of the 
efficiency criterion and what is considered to be efficient.  
  
An Interfirm Perspective on Control (Governance) Change 
This research contributes to theory development on the shaping of governance in interfirm 
transactional relationships. It responds to the calls for longitudinal research into the 
(co)evolution of accounting, control and trust (e.g; Free 2008; Caglio and Ditillo 2008; 
Gulati 2010). Particularly, the research theorizes the interaction between implicit control 
(trust) and explicit control; such an interaction is embedded in the historical development of 
the organizational relationship. The research demonstrates that accounting and control 
practices serve the building of trust. Therefore, accounting and control practices not only are 
safeguarding and incentivizing devices, but also help building cooperative attitudes in the 
relationship. These practices also help to create commitments with the partners involved. 
Consistent with prior theoretical work (Vosselman and Van der Meer-Kooistra, 2009) our 
field study reveals that trust positively influences the institution and practicing of formal 
controls, and vice versa. But as soon as trust is built it starts to become an (implicit) control 
in itself. It produces cooperative frames and, thus, commitments by the partners. Explicit 
control interacts with implicit control.  
 
But the study also reveals how power may become important. In contrast with prior literature 
(e.g; Gulati 1995a; Gulati 1995b; Vélez, Sánchez, and Álvarez-Dardet 2008), this research 
suggests that trust in a long term relationship may become questionable and may not develop 
further. It may change into a power relationship. Of critical importance are the backgrounds 
and norms and values of the boundary spanners of organizations in the interfirm relationship. 
A mismatch between the values and norms of the boundary spanners may result in power 







This research also points out that the production of “thin” trust through a contractual 
agreement on safeguards, constraints and incentives for the purpose of aligning interests, and 
the production of “thick” trust by signaling commitment to the relationship (see Vosselman 
and Van der Meer-Kooistra, 2009) cannot be isolated from each other. In the field study, the 
(re)creation of safeguards, constraints and incentives in the context of interest alignment 












































Dit onderzoek beoogt inzicht te verkrijgen in ‘governance’ op een tweetal niveau’s: het niveau 
van hetFM veld (field level) in Nederland en het niveau van een interorganisationele relatie. 
Daarbij wordt ‘governance’  breed geconceptualiseerd als een ‘pakket van praktijken’ dat laterale 
relaties rond de regeling en de uitvoering van facilitaire dienstverlening reguleert.  
 
Ten behoeve van het veldonderzoek is een model van de institutionalisering van nieuwe vormen 
van governance ontwikkeld.  Een dergelijke institutionalisering vindt plaats in een wisselwerking 
van constructie op veldniveau en adoptie op het niveau van organisaties en organisatorische 
samenwerkingsverbanden.  De ontwikkeling van het model is theoretisch gevoed vanuit de 
institutionele theorie, met name vanuit de sociologische variant van deze theorie. Overwogen is 
dat de nieuw -institutionele economische theorie governance structuren beziet als instituties die 
reeds beschikbaar zijn op het niveau van het veld en niet als ‘institutions in the making’. Nieuw-
institutionele sociologische theorie levert daarentegen inzichten op over hoe nieuwe vormen van 
‘governance’ ontstaan en hoe ze zich ontwikkelen.  Zo’n nieuwe vorm van ‘governance’ wordt 
beschouwd als een institutie omdat het stabiliteit en betekenis geeft aan een set van praktijken. 
 
 In het veldonderzoek zijn diverse personen uit diverse organisaties geinterviewd. Tot de 
organisaties behoren de leveranciers van diensten, klantorganisaties, consultants, professionele 
associaties en de academische wereld.  Er werden in totaal veertien semi-gestructureerde 
interviews uitgevoerd. Bovendien werden documenten (in de vorm van diverse rapporten, 
waaronder rapporten over de marktontwikkelingen) bestudeerd, werden presentaties van 
consultants bijgewoond en werden boeken bestudeerd.  Om meer betrouwbaar inzicht te 
verkrijgen in de ontwikkelingen op  het veld van FM werd wetenschappelijke literatuur uit de 
FM discipline uit de periode 1995-2010 bestudeerd.  Voorts werden internet sites bezocht om 
additionele informatie te vergaren.  
 
Ten behoeve van het interorganisationele onderzoek (‘interfirm level’) is een ‘interfirm’-relatie 
onderzocht. Negentien semi-gestructureerde interviews werden uitgevoerd met managers op 
verschillende hierarchische posities in diverse organisaties. Documenten in diverse vormen, 
zoals jaarlijkse rapporten, presentaties door managers, ‘roadmaps’, rapportages over 





‘performance’ en organisatieschema’s waren belangrijke bronnen van informatie. Er werden 
twee rondes met interviews georganiseerd, zodat de ontwikkelingen in de ‘interfirm’-relatie in de 
loop van de tijd gevolgd konden worden. Bovenop de interviews werd een viertal bijeenkomsten 
georganiseerd. Die bijeenkomsten dienden om de toegang tot de organisaties te 
vergemakkelijken en om de resultaten uit de eerste ronde van interviews met de participanten te 
bespreken en te bediscussieren.  
 
De theoretische basis voor deze interorganisationele studie is gezocht in theorie over 
management control en vertrouwen (‘trust’). Governance blijkt op het niveau van een 
interorganisationele relatie sterk verbonden met het beinvloeden van partijen met behulp ven 
expliciete en impliciete controlmechanismen. 
 
Theoretische bijdragen 
Deze studie draagt bij aan zowel de academische ‘accounting and control’-discipline als de 
academische discipline van het facilitair management.  De focus heeft evenwel gelegen op de 
accounting and control discipline. Meer in het bijzonder draagt deze studie bij aan een tweetal 
onderzoekstromingen binnen die discipline: institutionele perspectieven op veranderingen in 
governance op ‘field level’ en perspectieven op veranderingen in management control binnen 
een interorganisationele relatie. Meer in het bijzonder zijn de bijdragen de volgende. 
 
In relatie tot het veldonderzoek 
1. Het veldonderzoek is een eerste onderscheiden studie binnen de accounting en control 
discipline die aandacht besteedt aan een tweetal concepten van rationaliteit, namelijk 
instrumentele en institutionele rationaliteit ( Lounsbury, 2008). De benadering op basis van 
instrumentele rationaliteit werd eerder buiten de accounting and control discipline gekozen 
door diverse onderzoekers op het gebied van institutionele theorie (e.g;. Kraatz and Zjac, 
1996; Oliver 1991). Toegepast op deze studie laat de instrumentele  benadering van 
rationaliteit een aantal actoren in het veld (‘institutionele ondernemers’) zien die als gevolg 
van institutionele druk veranderingen doorvoeren. Zo blijkt bijvoorbeeld dat adviseurs 
(consultants) en leveranciers van diensten door hun actieve bijdrage aan de constructie van 
zogenaamd IFM  de rol van institutionele ondernemer in het Nederlandse FM-veld 





verwerven. Het idee van IFM (Integrated Facilities Management) werd in Nederland 
geimporteerd door een multinationale klantorganisatie en een multinationale dienstverlener. 
Deze actoren krijgen in de studie het ‘label’ van ‘field-crossing actors’; zij verbinden the 
‘local’ met de ‘global’, het internationale veld met het Nederlands veld. Zij brengen nieuwe 
concepten van ‘governance’ naar het Nederlandse veld.  Locale dienstverleners en 
‘consultants’ blijken het idee van IFM snel te adopteren en verder te ontwikkelen. Meer en 
meer wordt  IFM door de institutionele ondernemers gepositioneerd als een rationeel 
antwoord op bestaande omstandigheden. Die omstandigheden  worden onder andere 
gekarakteriseerd door een grote druk on kosten te verlagen en door wettelijke beperkingen 
rond het ontslagrecht. De institutionele ondernemers argumenteren dat werknemers betere 
carriereperspectieven krijgen als zij in dienst komen van dienstverleners; IFM biedt daartoe 
de mogelijkheden omdat het de facilitaire dienstverlening volledig tot de ‘core business’van 
die dienstverleners maakt.  De institutionele ondernemers verspreiden de succesverhalen van 
initiele (en latere)  ‘adopters’  van IFM om de rationaliteit van IFM te onderstrepen. De 
voortgaande ontwikkeling van IFM blijkt ook te worden ondersteund door een aantal 
professionele organisaties (FMN, F-MEX, IFMA, EuroFM). Deze organisaties verspreiden 
kennis, nieuwe ideeen en ‘best practices’. Dat geschiedt o.a. via publicaties en conferenties.  
Deze organisaties zijn een kern van een professioneel netwerk zoals dat in het hart ligt van 
het  model dat in hoofdstuk 4 van deze thesis wordt ontwikkeld.  
 
De instrumentele rationaliteit is dus de rationaliteit van de keuze voor IFM; een rationaliteit 
die sterk wordt beinvloed door de actie van institutionele ondernemers. Maar die acties 
worden ook beinvloed door een achterliggende institutionele logica. Vanuit een perspectief 
van institutionele rationaliteit wordt een verklaring  gegeven van de invloed van die (bredere) 
institutionele logica op de acties en inzichten van de actoren in het veld, inclusief de 
institutionele ondernemers. Het blijkt dat IFM als rationeel instrument wordt geaccepteerd 
omdat het resoneert met de dominante institutionele logica van de rationalisatie. Dit wordt 
geconcludeerd uit een historische analyse op basis van academische en professionele FM-
literatuur en uit interviews met diverse participanten. Kostenreductie  blijkt een 
allesoverheersend motief. De ‘logica van de rationalisatie’  is in de loop van de tijd versterkt 
door de ‘performativiteit’ van theorieen over de ‘value chain’, over ‘lean and mean 





production’ en over uitbesteding.  Ook sterke concurrentie en de financiele crisis hebben de 
‘logic of rationalization’ versterkt.  
 
2. Deze studie is een voorbeeld van een ‘multi-level’-analyse. In dat verband beantwoordt de 
studie aan oproepen van diverse ondescheiden onderzoekers (e.g; Hopper & Major; 2007; 
Lounsbury, 2008).  Een belangrijke  nadruk ligt op de vraag hoe een nieuwe institutie op 
veldniveau wordt geconstrueerd. Vorige studies concentreerden zich meer op de adoptie van 
een institutie op het niveau van een organisatie of het niveau van een organisatorisch 
samenwerkingsverband. Uitzonderingen daarop vormen Dillard et al. 2004, Hopper and 
Major, 2007;  Ezzamel et al., 2007;  and O’Dwyer et al., 2011. Door de aandacht voor de 
constructie op veldniveau is deze studie ook een antwoord op de roep om institutionele 
ondernemers meer in de analyse te betrekken  (o.a. Garud, Hardy and Maguire, 2007).  
 
3. Een van de veronderstellingen in de literatuur over de ‘institutional logics’  (e.g; Lounsbury 
& Crumley, 2007; Thornton, 2002)  is dat praktijken of instituties veranderen omdat de 
onderliggende logica verandert. Deze studie laat echter zien dat governance instituties 
veranderen zonder een verandering van de onderliggende logica. Alle beschikbare 
governance praktijken en instituties blijken in overeenstemming te zijn met de dominante 
logica van de rationalisatie. IFM als set van praktijken ontwikkelt zich zonder dat er sprake is 
van een verandering in onderliggende logica. Deze bevinding heeft betekenis voor de op de 
institutionele theorie gebaseerde verklaring van variaties in instituties in de praktijk.  
 
4. Dit onderzoek onderstreept de kritiek (e.g; Hirsch and Lounsbury 1997; Palmer, Jenning, and 
Zhou 1993) op de veronderstelde dichotomie tussen de technische en institutionele omgeving 
(e.g; Tolbert & Zucker, 1983) van de organisatie of het organisatorisch 
samenwerkingsverband, een dichotomie die aanleiding heeft gegeven tot een onderscheid 
tussen efficiency-zoekend (vooral de early-adopters) en legitimiteit-zoekend (de ‘late 
adopters’) gedrag van adopterende organisaties. als het gaat om de adoptie van nieuwe 
‘governance’-structuren. Dit onderzoek suggereert dat institutionele rationaliteit (en dus 
institutionele logica) de beslisisngen van zowel de ‘early’ als ‘late adopters’ van nieuwe 





governance instituties stuurt. De dominantie van de logica van de rationalisatie bepaalt dat 
het criterium van efficiency dominant is.   
 
In relatie tot het onderzoek naar de control in een interorganisationele relatie 
5. Dit onderzoek draagt ook bij aan theorieontwikkeling over de vormgeving van governance in 
een interorganisationele relatie. Het beantwoordt oproepen van diverse onderzoekers (e.g; 
Free 2008; Caglio and Ditillo 2008; Gulati 2010) tot het doen van meer longitudinaal 
onderzoek naar de (co)evolutie van control en vertrouwen. De theorievorming betreft in de 
eerste plaats een interactie tussen impliciete control (trust)  en expliciete control; een 
interactie die is ingebed in de historische ontwikkeling van een interorganisationele relatie.  
Dit onderzoek demonstreert dat accounting en control praktijken dienstbaar zijn aan de 
opbouw van vertrouwen. Accounting en control praktijken zijn daarmee niet alleen 
functioneel ten behoeve van waarborging en prikkeling, maar helpen ook een cooperatieve en 
betrouwbare samenwerkingsrelatie met een commitment van de partners te handhaven.  
Consistent met eerder theoretisch werk (Vosselman en Van der Meer-Kooistra, 2009) 
demonstreert deze studie dat vertrouwen de creatie van formele control structuren en 
praktijken positief beinvloedt , en omgekeerd. Maar zo gauw het vertrouwen is opgebouwd 
ontwikkelt het zich ook tot een (impliciete) control in zichzelf. Het bevordert cooperatieve 
vensters op het samenwerkingsverband (en daarmee commitment van de partners). Expliciete 
control blijkt te interacteren met impliciete control.   
 
Maar ook macht wordt in de beschouwing betrokken. In tegenstelling tot veel van de 
bestaande literatuur (e.g; Gulati 1995a; Gulati 1995b; Vélez, Sánchez, and Álvarez-Dardet 
2008) suggeeert dit onderzoek dat een bestaande vertrouwensrelatie in een 
interorganisationele relatie kan veranderen in een machtsrelatie. Kritische daarbij zijn de 
achtergrond en de waarden en normen van de ‘boundary spanners’ . Een ‘mismatch’ van 
achtergronden, waarden en normen kan een vertrouwensrelatie doen veranderen in een 
machtsrelatie. In zo’n machtsrelatie produceert expliciete beheersing geen vertrouwen, maar 
wantrouwen. 
Het onderzoek laat ook zien dat de productie van enerzijds ‘dun vertrouwen’ via contractueel 
vastgelegde waarborgen, beperkingen en prikkels (tegen de achtergrond van ‘interest 





alignment’) en van anderzijds ‘dik vertrouwen’ via relationele signalering niet geisoleerd 
kunnen worden. In de case study blijkt het (her)ontwerp van waarborgen, beperkingen en 
prikkels te worden aangedreven door zowel zorgen over onterechte toe-eigening, als door 
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